Szeto Chak Mei v. Chan Lam Shan and Others

Read the full judgment text of HCMP 836/2012 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 3 November 2015.

1. This is an application by the defendants to file further witness statements in this action.

Cited by 1 case · Cites 1 case

Case No.HCMP 836/2012
Court
High Court CFI
Date03 Nov 2015
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCMP 836/2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 836 OF 2012

______________________

  IN THE MATTER OF All that 1/1,300th part or share of and in The Remaining Portion of Section A of New Kowloon Marine Lot No 25 (Flat B on 16th Floor, No 120 Broadway, MeiFoo Sun Chuen, Kowloon)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Order 113, Rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A

______________________

BETWEEN    
  SZETO CHAK MEI, the sole administratrix of the unadministered properties of the late SZETO CHIU, deceased Plaintiff
  and
  CHAN LAM SHAN(陳藍珊) 1st Defendant
  SZETO YAN YEE(司徒欣頤) 2nd Defendant
  SZETO KEI YAN(司徒基仁) 3rd Defendant
  KEUNG MAN SHAN 4th Defendant
  (transliterated as 姜雯珊)
  ALL OTHER PERSONS NOW IN OCCUPATION OF FLAT B, 16TH FLOOR, NO 120 BROADWAY, MEI FOO CHUEN, KOWLOON 5th Defendant

______________________

Before: Hon G Lam J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 3 November 2015
Date of Decision: 3 November 2015

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D E C I S I O N

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1.This is an application by the defendants to file further witness statements in this action.

2.The trial of the action concerns a property in Mei Foo Sun Tsuen.  The plaintiff is the administratrix of the estate of the registered owner of the property.

3.The 1st defendant is the former wife of one of the sons of the registered owner.  The other defendants are persons living in the property who do not claim a proprietary interest of their own in the property and they reside there as part of the family of the 1 st defendant. 

4.The 1st defendant’s case is broadly that by reason of certain assurances and promises made to her by the registered owner (that is, her former father‑in‑law) during his life time, and by his wife, Madam Lui, a proprietary estoppel had arisen in her favour entitling her to treat the property as her own or, at any rate, to continue to occupy the property.

5.The trial has been set down for some time now for five days to commence on 26 November 2015.  A direction was given on 13 May 2014 for the exchange of witness statements within 56 days.  An unless order was made on 29 October 2014 requiring the 1st defendant to exchange witness statements by 10 December 2014, on which witness statements were eventually exchanged.

6.The 1st defendant took out a summons to file a supplemental witness statement on 20 July 2015.  Prior to that, as the correspondence in the bundle before me shows, the 1st defendant had asked the plaintiff if she wished to file a supplemental witness statement, in which case the 1st defendant proposed that each side could do so by consent within 14 days.  The plaintiff did not indicate that she wished to file any supplemental witness statement.

7.By my order on 20 August 2015, I granted leave to the 1st defendant to file her supplemental witness statement, but a number of paragraphs were required to be redacted, leaving only six paragraphs in the supplemental statement which, together, occupied about one page in Chinese.

8.The 1st defendant’s supplemental witness statement, as redacted, deals with a very limited of number of matters.  The paragraphs excluded were opposed by the plaintiff on various grounds, including that the trial was imminent and that new investigation would have to be conducted and possibly new witnesses called.

9.On that occasion I gave leave also for the plaintiff to file a supplemental witness statement “in reply” within 21 days.  On 9 September 2015, the plaintiff filed a supplemental witness statement of 12 pages.  In my opinion, most of the content of that witness statement is not a reply to the 1st defendant’s supplemental witness statement.  What the plaintiff’s supplemental witness statement seeks to deal with are either matters that were raised long before the 1st defendant’s supplemental witness statement, or are new matters raised by plaintiff herself for the first time but not strictly in reply to 1st defendant’s supplemental witness statement.  For example, the 1st defendant’s allegation that her parents‑in‑law wished to transfer the property to her and her husband, and that the plaintiff had telephoned her in the early part of 1990 to tell her that the plaintiff’s father (that is, the 1st defendant’s father-in-law) wanted to transfer the property to them, was pleaded in paragraph 7 (3) of the defence and counterclaim filed in June 2013, and also mentioned in paragraph 19 of the 1st defendant’s first witness statement.  It was not at all a new allegation raised in the 1st defendant’s supplemental witness statement.  Yet paragraphs 2 to 8 of the plaintiff’s supplemental statement deal extensively with that topic.

10.As for section C of the plaintiff’s supplemental statement, it seems to me to go into an all‑out attack on the relationship between the 1st defendant and her former mother-in-law which, in my view, cannot be justified under the cloak of a reply to paragraph 11 of the 1st defendant’s supplemental witness statement.  In fact, it is difficult to identify any part of the plaintiff’s supplemental statement that can properly be regarded as a reply to the 1st defendant’s supplemental statement. 

11.In my view, it is an abuse of the liberty given to file a supplemental witness statement in reply. 

12.In response, the 1st defendant has at first objected but subsequently tried to introduce further evidence, including some that had specifically been excluded at the last hearing by way of further witness statements under a summons dated 7 October 2015.  The 1st defendant seeks leave not only to file a supplemental witness statement for each of herself and the 3rd defendant, but also to file a witness statement of a new witness, that is, the 2nd defendant.

13.The trial will be starting in three weeks’ time.  The trial bundles are due to be lodged, under my direction, on 5 November, that is, the day after tomorrow.  All these attempts to put in new evidence by way of supplemental witness statements have come very late. Moreover, the matters involved do not go directly to the issues.  They go to certain alleged incidents, habits, emotions and opinions within the family that are said to make the 1st defendant’s case of the assurance or promise either more or less plausible as the case may be. The court has to be vigilant, particularly in this kind of case involving a family dispute where the contestants may have an inexhaustible mine of memories or impressions of all kinds of events that had happened in the family going a long way back.  The court needs to guard against having limitless rounds of evidence, or allowing the evidence to get out of hand.  Ensuring that any supplemental evidence is sufficiently concise, probative and necessary is especially important at a stage so close to the trial as here.  The court has to maintain the discipline of case management even if the parties consent to introduce new matters, because of the potential impact on the conduct of the trial.

14.In the present case, it seems to me that if the plaintiff wishes to adduce a supplemental witness statement of her own covering the matters in her supplemental witness statement, she ought properly to apply for leave to do so and not to have “slipped it in” as purported evidence in reply. 

15.It follows that the plaintiff’s supplemental witness statement ought to be expunged, and I so order.

16.The 1st defendant’s application is premised on the plaintiff’s supplemental witness statement and, as such, is at best premature.  That summons is therefore adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.

(Submissions as to costs)

17.Costs of the hearing be to the 1st defendant, in any event.  The 1st defendant’s costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.  Subject to that, the costs of the 1st defendant’s summons be reserved.

  (Godfrey Lam)
  Judge of the Court of First Instance
  High Court

Mr Jeffrey Li, instructed by Christine M Koo & Ip, for the plaintiff

Mr Paul H M Leung, instructed by C L Chow & Macksion Chan, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the 1st defendant