Francis Jacqueline v. Hospital Authority
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 235/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 December 2015.
1. The applicant is the wife of a Mr Francis, Paul Leonard. She claims she has the power of attorney of Mr Francis since 1999.
Cited by 1 case
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HCAL 235/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 235 OF 2015 _______________
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ A. Introduction 1.The applicant is the wife of a Mr Francis, Paul Leonard. She claims she has the power of attorney of Mr Francis since 1999. 2.On 30 November 2015, the applicant made an ex parte application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus against the Hospital Authority (“the HA”)[1] to bring Mr Francis before the court to justify his detention by the HA. The application was supported by the applicant’s affidavit dated 30 November 2015. 3.In gist, it is the applicant’s position that on 9 November 2015, Mr Francis was without reasons and basis taken by the staff of HA through deception to a hospital at No 8 Chung Yan Road, Lantau Island. She has since then been unable to find or locate Mr Francis. She has made various visits and phone calls to the hospital without any success in seeking to see or talk to Mr Francis. She alleges that she was blocked by the staff in the hospital and even assaulted when she sought to look for her husband. 4.The applicant emphasises in her affidavit and in court that Mr Francis suffers no medical conditions that require any detention by the HA in a hospital and, in any event, he has never trusted the HA and would not have agreed to be hospitalised in a hospital under the HA. 5.Upon receiving her application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, and after clarifying why she used a PO Box address in her affidavit instead of a residential address as generally required under Order 41, rule 1(4) of the Rules of High Court (Cap 4A) (“the Rules”), the court on 11 December 2015 directed that a writ of habeas corpus be issued and the applicant and the HA shall attend the court on 23 December 2015 for the return of the writ and directions. The court further directed the applicant to file and serve the writ and the notice to make a return (“the Notice”) on the respondent, and gave leave to the applicant for the time being to use the PO Box address stated in the affidavit for the purpose of Order 41, rule 1(1). 6.Pursuant to the directions, the applicant issued the writ dated 14 December 2015 and served it on HA. She has apparently not served the Notice. 7.This is the hearing of the return of the writ of habeas corpus. B. The HA’s return and evidence 8.A respondent is by the issue of a writ of habeas corpus required to produce before the court the person alleged to be detained and make a formal return to the writ: section 22A(7) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) (“HCO”). 9.The return must be filed in accordance with the requirements prescribed in Order 54, rule 7 of the Rules, which is to have it “indorsed on or annexed to the writ”. See also: Hong Kong White Book 2016, paragraph 54/1/7. 10.A formal return must be filed even though the respondent is not possible to comply with the writ, specifying the reasons why it cannot be done: section 22A(8) of the HCO. In such circumstances where the respondent does not have the person in detention as alleged, the correct practice is for the respondent to file a “Nil Return”: Re W [2006] 1 HKC 468 at paragraph 4, per Hartmann J (as the NPJ then was). It is only when the return is filed that the court can inquire into the circumstances pertaining to the detention, if any: Re Meng Ching Hai [1990] 1 HKC 185 (CA) at 186H - 187A, per Cons VP. 11.In the present case, the HA has made a Nil Return dated 23 December 2015, which states as follows:
12.The HA has also filed an affirmation by the same Dr Ma dated 21 December 2015. The affirmation reads as follows:
13.Thus, in substance, the HA’s position is that:
14.The Return has been read into record by Ms Souza for the HA at the hearing. The HA now asks the court to discharge the writ. See: Order 54, rule 8. C. This habeas corpus application 15.The question that the court has to look at on the return of a writ of habeas corpus is whether the applicant can demonstrate a prima facie case of unlawful detention, which then requires the respondent to prove to a civil standard by clear and cogent evidence that the detention is lawful or that there is no detention: Re W, supra, at paragraph 51. 16.In the present case, I am satisfied with the evidence before this court that Mr Francis is no longer in the custody of the HA at any of its hospitals and he had not been unlawfully detained during the period between 9 and 18 November 2015. I will explain why. 17.The applicant’s position (as expressed in her affidavit and in her oral submissions in court) in summary amounts to accusing that the HA and its staff at the Hospital had for unknown reasons taken Mr Francis into detention and custody, and had denied her any access to him. In doing so, the HA staff had resorted to “deception” and “false pretences”. 18.These are very serious allegations. 19.The HA is a statutory authority established to manage all the public hospitals in Hong Kong, and Dr Ma is a consultant of the A&E Department and the Emergency Medical Ward of the Hospital. Further, it must be noted that the applicant has also confirmed with the court that she has made numerous reports to the police concerning the missing of Mr Francis and her allegations that the HA and the staff at the Hospital had taken him unlawfully. There is no evidence that the police’s investigations have revealed anything that remotely supports these allegations. 20.In the circumstances, when these matters are looked at together, and with nothing but bare assertions (albeit put in an affidavit), I am not satisfied that there is even a prima facie case that the HA and its staff would in discharge of their duties have acted in concert to detain Mr Francis in the Hospital (or any other hospitals under the HA) for no or no good medical reasons as now alleged by the applicant. This is particularly so when the HA through Dr Ma’s affirmation has confirmed the matters set out above. 21.Alternatively, even if a prima facie case had been demonstrated, for the same above reasons, I am satisfied that there is clear and cogent evidence to show that (a) Mr Francis was not in any form of unlawful detention during the period between 9 and 18 November 2015 (as he was admitted to the Hospital for medical treatments); and (b) he has not been in any of the HA’s hospitals since 18 November 2015. In other words, I am satisfied that the HA did not at the time of this application and also does not now have the custody of Mr Francis, let alone any unlawful detention. 22.For these reasons, I would discharge the writ of habeas corpus. D. Conclusion 23.I will discharge the writ of habeas corpus with no order as to costs. 24.Lastly, the court would like to register its gratitude for the assistance rendered by Ms Souza through her very helpful skeleton.
The applicant appeared in person Ms Denise Souza, instructed by Mayer Brown JSM, for the respondent [1] I should note that, as rightly pointed out by Ms Souza for the HA, the proper respondent that should be named in the writ of habeas corpus should be the Chief Executive of the HA, instead of the HA itself. | |||||||||||||||||||||
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