Wong Siu Pui v. Lau Tak Chi
Read the full judgment text of DCPI 2711/2013 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 31 December 2015.
1. This is the plaintiff’s claim for personal injury against the defendant resulting from a traffic accident which, the plaintiff says, was caused by the defendant’s negligent driving. The defendant disputes both liability and quantum.
Cited by 1 case · Cites 3 cases
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DCPI 2711/2013 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 2711 OF 2013 --------------------------------------
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---------------------------- JUDGMENT ---------------------------- INTRODUCTION 1.This is the plaintiff’s claim for personal injury against the defendant resulting from a traffic accident which, the plaintiff says, was caused by the defendant’s negligent driving. The defendant disputes both liability and quantum. 2.The accident occurred at about 11:30 pm on 21 October 2011 on Ching Cheung Road near Caritas Medical Centre in Sham Shui Po. The collision, which took place on the third (outermost) lane of the road westbound, was between the plaintiff’s motor cycle (a scooter) and the defendant’s medium goods vehicle(“mgv”). Each party put the blame on the other for the accident. Subsequently, only the defendant was charged by the police for careless driving but he was acquitted after trial. The records of the criminal proceedings, together with the statements, photographs and sketches taken by the police, are included as part of the trial bundle for the present civil claim. THE ISSUES 3.In view of the different accounts given by the plaintiff and the defendant respectively, as far as the liability is concerned, the major issues are as follows:-
4.There is no dispute that the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the accident. Subject to the issue of liability, in relation to quantum the issues are as follows:-
THE ISSUES ON LIABILITY (i) How the accident happened Evidence 5.On the issue of liability, there is the plaintiff’s own evidence on the one hand and that of the defendant and his employer Mr Au (the front seat passenger of the mgv) on the other. All the three witnesses adopted their respective witness statements as their evidence-in-chief and supplemented them with oral evidence in court. 6.The evidence of the plaintiff, in summary, is as follows. He was at the time riding the scooter from Shatin to the accident location through the Lion Rock Tunnel, intending to return home in Tuen Mun. Before the accident, he had been travelling on the second (middle) lane at about 60 km/h. Ahead of him were an engineering vehicle(工程車)and a trawler[2], the distance between the latter two was about a car length. Seeing that the said two vehicles were moving at only about 20 to 30 km/h and that there was no traffic on his right, he decided to overtake them by cutting into the third lane. When he was on the third lane and approaching the engineering vehicle, much to his apprehension the latter moved close to the dividing line between the second lane and the third lane. He sounded the horn and reduced his speed to about 50 km/h. Seeing that the driver of the engineering vehicle signalled him to pass, he accelerated to 60 km/h again and overtook both the engineering vehicle and the trawler. When the engineering vehicle and the trawler were already some distance away, he intended to cut back into the second lane. However, he then perceived a “black shadow” following him and heard some noise from behind. He found that it was the mgv approaching. He was too frightened to react by either speeding off or cutting to the left. Shortly after, the scooter was hit at the rear. He fell and rolled on the ground. When he eventually stopped, he found himself sitting with his back leaning against the stone divider in the middle of the road and was unable to stand up. The place where he was sitting was about 10 metres away from the rear of the mgv. His case is that when the collision occurred his scooter was still travelling in the middle of the third lane. It is also his case that the scooter was hit by the middle of the front bumper of the mgv. Later, he saw the defendant and Mr Au walking towards him from the mgv. He asked them who the driver was and why he hit him. He did not hear either the defendant or Mr Au blaming him for the accident. Subsequently, he was admitted to the hospital. 7.The evidence of the defendant, in summary, is as follows. He was driving the mgv going from Kowloon Bay to the airport and his employer Mr Au was sitting on the front passenger seat. Before the accident, he was doing 60 km/h on the second lane of Ching Cheung Road. He saw the plaintiff’s scooter following the two slow vehicles emerging from the nearside lane (the first lane) to the second lane and the three vehicles were then doing about 40 to 50 km/h. The reason why the three aforesaid vehicles had to change to the second lane was that the first lane ahead was blocked by two vehicles with flashing arrow signs(箭咀車)[3]. Therefore, he slowed down to a similar speed as theirs and maintained a space of about a car length from the scooter. Having followed the scooter for about 8 seconds and seeing that the latter had no intention to overtake the vehicles in front, he then accelerated to 60 km/h and at the same time cut into the third lane. However, when the mgv had about 90% of its body inside the third lane, the plaintiff’s scooter without any warning or signal cut sharply in his front and then decelerated. The defendant immediately braked and steered to the right, but the left front bumper of the mgv still collided with the right side of the scooter. As a result, the plaintiff fell off between the third and the second lanes. When the scooter was entering the third lane, its speed was about the same as the mgv. When the plaintiff decelerated, the scooter had not yet totally entered the third lane. It was the defendant’s case that had the plaintiff not decelerated after cutting, the collision would not have happened. The defendant disagreed that he was tailgating the plaintiff and attempting to force the latter to let him pass. After the accident, the defendant asked the plaintiff, “Why did you cut lane and not put the indicator on?” The plaintiff did not reply. He then said, “You cut into the third lane and brake again”. The plaintiff also did not respond. 8.The defence witness Mr Au said that after the accident he went to the rear of the mgv and saw that the plaintiff was some distance away from the mgv crawling slowly toward the stone divider. The plaintiff asked him, “Why your vehicle hit me?” He replied, “Why were you so carelessly cutting lane?” As regards the cause of the accident, in summary, Mr Au said that the mgv was originally doing about 60 km/h on the second lane when he first noticed the trawler and the engineering vehicle coming from behind on the first lane. The two aforesaid vehicles had moved fast, overtook the mgv and cut in whilst the mgv slowed down to about 55 km/h. The mgv had followed the engineering vehicle on the second lane for just a while before it started to cut into the third lane with a view to overtake the engineering vehicle and the trawler. That was when the space between the mgv and the engineering vehicle was less than 15m. It was only then that he noticed that the scooter was following the engineering vehicle on the second lane. He was not clear about ever seeing the scooter cutting from the first lane. Both the engineering vehicle and the scooter were travelling faster than the mgv. After the mgv had moved on the third lane for about the distance between two lamp posts, the scooter suddenly and without any warning cut into that lane and then reduced its speed, with its brake light flashed once. The mgv also braked and steered to the right but was unable to avoid the collision, having the corner of its bumper hit the tail of the scooter. Had the scooter not braked after entering the third lane, the accident would not have happened. Assessment of the plaintiff’s evidence 9.There are a number of difficulties with the evidence of the plaintiff. Firstly, he had given different versions on material aspects of the incident. Examples include the following:-
10.Secondly, there are a number of inherent improbabilities in the plaintiff’s account of the accident:-
11.Thirdly, the plaintiff agreed under cross-examination that he was myopic and astigmatic, both of which to the degree of about 1 dioptre. He also admitted that he had not worn any corrective glasses at the time of the accident as required by his driving licence. Besides, he has hearing problem, a fact which is clearly shown (and the plaintiff admitted) during the course of his testimony. There were many occasions when he did not hear questions from counsel and the bench. In these regards, I note that the accident occurred late at night and when the plaintiff was wearing a helmet of a type which covered his ears[18]. Although this does not impact upon his credibility as witness, I have reservation whether his evidence on distance and position and generally what he saw at the relevant time is reliable at all. Based on common sense and experience, I find it more likely than not that his impaired eye-sight would have affected his observation and assessment of the traffic condition, especially in case of an emergency which occurred late at night, even with the presence of street lights. Had it been otherwise, there would not be any need for the condition on his driving licence that he should wear collective glasses. Therefore, even assuming that the plaintiff had, as he said, checked the mirror before cutting into the third lane, I have reservation whether he could see the images in the mirror clearly. Assessment of the defence evidence 12.As regards the defendant, I am alive to the fact that his evidence is not entirely satisfactory. I am also alive to the various inconsistencies as outlined in the written submission of Mr Chang[19], counsel for the plaintiff, the most notable one being his failure to mention in his cautioned statement to the police[20] what he now says was the major cause of the collision, namely that the plaintiff had decelerated suddenly upon cutting in. However, I note also that he had said in the same document that whilst he was cutting into the third lane, the plaintiff suddenly also cut in when there was less than a car length between the left front of the mgv and the scooter, causing him (the defendant) to immediately brake and steer to the right to try to avoid collision without success. Contrary to his present defence, the defendant had said under caution that the plaintiff had not braked whilst cutting and that the brake light of the scooter had not been turned on. The defendant was unable to explain under caution, if the speeds of the mgv and the scooter were similar and the scooter had not decelerated, how there could be a collision between the two. Besides, there are other areas of discrepancy in his oral evidence in court, especially those about the relative speeds and positions of the mgv and the scooter at various points of time. I do not propose to discuss them in details. It suffices for me to say that I have taken them all into consideration. 13.As regards the defence witness Mr Au, even Mr Pun, counsel for the defendant, concedes that his evidence is “unhelpful”[21]. In fact, it is plain that Mr Au’s oral evidence in court is confusing and not reliable in many aspects. To take a few examples, in his witness statement he said that when he first saw the trawler and the engineering vehicle, they were travelling on the first lane and followed by the scooter, all of them being some distance away ahead of the mgv. In cross-examination, however, he said that the trawler and the engineering vehicle had come from behind, overtaken the mgv and cut from the first lane into the second lane. That, it is noted, is contradictory to the evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant, as both of them testified that the low speed of the vehicles in their front was the reason for the scooter and the mgv to change lane. Moreover, bearing in mind that the trawler was loaded with heavy equipment and that it was escorted by the engineering vehicle, it is most unlikely that it would be travelling very fast. In re-examination, he retracted this part of his evidence. Secondly, he said that he could not tell the distance between the mgv and the scooter. He said that he only noticed the scooter after the mgv had cut from the second lane into the third lane and he did not see how the scooter ended up lying in front of the mgv. Thirdly, he had mentioned in both his police statement and his witness statement that during the trip from Kowloon Bay to the Airport, he was sitting beside the defendant and eating. A reasonable reading of his statements is that he was still eating when the accident occurred. Despite his oral evidence in court to the contrary, I found that it is more likely than not that he was in fact eating when the accident occurred and that he had not paid attention to the traffic condition. Findings of liability 14.I bear in mind that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and that the standard of proof is only that of balance of probabilities. Because of the relatively low standard of proof in civil cases generally, it is permissible for the tribunal of fact to make a finding if it prefers the evidence of one witness to the other. 15.Having considered all the evidence as a whole and also taking into account the long lapse of time between the accident and the present trial, I am generally unable to accept that the accident occurred in the way as the plaintiff described. Subject to one exception, his evidence is in my assessment not reliable. In particular, I am unable to accept that:-
The exception which I have mentioned is his evidence that he had reduced his speed upon cutting into the third lane with a view to avoid collision. I find as a fact that the plaintiff had indeed reduced his speed upon cutting in. I accept this particular part of his evidence firstly because it has always been a consistent component in his various accounts from beginning to end, even though there are some discrepancies as to (i) what he was trying to avoid hitting, an unknown private vehicle or the engineering vehicle; and (ii) whether his reduction in speed was a cause to the accident. Secondly, it is in my view an admission against his self-interest and therefore is more likely to be true. Thirdly, if his reduction of speed was already “history” and not relevant one would rhetorically why was it that he told the police officer at the scene that it was the cause? And why was it that he mentioned it in all his subsequent versions? 16.As regards the defendant, despite the fact that his evidence is not entirely satisfactory, I find that certain material aspects of his testimony are supported by independent evidence:-
17.Based on all of the above, I prefer the evidence of the defendant to that of the plaintiff. I have also considered the evidence of Mr Au. I find that the fact that I attach no weight to Mr Au’s evidence does not affect my assessment of the evidence of the defendant. In particular, I find as a fact that:-
(ii) Was the defendant negligent? 18.Although I have made certain factual findings adverse to the plaintiff, this is not the be all and end all of the issue of the defendant’s liability. It is because the defendant admitted that before he cut into the third lane, he was conscious of the possibility of the scooter cutting out at any time due to the very slow speed of the engineering vehicle and the trawler. Besides, the mgv was close to the scooter when the defendant started to accelerate and attempt to overtake. Despite the above, the defendant admitted that he had not sounded the horn or flashed the headlight to warn the plaintiff or tried to enlarge the distance between the mgv and the scooter. Can it be said, therefore, that the defendant was negligent in the circumstances and that his negligence, if any, contributed to the accident? 19.In his answer to the court, the defendant said that during the 8 to 10 seconds during which the mgv was following the scooter on the second lane, the distance between the two vehicles was maintained at about one-car length. It was only after seeing that the plaintiff had given no indication to pull out that the defendant accelerated and changed lane with a view to overtake. 20.Having considered the evidence as a whole, I do not think that the defendant was negligent in not giving any warning to the plaintiff that he intended to cut into the third lane. First, based on common experience, it is not common in Hong Kong for a driver to warn vehicles in his front that he intended to cut into adjacent lane. The warning is primarily given to the vehicles behind. Therefore, I agree with the defendant’s evidence that if he had either sounded his horn or flashed the highlights in the circumstances of the present case, he might have given the plaintiff a wrong signal that the plaintiff was driving too slowly. Secondly, it was the plaintiff’s duty to check the traffic behind carefully and give proper warning before he changed lane. It is my finding that the plaintiff had failed to do both of these; otherwise, the defendant would not have changed lane or accelerated. 21.Moreover, as regards the defendant’s acceleration, it is his evidence, which I accept, that it happened when he was cutting lane. In other words, the mgv was accelerating towards its right rather than its front. His was not a sport car but a lorry, so it would take a bit of time for the mgv to pick up speed. In the circumstances, I do not think that a reasonable and competent driver would have foreseen any danger in the defendant’s acceleration. Furthermore, there was not any inflexible rule that the defendant had to allow the distance between his vehicle and the vehicle in his direct front to be enlarged before he could cut into the adjacent lane. Lastly, it was the defendant’s evidence, which I accept, that the plaintiff’s speed was similar to his immediately before the collision so that had the plaintiff not decelerated the accident would not have happened. 22.Based on the above, I find that there is not sufficient basis to find that the defendant had been negligent or that the accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence. To the contrary, I find that the accident was caused solely by the plaintiff cutting in sharply without proper regard to the traffic behind him and then decelerated suddenly. (iii) Contributory negligence 23.In view of the findings above, the issue of contributory negligence does not arise. CONCLUSION ON LIABILITY 24.Based on the findings above, the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is dismissed. THE ISSUES ON QUANTUM 25.For the sake of completeness, just in case I were wrong on the issue of liability, I shall also deal with the issue of quantum. 26.Subject to the issue of liability, the parties have agreed on the following heads of damages:-
27.The only disputes on quantum are about the amount for pain, suffering and loss of amenities (PSLA) and whether the plaintiff is entitled to any pre-trial loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity. Evidence 28.The plaintiff was aged 49 at the time of the accident and is now aged 54. He is and was an automobile technician employed on government contract. His monthly salary was $14,155. 29.After the accident, he was hospitalised for about a week and was discharged on 28 October 2011. He was granted sick leave from 21 October 2011 to 29 February 2012 which was a little bit over 4 months. He was given full paid sick leave by the Government. He returned to his previous work with the Government in March 2012. According to the plaintiff’s evidence in court, there has been no significant change in the kind of jobs assigned to him by his superior[26]. His employment contract with the Government has also been renewed. 30.The plaintiff had complained of bilateral shoulder pain. X-ray of his shoulder revealed no fracture and he was treated conservatively with physiotherapy. He still complains of residual disabilities in the shoulder, back, right hand and left foot. He says that the disabilities affect his working capacity and efficiency in lifting and carrying and physical tolerance. 31.The plaintiff says that he can handle all of his activities of daily living alone. He could go outdoors and took public transportation alone. He has not driven his scooter after the accident because he is afraid of similar accident. 32.The medical evidence regarding his injury has been helpfully set out in the plaintiff’s written closing submission[27]. In brief, the plaintiff suffered, among other things, fracture distal phalanx of his left big toe. To this, K-wire fixation was performed. In the course of the operation it was found that his second toe also suffered soft distal interphalangeal joint subluxation and K-wire to which was also applied. 33.The Physiotherapy report[28] says that the plaintiff was diagnosed of “back pain” on 29 August 2011 (which was before the accident) and was referred for physiotherapy. 34.The medical experts agree that the plaintiff’s back problem was a pre-existing condition which was aggravated by the injury[29]. At the time of the joint examination by the experts (24 June 2014), it was found that there was tenderness elicited over L3/4 midline. Extension of back was mildly limited and the plaintiff complained of pain on side flexion. There was no muscle spasm or obvious feature of lower limb neurological deficit detected.[30] 35.The major differences in opinions between the experts are twofold:-
The experts, however, agree that the plaintiff is able to resume his pre-injury work as an automobile repairer[31]. 36.Apart from the injury to his toes, there were also some superficial penis and scrotum lacerations caused by the accident. However, the lacerations have since been healed. 37.The effect of the opinions of the medical experts is that the plaintiff has recovered well and that his daily living is likely to be unaffected. Assessment of the medical evidence 38.The plaintiff accepted that he had received physiotherapy for his back and that the back pain had been with him for 2 to 3 years before the accident. The medical records show that after the accident he only complained of back pain on 5 December 2011. In view of the above, I prefer the evidence of Dr Kwok to that of Dr Wong that if the left transverse process fracture of L3 and L4 had taken place during the accident, there should have been pain and tenderness over the lumber pain area during the time of the plaintiff’s stay in the hospital. I also accept Dr Kwok’s evidence that it was in any event a minor fracture and by the time of the joint examination by the expert, it had healed without consequence. I find therefore that the plaintiff has failed to discharge his burden of proving that the transverse process fracture of L3 and L4 was caused by the accident. 39.In view of the fact that the plaintiff is capable of returning to his former work as an automobile technician without significant limitation and can manage his daily living with difficulties, I am of the view that the estimates given by Dr Wong for the plaintiff’s impairment and loss of earning capacity are on the high side. I accept Dr Kwok’s evidence that the two figures are both at about 2%. 40.In the light of the expert medical evidence, following the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Chan Kam Hoi v Dragages et Travaux Publics[32], some discount has to be made to any award of damages, given the pre-existing state of the plaintiff’s spine which had already been causing him pain prior to the accident. In my view, a 50% discount would be appropriate in the present case as far as the back problem is concerned. (i) PSLA 41.Based on the evidence before the court, having regard to the comparables provided by Mr Chang and Mr Pun, including but not limited to Lee Ka Kuen v Hung Shing Environmental Recycle Ltd[33]; and Tsang Ching Fei v Mo King Guo[34], and also having taken into account the discount for his pre-existing back condition and the effect of inflation over the years, in my view the appropriate amount of damages under this head would be $200,000. (ii) Pre-trial loss of income and MPF contribution 42.With the greatest respect to Mr Chang, his reliance on Parry v Cleaver[35], which is a case on non-deductibility of pension from damages, is misconceived. Also, in my view there is no true analogy between insurance money and employment benefit (of which paid sick leave is one) as contended by him. It suffices for me to deal with Mr Chang’s submission on this point by quoting the following passage from McGregor on Damages[36]:-
The learned author cited Hussain v New Taplow Paper Mills[37] in support of the above proposition. 43.In my judgment, the plaintiff had not suffered any compensable loss under this head. Firstly, he had fully paid by the Government for the sick leave period. Secondly, the plaintiff has adduced no evidence to show that he has suffered any actual or real financial loss as a result of him having to utilize his sick leave entitlement previously accumulated for the injury he sustained. Thirdly, according to the plaintiff’s evidence in court he has since accumulated further sick leave entitlement under the terms of his employment contract[38]. 44.In the circumstances, I would disallow the claim under this head. (iii) Loss of earning capacity 45.In a well-known passage in Moeliker v Reyrolle[39],it is said,
46.The above passage was approved by the Privy Council in Chan Wai Tong & Anor v Li Ping Sum[40] where it said,
47.In the present case, apart from the plaintiff’s assertion, there is no evidence before the court on the risk, if any, that the plaintiff will risk at some future time during his working life losing his employment. To the contrary, the evidence is that the plaintiff is in the employ of the government, albeit on contract, and that his employment has been renewed. The Occupational Therapy Report also says that “his performance was ascended to be matched with his previous job without significant aberration”[41]. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that in the ordinary course of event the plaintiff will be able to stay in his present employment until he has reached the normal retirement age. 48.In the circumstances, I would reject this head of claim as well. Conclusion on quantum 49.Therefore, if I were wrong on the issue of liability, the plaintiff’s damages would be as follows:-
50.There would also be interest on general damages at 2% per annum from the date of service of the writ and interest on special damages at 4% per annum from the date of accident. CONCLUSION 51.The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is dismissed. 52.Following the general rule that costs should follow the event, I make an order nisi that the plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs in this action, to be taxed if not agreed.
Mr Geoffrey P Chang, instructed by Mandy Wan & Co, for the plaintiff Mr Chase Pun, instructed by Cheung Chan & Chung, for the defendant [1] Contributory negligence has been pleaded by the defendant. See para 4 of Defence, at p 41, Bundle A. [2] There is no dispute that the engineering vehicle had two flashing lights installed on its roof and that it was escorting the trawler. There is also no dispute that the trawler was loaded with a truck-mounted crane(吊臂車). [3] See the police scene photographs at pp 137 & 138, Bundle B. [4] Dated 12.11.2011, at p 113, Bundle B [5] Dated 11.5.2012, at p 147, Bundle B [6] Dated 11.9.2014, at p 102, Bundle A [7] Mr Pun also represented the defendant at the criminal trial. [8] p 113, Bundle B. [9] p 102, Bundle A, at para 4. [10] pp 150J, 151J-K, 152F-O & 170N, Bundle B. [11] p 151J, Bundle B. [12] The plaintiff said, and there is no dispute, that the trawler was about 40 feet (app. 12m) long. He also said that the distance between the trawler and the engineering vehicle was only about one car length (which, he agreed, was about 4 to 5m). [13] pp 169A-Q, 180S-181G. See also the statement of PC 6269 at p129, Bundle B. [14] p 133, Bundle B [15] See the scene photos at p 134, Bundle B [16] See p 67, Bundle B. [17] See the evidence of PC6269 at p180P and the evidence of PC 52299 at p 186 I-N, Bundle B. See also the photo of the scooter at p 136, Bundle B. [18] For a photograph of the helmet, see p 68, Bundle B. [19] Dated 16.10.2015. [20] Dated 17.11.2011, at p 117, Bundle B. [21] See defendant’s closing submissions, dated 16.10.2015, at para 31. [22] p 133, Bundle B [23] Probably from the tail light of the scooter. See the photos at p 138, Bundle B. [24] The 35m included the thinking distance (15m) and the brake distance (20m). [25] See the photos at p 137, Bundle B. [26] See also the Occupational Therapy Report, dated 13.12.2014 at p 80, Bundle A [27] See plaintiff’s closing submissions, para 11-18G [28] At p 76, Bundle A. [29] ibid, para 40-44 of the Joint Expert Report, pp 94-95, Bundle A. [30] ibid, para 51. [31] ibid, para 56-59. [32] [1998] 2 HKLRD 958 [33] DCPI 835/2005 [34] DCPI 2135/2006 [35] [1970] AC 1 [36] 19th edition of the work, at para 38-150. [37] [1988] AC 514. [38] It is a term of his employment contract at Clause 10 (p 86, Bundle B) that he can accumulate 4 paid sick leave after a month’s work and a maximum paid sick leave entitlement of 120 days. [39] [1977] 1 WLR 132, at 140A-C [40] [1985] HKLR 176 [41] P 80 Bundle A |
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