HKSAR v. Wong Chun Kit
Read the full judgment text of CACC 33/2015 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 20 January 2016.
1. On 18 August 2014, before Zervos J in the Court of First Instance, the applicant pleaded guilty to trafficking in 963.81 grammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride. On 21 January 2015, he was sentenced to 11½ years’ imprisonment. On 28 January 2015, he filed his Form XI – a Notice to Apply for Leave to Appeal against Sentence. On 14 July 2015, the hearing of this application was adjourned on the applicant’s own application. At the resumed hearing on 20 January 2016, we dismissed that applicatio
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CACC 33/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 33 OF 2015 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC 501/2013) ____________
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_________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT _________________________ Hon Pang JA (giving the reasons for judgment of the court): 1.On 18 August 2014, before Zervos J in the Court of First Instance, the applicant pleaded guilty to trafficking in 963.81 grammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride. On 21 January 2015, he was sentenced to 11½ years’ imprisonment. On 28 January 2015, he filed his Form XI – a Notice to Apply for Leave to Appeal against Sentence. On 14 July 2015, the hearing of this application was adjourned on the applicant’s own application. At the resumed hearing on 20 January 2016, we dismissed that application. These are our reasons. THE FACTS 2.Shortly before 1 pm on 27 May 2013, at Lok Ma Chau Control Point, the applicant, who had just returned from the Mainland and was coming through the “Nothing to Declare Channel”, was asked by Customs officers to have his bag examined. This led to the discovery of the drug in question, the bulk of which was wrapped in two plastic bags. Under caution, the applicant admitted that he thought the substance was cannabis, and that he was to deliver the drug to a man at Sheung Shui for a reward of $4,500. That was his first response. Later, when asked if he was willing to take part in a controlled delivery, the applicant agreed and divulged that he was in fact expected to convey the drug to Fanling train station. 3.In the event, and not before a number of unsolicited calls were made to the applicant’s mobile phone to enquire of his whereabouts, a man did appear at the appointed meeting place in Fanling and was arrested. However, as was stated in the agreed summary of facts, the Customs officers “reacted too quickly” and “stopped and arrested the other man before he had been given the dangerous drugs”, and “although the other man was … initially charged the prosecution ha[d] not proceeded with the case against this other man.” The summary of facts went on to emphasize that the failure of the controlled delivery was “not because of any fault or failing by the defendant.” In a video interview recorded on the following day (28 May 2013), the applicant insisted that he thought he was bringing cannabis into Hong Kong – that was what his Mainlander boss had told him. He said he had previously carried milk powder for this boss. BACKGROUND AND MITIGATION 4.The following passages appear in the judge’s oral reasons for sentence:
THE SENTENCE 5.The judge went on to say:
GROUNDS OF APPEAL 6.In a note attached to his Form XI dated 28 January 2015, the applicant complained that his sentence was “too heavy”. (Hereinafter referred to as “Ground 1”) 7.In an undated letter which this Court received on 24 June 2015, the applicant further complained that, although not bearing any immediate result, a piece of information he provided to the authorities on 26 November 2014 had, in fact, come to fruition in April 2015. This delay, the applicant complained, had deprived him of such extra credit that the judge could have given him at the time of sentence (21 January 2015), had the result materialized before that date. (Hereinafter referred to as “Ground 2”) 8.Before us, at the resumed hearing on 20 January 2016, the applicant claimed that, based on some other pre-sentence information he provided, the Customs and Excise Department (“C&ED”) had, in June 2015, successfully raided a warehouse used for growing cannabis, as well as arresting someone in connection with it. This, the applicant argued, should entitle him to yet another discount in sentence. (Hereinafter referred to as “Ground 3”) PROCEDURAL HISTORY 9.As can be seen, the applicant’s assistance to the authorities was a factor that the judge had taken into account in determining sentence (see footnote 1 for the relevant passage in the judge’s oral reasons for sentence). That, the judge did after three Sivan hearings dated 18 August 2014, 28 November 2014 and 21 January 2015, respectively. Nevertheless, the applicant raised Ground 1 at the time of filing his Form XI (see paragraph 6 above) and made a parallel application for legal aid to appeal his sentence. That application was dismissed on 27 March 2015. 10.On 12 June 2015, relying on Ground 2 (see paragraph 7 above), the applicant renewed his application and because the Legal Aid Department (“LAD”) needed more time and information to process that application, the Court’s hearing on 14 July 2015 was adjourned, part-heard, to a date to be fixed. On 17 September 2015, the applicant’s renewed application for legal aid was refused, and the Court’s hearing was set down to resume on 20 January 2016. 11.By a letter dated 16 December 2015, LAD refused to grant the applicant legal aid for a third time. It is not apparent from that letter the basis on which the applicant had made the application leading to this refusal[2]. 12.By a letter dated 29 December 2015, the applicant asked for a further adjournment of the Court’s hearing – “so that [he] could seek advice from the barrister who will represent [him]”. In the resumed hearing on 20 January 2016, however, the applicant admitted not having, and was unlikely to have, sufficient funds to engage any private legal representation. Instead, he laid claim to a further discount in sentence based on Ground 3 (see paragraph 8 above). 13.Moreover, notwithstanding the respondent’s explanation to the contrary (see paragraph 19 below) the applicant insisted that the raid in June 2015 was a result attributable to his assistance. It was alleged that, for some reason, C&ED was deliberately withholding the truth in relation to this and many other pieces of information that he had provided since being taken into custody. He said he wanted more time to seek help to expose and redress this injustice. 14.In the end, the applicant came to terms with the immense, possibly insurmountable, hurdle that he had to overcome to substantiate his allegation and withdrew his application for a second adjournment. He asked of this Court the following question, “What could be done to accord him credit if, further down his sentence, the information he provided began to produce results?” DISCUSSION 15.We will begin by dealing with the applicant’s more specific claims. Ground 2 16.As early as when Ms Ng, counsel for the respondent, filed her written submissions for the first hearing on 14 July 2015, she had made it plain that her instructions were:
17.That being the case, and absent any evidence of the intelligence officers of C&ED being untruthful, Ground 2 is not made out. Ground 3 18.As we discovered at the resumed hearing, the substance constituting Ground 3 was first made known to LAD sometime after the adjournment on 14 July 2015, the applicant having provided them with very general information about a particular individual and his alleged drug trafficking activities. LAD was given to understand that this and a person arrested in June 2015 by C&ED was the same individual. LAD was told that the applicant had previously provided information on this person to C&ED. 19.As it also transpired at the resumed hearing, Ms Ng’s instructions, having caused an enquiry into the matter at LAD’s prompting, were that it was all a false trail, the position of C&ED being (a) there was insufficient specificity in the applicant’s information to link the two persons, and (b) the raid and arrest in June 2015 were traceable to other sources and had nothing to do with the applicant. 20.Finally, we were told by Ms Ng that the above result was in fact intimated to the applicant during the adjournment so, in raising Ground 3, the applicant’ was really voicing his disquiet about C&ED’s reply and saying he was cheated. Referring again to the difficulty of putting this allegation to proof and the absence of evidence of C&ED being disingenuous (see paragraphs 14 and 17 above), however, we can only say that this ground is not made out. Ground 1 21.With Ground 2 and Ground 3 falling away, it only remains for us to say that the sentence in this case was arrived at after a most meticulous exercise. Faultlessly, the judge had applied the guidelines for trafficking in the stated kind and quantity of dangerous drugs as well as taking account of everything that could be said on the applicant’s behalf. In particular, we would emphasize that the 45% discount was, and is, the customary maximum for any defendant “who had provided assistance to the authorities without testifying against those about whom they had provided information”[3]. Post-sentence events 22.In answer to the applicant’s question (see paragraph 14 above), we repeat what this Court has said on a number of previous occasions, namely, as a general rule, the Court of Appeal is not “a court of post‑sentence supervision”, and that it must be allowed to “remain faithful to its true role of a sentencing review court”[4]. It follows that if, in the event, a situation did arise according to the applicant’s postulation then the proper course would be to refer the matter to the Government for executive relief. DISPOSAL 23.For the above reasons, the applicant’s application was dismissed.
The applicant appeared in person Ms Laura Ng, SPP of the Department of Justice, for the respondent [1] See paragraph 9 of this judgment below. [2] In court on 20 January 2016, the applicant explained it to be a fresh application based on fresh information. He did not, otherwise, divulge any detail. [3] See Z v HKSAR [2007] 10 HKCFAR 183, at 194E-G. [4] See HKSAR v Conde Nassou CACC 427/2014 (29 January 2016, unreported) at paragraph 23 of the judgment; also HKSAR v Yeung Kwai Kuen [200] 3 HKC 395. | |||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment