Lui Pui Shan v. Immigration Tribunal
Read the full judgment text of CACV 21/1995 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 8 March 1995.
1. The solicitors on whom the notice of appeal was served were the solicitors on the record for the infant by her father and next friend at the time of such service. I have listened with care to the arguments advanced, ably as always, by Mr Dykes in support of his contention that such service was ineffective. But in the circumstances here, I have come to the conclusion that the service was effective. In the normal way, the authority of a solicitor on the record extends to receiving a notice of a
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CACV000021/1995 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1995, No. 21 ____________
____________ Coram : Bokhary, J.A. Date of hearing : 8 March 1995 Date of judgment : 8 March 1995 ____________________ J U D G M E N T ____________________ Bokhary, J.A.: 1. The solicitors on whom the notice of appeal was served were the solicitors on the record for the infant by her father and next friend at the time of such service. I have listened with care to the arguments advanced, ably as always, by Mr Dykes in support of his contention that such service was ineffective. But in the circumstances here, I have come to the conclusion that the service was effective. In the normal way, the authority of a solicitor on the record extends to receiving a notice of appeal served by the opposite party. And that, I think, remains so even though an infant and legal aid are involved. 2. In the result, I dismiss the application for the setting-aside of the service of the notice of appeal, doing so with an expression of my indebtedness to counsel on both sides for their assistance. 3. Naturally, I express no view whatsoever on the merits of the appeal. What I think I may permit myself to add is this. In upholding this service, I am not to be taken as encouraging this appeal. It is still open to the Immigration Tribunal, with the assistance of its legal advisers, to give further mature consideration to Rhind J's judgment and to consider whether or not the appropriate course may be to accept that judgment and determine a fresh application in the light of such guidance as may be gained from a dispassionate study of that judgment. That I think I may permit myself to say. But I do not think that I may permit myself to say any more. 4. I will give the Immigration Tribunal leave to withdraw its summons for an extension. Such extension is no longer necessary. [Costs] 5. It is not suggested that any money would change hands as a result of any order for costs which I may make in this case. In all the circumstances, I do not make any order for costs on either summons, save to order that the respondent's own costs be taxed under the Legal Aid Regulations. (K Bokhary) Justice of Appeal Representation: Mr A Wu (of the Attorney General's Chambers) for the Appellant Mr Philip J. Dykes (instructed by William Clarke & Co.) for the Respondent |