Golden Best Investment Ltd v. Secretary for Justice
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1288/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 July 2016.
1. On 12 May 2016, To J dismissed an appeal by the Claimant in respect of the decision of the Small Claims Tribunal dismissing its claim. The Claimant applies by a summons of 21 May 2016 for leave to appeal against the judgment of To J.
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HCMP 1288/2016 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1288OF 2016 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCSA NO 39 of 2015) ________________________
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_______________ JUDGMENT _______________ Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.On 12 May 2016, To J dismissed an appeal by the Claimant in respect of the decision of the Small Claims Tribunal dismissing its claim. The Claimant applies by a summons of 21 May 2016 for leave to appeal against the judgment of To J. 2.By reason of Section 29A(1) of the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance [“SCTO”] Cap 338, this court may only grant leave if it involves a question of law of general public importance. Further, as provided in Section 29A(2)(a), the application for leave should set out the question of law. 3.Counsel for the Claimant put forward the following as the ground of appeal and the question of law of general public importance:
4.With respect, this is not the proper way to formulate a question of law. The photo in question, considered together with the evidence of the surveyor (alluded to by To J at paragraph 31 of his judgment) must be relevant evidence on which a finding of due service can be established. Whether the evidence is sufficient is a matter for the Tribunal bearing in mind Section 23 of the SCTO. This is not a question of law. 5.Insofar as the Claimant is attempting to argue that Section 35(2) of the Buildings Ordinance prescribed the only mode to prove service (as such it may be a question of law), it does not appear to be an argument run before To J. In any event, it is quite plain that Section 35(2) is a permissive provision rather than a mandatory one. The argument to the contrary is plainly unarguable. 6.For these reasons, we refuse to grant leave to appeal. 7.We dismiss the summons and order the Claimant to pay the costs of the Respondent. Having considered the statement of costs prepared by the Government Counsel and the complexity of the matter, we fix the costs of the Respondent at $40,000 (of which $28,000 is counsel’s fees).
Written submissions by Ms Margaret Tsau, instructed by Messrs Pang, Wan & Choi, for the claimant Written submissions by Mr Adrian Lai, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the respondent |
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