Chung Kin Kwong v. Accupower Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 26/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 July 2016.
1. This is the hearing of an originating summons taken out by the plaintiff for, among other things, declaratory reliefs against the defendant in relation to a written agreement between them dated 27 October 2010.
|
HCMP 26/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 26 OF 2015 ____________
_____________
____________
_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1.This is the hearing of an originating summons taken out by the plaintiff for, among other things, declaratory reliefs against the defendant in relation to a written agreement between them dated 27 October 2010. 2.The plaintiff is an indigenous villager of Wang Toi Shan Tsuen, Pat Heung, Yuen Long. Pursuant to the Government’s Small House Policy, he applied for and was granted a piece of land for the development of a small village house in 1988, namely Lot No 3280 in Demarcation District 111, Yuen Long. Since then, he has been and still is the registered owner of the land. 3.The plaintiff did not have the means, however, to develop the land in 1988, and remained unable to do so. In 2010, he was introduced by a friend, Mr Chan Ming, to his employer, one Mr Lo, as a person who might be interested in co-operating with him to develop the land. At their meeting in August 2010, Mr Lo claimed to be able to finance the development of a village house on the land. They discussed an arrangement for development on the basis that Mr Lo would, via his company, provide the funds for the development and construction, and the plaintiff would provide the land. Upon completion of the development, the plaintiff would be entitled to the 2nd (that is, the top) Floor and the Roof of the house, whereas Mr Lo would have the Ground and 1st Floors. The plaintiff was agreeable to the proposal and, accordingly, on 27 October 2010, accompanied by Mr Chan Ming and another friend Mr Lee, the plaintiff went to an office in Kowloon Bay and signed a development agreement with Accupower Limited, the defendant herein. The defendant was named as the developer in the agreement. The plaintiff understood the defendant to be Mr Lo’s company. 4.The development agreement provided as follows, I will read out the relevant clauses and the English translation will be inserted later when my judgment is typed up.
5.On 4 January 2011, pursuant to Clause 2(b) of the agreement, the plaintiff went to a law firm and signed a power of attorney in favour of one Chow Chi Leung at a meeting arranged by Mr Lo. A representative of a construction company called Landhood Development & Planning Company (“Landhood”), one Mr Cheung, was also present at that meeting. 6.Shortly afterwards, the plaintiff was informed that Mr Chow had died, and on Mr Lo’s request, he went to two law firms respectively to cancel the first power of attorney and to sign a second power of attorney in favour of one Chan Woon Yin on 14 February 2011. Mr Lo told the plaintiff that Chan Woon Yin was a director of his company who was in charge of contractor matters. Mr Cheung was present at the signing of this power of attorney among several people, as was one Mr Tang, who turned out (unknown to the plaintiff at the time) to be a representative of a money-lender called Fine State Finance Limited (“Fine State”). The plaintiff said he was told that the documents he signed would authorise Landhood to apply for the Government’s consent for the commencement of building works, and to apply for a certificate of compliance subsequently on his behalf. 7.It appears that the late Mr Chow had signed a construction agreement with respect to the land in question, purportedly in the capacity of the registered owner, with Landhood on 15 January 2011 for the sum of HK$1.3 million. Mr Chan Woon Yin signed a similar agreement on 14 February 2011 for the sum of HK$1.2 million. The plaintiff accepted that the first construction agreement signed by Mr Chow had been superseded by the second signed by Mr Chan Woon Yin. 8.From March 2011 onwards construction work began. By April 2012, construction of the village house was completed by Landhood. 9.The plaintiff said that, to his surprise, in September 2012, he received a demand from Fine State for repayment of five loans. Indeed, on 26 September 2012, Fine State issued a writ in HCA 1784/2012 against the plaintiff as the 1st defendant and Chan Woon Yin as the 2nd defendant, suing for recovery of HK$1.3 million together with interest under five loan agreements signed by Chan Woon Yin on behalf of the plaintiff on the strength of the power of attorney of February 2011. The plaintiff duly made a report to the police on suspicion that he had been the victim of fraud. 10.I have called for the file in HCA 1784/2012, and it was stated in the affirmations filed therein on behalf of Fine State that it was not aware of the development agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant in these proceedings at the time when it lent money under the five loan agreements, and that it had simply, pursuant to the loan agreements, advanced funds directly to Landhood for the construction of the house. 11.On the plaintiff’s case, what seems to have happened is that the defendant had, using the power of attorney, purported to borrow money in the plaintiff’s name for the construction of the house, and engaged builders to construct the house which has been completed and inhabitable for several years. 12.It is perhaps a little surprising that neither the defendant nor Mr Lo has come forward to make any claim for any interest in the Ground and 1st Floors of the house, which, one would have thought, could be worth substantially in excess of the amounts owed to Fine State. 13.Anyhow, on the materials before me, it seems plainly contrary to the intention of the parties, as evidenced in the agreement, that the defendant should borrow money in the plaintiff’s name for the construction of the house, leaving the plaintiff exposed to an action by the lender (regardless of the outcome of that action). The whole point of the agreement was that the plaintiff should not have to worry about financing the construction of the house. In these circumstances I am satisfied that there had been repudiation of the agreement by the defendant, accepted by the plaintiff at the latest by the issuance of these proceedings. 14.These proceedings have been served on the defendant at its address as stated in the agreement and an advertisement has also been published on English and Chinese newspapers. Neither Mr Lo nor the defendant or any representative of it has contacted the plaintiff or appeared in these proceedings. The evidence placed by the plaintiff before this court has not been challenged. In the circumstances I am satisfied that it would be just to grant a declaration along the lines of paragraph 1 of the amended originating summons, as follows:
15.I should mention that, as recognised by Mr Chan, who has appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, this declaration is a limited one. In particular, he accepted that, in accordance with established principles, the termination of an agreement by repudiation and acceptance does not affect the accrued primary rights and obligations between the parties. As Dixon J said in McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457, 476-477:
This statement of the law has been approved by the House of Lords in the UK in Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 at 396, per Lord Wilberforce, Colonial Bank v European Grain and Shipping Limited [1989] AC 1056, 1098-1099, per Lord Brandon, and Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185, 193, per Lord Millett. 16.Accordingly, the declaration that is being granted here does not extend to the title to or beneficial ownership of the house or any part of it. Nor does it, of course, affect the position of Fine State as lender, who is not a party to this action.
Mr Frederick Chan, instructed by Cheung & Choy, assigned by DLA, for the plaintiff The defendant was not represented and did not appear | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||