Chow How Yeen Margaret and Others v. Wex Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 537/2013 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 September 2016.
1. This is my ruling for the amendment summons and strike-out summons which I heard on day 1 of the trial:
Cites 1 case
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HCA 537/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 537 OF 2013 ____________
__________ R U L I N G __________ 1.This is my ruling for the amendment summons and strike-out summons which I heard on day 1 of the trial: Amendments to the statement of claim 2.Although the cause of action has not changed, the disputed amendments, if allowed, would have the effect of increasing the claim of the plaintiffs by CAD670,000. This means that 200,000 shares purchased by Chow (P1) were not purchased at CAD2.70 each as currently pleaded but will become CAD5.50 each. 3.The plaintiffs say that it was a mistake in calculation and there is documentary evidence from the defendants’ side to support the proposed amendments. 4.The sheer lateness of this application is enough to dismiss it. 5.With respect, I do not regard such a substantial change to the quantum as being a mere clerical mistake or error in calculation. It is a substantial change to the computation of part of the damages. Moreover, the documentary evidence in support was disclosed in a further list of documents after the pre-trial review. How could the plaintiffs expect the defendants to come up with evidence to rebut the proposed amendments in the limited amount of time? 6.The summons for amendment proposes to give a timetable for consequential amendments. This timetable, would mean that issues on quantum would only be defined towards the end of trial. This simply would not enable proper cross-examination of witnesses to be done. 7.Further, Mr Carolan, counsel for the defendants, says that in the current form of pleadings, quantum is not in issue. The amended quantum would prevent the defendants from proving the negative, ie that the plaintiffs have not paid at CAD5.5 per share in the limited time available. This is in my view a real prejudice to the defendants which the court should not allow to happen. 8.Mr Carolan further bases his opposition on the grounds that:
9.On its face, the Annual Report of 2005 had nothing to do with Chow’s shares (as opposed to Muscular). Chow’s own old spreadsheet also claimed CAD2.7 per share. Even so, with respect to Mr Carolan, ground (a) concerned whether or not there was sufficient proof of the amendments. It was not plain and obvious that the plaintiffs could not have persuaded the court in the course of evidence that there was such proof. This ground in itself would not have persuaded me to dismiss the application. 10.Ground (b) does not trouble me. If the amendments were allowed, the court certainly has discretion to permit Chow to supplement her witness statement by oral evidence confirming the unit price of the shares and identify the documents she would rely on to establish the amendments. 11.In summary, due to the lateness in the application and the prejudice that would be caused to the defendants, I disallowed the amendments, save to the extent that they were not opposed by the defendants. The strike-out summons 12.This concerns paragraph 46 of Shum’s witness statement which states:
13.Mr Remedios, counsel for the plaintiffs, submits that this sentence was irrelevant and not pleaded, and the plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to explore evidence arising from this statement. It was Shum’s personal opinion. It also contradicts the joint expert opinion which he refers to in his submission. 14.I agree with Mr Remedios’ submission. The court need not rule on the truth of the contents of that assertion. The contents of this part of the witness statement are irrelevant. 15.On the other hand, paragraph 46 needs to be looked at in the proper context. Shum was explaining why he did not see fit to disclose the litigation on the China Patent and the judgment dated 27 November 2001 to Chow. Whether that belief was rightly or reasonably held may be relevant to the issue of whether Shum was dishonest in concealing material facts from the plaintiffs and the defence to the fraud claim. I am not satisfied that paragraph 46 was so plainly and obviously irrelevant or frivolous or vexatious that it should be struck out without hearing the evidence of Shum. 16.I therefore dismissed the application. 17.I will deal with costs all in one go at the end of the trial.
Mr Leo Remedios and Ms Yvonne Ngai, instructed by Chan, Lau & Wai, for the plaintiffs Mr Paul J Carolan, instructed by Baker & McKenzie, for the defendants | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 537/2013