Halliburton Bv Merkezi Hollanda Ankara Merkez Turkiye Subesi v. Sheng Yi (HK) Trade Co Ltd and Others

Read the full judgment text of HCA 1627/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 8 February 2017.

1. The plaintiff in these proceedings is the victim of what is said to have been an international fraud, as a result of which the plaintiff transferred a sum of US$4,977,000 to the bank account of the 1 st defendant in Hong Kong. That transfer took place on 15 June 2016. In the application before me the plaintiff seeks judgment in default of defence against certain of the defendants to its Action.

Cited by 3 cases · Cites 1 case

Case No.HCA 1627/2016
Court
High Court CFI
Date08 Feb 2017
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCA 1627/2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1627 OF 2016

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BETWEEN    
  HALLIBURTON BV MERKEZI HOLLANDA
ANKARA MERKEZ TURKIYE SUBESI
Plaintiff
  SHENG YI (HK) TRADE CO LIMITED 1st Defendant
  CHUANGXINDA TECHNOLOGY CO LIMITED Intended 2nd Defendant
  HONG KONG XIE YING TRADING CO LIMITED Intended 3rd Defendant
  LO WAH (盧燁) trading as WEALTH INTERNATIONAL CO Intended 4th Defendant

________________________

Before:  Mr Recorder Anthony Houghton SC in Chambers
Date of Hearing:  8 February 2017
Date of Judgment:  8 February 2017

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J U D G M E N T

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1.The plaintiff in these proceedings is the victim of what is said to have been an international fraud, as a result of which the plaintiff transferred a sum of US$4,977,000 to the bank account of the 1st defendant in Hong Kong. That transfer took place on 15 June 2016. In the application before me the plaintiff seeks judgment in default of defence against certain of the defendants to its Action.

2.Shortly after the initial transfer to the 1st defendant there were further transfers this time from the account of the 1st defendant to the accounts of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants. In money terms the largest recipient was the 3rd defendant which received about US$2,165,000 from the 1st defendant.  The 2nd defendant received US$180,000 and the 4th defendant US$200,000. The other relevant misappropriated funds were “caught” by an injunction obtained by the plaintiff over the assets of the 1st defendant.

3.Subsequently yet further transfers were made from the accounts of the 2nd and 3rd defendants to accounts held by the 5th to 17th defendants.  The recipients of the transfers from the 1st defendant (i.e. the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants) have been described in submissions as the “2nd layer recipients” and the recipients of transfers from the 2nd and 3rd defendants as the “3rd layer recipients”.  For convenience I will adopt that shorthand description.  It must be borne in mind however that the 5th, 6th and 7th defendants received funds from the 2nd defendant whereas the other 3rd layer recipients received funds from the 3rd defendant.

4.Judgment has been entered (or proceedings settled or withdrawn) against all of the defendants except the 2nd defendant and the 5th 6th and 7th defendants.

5.The 2nd defendant has filed both a notice of intention to defend the proceedings, and a defence.  The 5th 6th and 7th defendants have not filed any such notice of intention to defend proceedings, nor has a defence been filed on behalf of any of those defendants.  In those circumstances the plaintiff applied for judgment in default against the 5th 6th and 7th defendants.

The statement of claim

6.The plaintiff's claim describes the alleged fraudulent scheme giving rise to the transfer of funds to the 1st defendant and sets out also the allegations regarding what it describes as the subsequent dissipation of those funds, from the account of the 1st defendant to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants, and onwards to the 3rd layer recipients.

7.The plaintiff alleges that the facts and matters set out in the Statement of Claim give rise to the reasonable inference that the 1st to 17th defendants were perpetrators or participants in the fraudulent scheme against the plaintiff and/or were used as intermediaries for the dissipation of funds and/or received part of the traceable proceeds of the funds on behalf of the fraudster for the 1st defendant.  It is alleged that the 1st to 17th defendants “knew or ought to have known” that the transfers of each layer wholly or partly consisted of the proceeds of fraud and that such transfers were made in breach of trust.

8.In the alternative the plaintiff asserts an entitlement to trace into, and claim equitable title to, the proceeds of the funds in the accounts of the 1st to 17th defendants which, it is alleged, those defendants hold on trust for the plaintiff's.

9.As noted above the 2nd defendant defends the plaintiff’s claims and has served a defence accordingly.  The 2nd defendant contends that its business is the trading and export of mobile phones and mobile phones accessories, but includes, as a subsidiary business, currency exchange and remittance services.  It is contended by the 2nd defendant that the remittance made to it by the 1st defendant on 16 June 2016 was part of a genuine currency exchange arrangement.

10.It is also contended that the 5th defendant and the 7th defendant were regular customers of the 2nd defendant in respect of its currency exchange remittance services.  The 2nd defendant contends that it arranged the purchase of US currency from the 6th defendant, to enable it to meet requests for such currency from the 5th and 7th defendants, on or about 15 June 2016.

11.In summary therefore the 2nd defendant denies any involvement in the alleged fraudulent scheme and contends, rather, that it received those funds without any notice of the alleged fraud.  The 2nd defendant is, it says, an innocent purchaser for value in respect of the US$180,000 which it received from the 1st defendant.

The terms of the judgment sought

12.No notice of intention to defend having been given, and no defence having been served, the plaintiff applied for judgment in default against the 5th 6th and 7th defendants. Counsel for the plaintiff helpfully provided to the court a draft order setting out the terms in which such judgment was sought.  The formulation was slightly different in respect of the 5th defendant as compared to the 6th and 7th defendants because of issues relating to the service of the Statement of Claim which are of no significance for present purposes.  Broadly what was sought against each defendant was an order for repayment of a specified sum to the plaintiff; an order directing the release or transfer of sums in specific bank accounts to the plaintiff; declarations that each defendant holds monies as a constructive trustee for and on behalf of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff is the beneficial owner of such funds; an order for an account in respect of the relevant amounts; and interest.

13.The basis for this was that, whether or not the 5th 6th and 7th defendants were participants in the fraud, they would be constructive trustees of the relevant funds if their state of knowledge was such as to make it unconscionable to retain those funds.

14.The plaintiff acknowledged that it was not the normal practice of the court to grant declaratory judgment without a trial, but submitted that this was a matter of practice, not of law, which would give way to the need to do justice between the parties in circumstances in which the declaration could properly be granted.  I was reminded that the judge giving judgment against the majority of other defendants on 24 November 2016 had made such declarations.

Appearance by D2

15.Submissions were made on behalf of the plaintiff objecting to appearance by the counsel for the 2nd defendant at the application for judgment against the 5th, 6th and 7th defendants.  It was contended by the plaintiff that the 5th 6th and 7th defendants were thereby circumventing the requirement for a company to appear by counsel unless authorised to appear by a director.  It was contended also that the 2nd defendant had no locus to make submissions on behalf of the 5th 6th and 7th defendants.

16.In any event, there was no dispute however that the evidence which had been filed on behalf of the 2nd defendant was relevant to the matters under consideration in respect of the 5th, 6th and 7th defendants.

17.In part this “locus” issue arose because of an agreement which it is said has been made between the 2nd defendant and each of the 5th 6th and 7th defendants as part of which the 2nd defendant was said to have obtained the consent of the other defendants to oppose the application for judgment against them.

18.It was the position of the 2nd defendant that it had locus because it had a direct interest in the outcome of the default judgment summons.  This was because, it was contended, a declaration that the 5th 6th or 7th defendants were constructive trustees in respect of part of the funds fraudulently taken from the plaintiff would entail or imply involvement by the 2nd defendant in the alleged fraudulent scheme.  Moreover it was contended that the 2nd defendant had locus simply as a party to the proceedings.

19.I received written and oral submissions on behalf of the 2nd defendant on the basis that these were made on its own behalf, and not as a representative or quasi‑representative of the 5th 6th or 7th defendants.

The entitlement to judgment under order 19 rule 7

20.The relevant rule entitles a plaintiff to apply for judgment where no defence has been served after the expiration of the period fixed for service of such a pleading.  When such an application is made the court “shall give such judgment as the plaintiff appears entitled to on his statement of claim”.  Where there are several defendants, and not all are in default, then such an application may be made by the plaintiff in circumstances in which the claim against the defaulting defendant or defendants is severable from claims against the other defendants.

21.As is made clear at 19/7/13 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure, the rule is discretionary rather than mandatory, and, moreover, the court may order the application to stand over until trial where there are matters affecting other parties waiting to be decided.

Determination

22.In the exercise of my discretion, having considered the various matters referred to above, it appeared to me that the appropriate course was with no determination, or judgment entered, at this time on the plaintiff's application.  The defendants are to be taken to have admitted the claims made against them in the Statement of Claim, but it appeared to me nevertheless to be premature to enter a judgment which would involve a declaration imputing fraudulent conduct on the part of these defendants in circumstances in which, because of the defence pleaded by the 2nd defendant, a trial is likely to be held in which the relevant factual circumstances are closely aligned with, and may overlap, those relevant to the claim against 5th, 6th and 7th defendants.

23.There remains the possibility that the trial judge, in due course, in the light of the evidence received, may come to the conclusion that making such declarations (or granting any of the other relief sought) would be inappropriate.  Therefore, notwithstanding the deemed admission on the part of the defendants, it appeared to me the better course was to leave the matter open for decision, in due course by the trial judge, whose discretion, notwithstanding the deemed admission by the defendants, will be exercised in the light of relevant evidence placed before him or her.

24.The parties agreed that, in those circumstances, the costs of the summons as between the plaintiff and the 5th 6th and 7th defendants should be to the plaintiff.  The costs of that summons as between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant are to be costs in the cause of the action.

  (Anthony Houghton SC)
  Recorder of the Court of First Instance
  High Court

Mr Derek Chan, instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright Hong Kong,for plaintiff

Mr Oscar Tan, instructed by KCL & Partners, for the 2nd defendant