HKSAR v. Javed Zakir
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 584/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 13 February 2017.
1. The Appellant was convicted after trial in the Magistrates’ Court on a charge that, contrary to Section 38AA(1)(a) and (2) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), he, on 15 March 2016, in Fanling, took up employment, namely as an odd-job worker, who remains in Hong Kong without the authority of the Director of Immigration after having landed unlawfully. He appeals against his conviction.
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HCMA 584/2016 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 584 OF 2016 (On appeal from STCC 1607/2016) ______________________
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1.The Appellant was convicted after trial in the Magistrates’ Court on a charge that, contrary to Section 38AA(1)(a) and (2) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), he, on 15 March 2016, in Fanling, took up employment, namely as an odd-job worker, who remains in Hong Kong without the authority of the Director of Immigration after having landed unlawfully. He appeals against his conviction. 2.Two Perfected Grounds of Appeal have been filed on his behalf. They read:
3.Section 38AA(1)(a) of the Immigration Ordinance provides that a person “who, having landed in Hong Kong unlawfully, remains in Hong Kong without the authority of the Director of Immigration under Section 13 … must not take any employment, whether paid or unpaid, or establish or join in any business.” As to employment, the prohibition is against taking employment, and is not confined to actually doing work. 4.What the Record of Interview states is summarised as follows in paragraph 6 of the Written Submissions provided by counsel for the Appellant:
5.If the Magistrate felt sure, which he did, that those admissions were admissible and true, he was entitled to convict the Appellant on those admissions, doing so on the basis that even though the Appellant had not yet started work, he had agreed to off‑load a truck (in return for a promise of payment but as it happens, even unpaid employment is prohibited by Section 38AA(1) of the Immigration Ordinance) and he had turned up at the time and place where he was to off‑load the truck. By agreeing to do work and turning up for work, a person takes employment within the meaning of Section 38AA(1) of the Immigration Ordinance. 6.Saying, as the Magistrate said, that the Appellant’s evidence that he was at the scene pursuant to a lunch arrangement was “unbelievable” can be said to be putting it too high since such evidence was not inherently incapable of being believed. But that is not fatal to this conviction. A Magistrate’s Statement of Finding is to be read as a whole and in a manner fair to both the prosecution and the defence. 7.Reading the Statement of Findings in the present case in that manner, I am satisfied that the Magistrate, who after all saw and heard the Appellant in the witness‑box, was really saying no more than that he felt sure on the whole of the evidence that there was no truth in the Appellant’s evidence that he was at the scene pursuant to a lunch arrangement. That is a view of the facts properly open to the Magistrate. 8.Despite the able arguments of counsel for the Appellant, I do not regard this conviction as unsafe or unsatisfactory. Nor, despite those able arguments, do I find any other basis for quashing it. 9.The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Mr Prakash L Daryanani, SPP of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Mohammed Jawadullah Shah, instructed by Hampton, Winter & Glynn, assigned by DLA, for the Appellant | |||||||||||||||||