HKSAR v. Lin Peng
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 547/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 March 2017.
1. The appellant was convicted after trial of one count of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 19 of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, Cap 212. He pleaded not guilty to the charge but was convicted after trial. He appeals against the conviction.
Cites 2 cases
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HCMA 547/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 547 OF 2015 (ON APPEAL FROM EASTERN MAGISTRACY ________________________
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Introduction 1.The appellant was convicted after trial of one count of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 19 of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, Cap 212. He pleaded not guilty to the charge but was convicted after trial. He appeals against the conviction. 2.The trial was conducted in Chinese but the appeal was in English. The Statement of Findings was translated into English. 3.Mr Gerald McCoy SC, leading Kim McCoy, put forward 3 grounds of appeal:
4.Mr McCoy SC, in his skeleton submissions, submits that a substituted conviction for common assault is the only safe outcome — with a new sentence to be imposed accordingly. In his oral arguments, Mr McCoy submits that a conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm should be the correct substituted conviction. Prosecution case at trial 5.Ms Christal Chan, who appears for the respondent, succinctly summarizes the Prosecution’s case in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the respondent’s Skeleton Submissions, which I adopt:-
The defence case at trial 6.I shall adopt what Mr McCoy SC sets out in paragraphs 7 to 11 of his Skeleton Submissions as a summary of the Defence case at trial:-
Analysis and assessment of evidence by the magistrate 7.The Magistrate warned himself that the case was basically one against one situation, hence calling for extra caution. The Magistrate found the evidence of PW1 clear and direct. Her demeanour impressed the Magistrate as frank and straightforward when testifying in court and she remained unshaken under cross-examination. 8.The Magistrate was aware of the discrepancy between the in-court evidence given by PW1 and what she stated in her written statement as to how the appellant grabbed her fingers resulting in her injuries. The Magistrate considered the discrepancy as immaterial as the grabbing took place in a split second and the contact was extremely short. The Magistrate found that it made no difference whether PW1’s fingers were bent outward or downward, the injuries of PW1 tallied with her evidence that her fingers were bent by the appellant. The Magistrate felt sure that PW1 was an honest and reliable witness and he accepted her evidence. 9.The Magistrate give himself a full Berrada direction as the appellant had a clear record, he also took into consideration the evidence of the character witnesses. 10.In the end, the Magistrate found that the account given by the appellant could not be the truth and he rejected the appellant’s evidence. The Magistrate found that the evidence of the appellant that the contact between his hand and PW1’s was no more that minor and he had never grabbed PW1’s fingers could not be reconciled with the objective fact that PW1 suffered a serious injury to her right middle finger in the incident, i.e. a displaced fracture which required surgical treatment and PW1 was not yet recovered at the time of the trial. The Magistrate found in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Findings “Judging from this, the injury to PW1’s finger would not be possibly caused by an impact described by the defendant as so minor that even the defendant himself did not feel it. If the impact was really that minor, PW1’s finger could not have suffered such serious injury.” The Magistrate also ruled out the possibility of self-harm or other reasons as DW2 confirmed that PW1 cried out in pain immediately at the time of the incident. The Magistrate was sure that the appellant’s account could not be the truth and he rejected the appellant’s evidence. 11.As for the evidence of DW2, the Magistrate assessed her evidence in paragraph 14 of the Statement of Findings, the certified English translation reads:-
12.Paragraph 14 of the Statement of Findings actually reads:-
Grounds of appeal Ground 1 — failure to consider a material /significant inconsistency between PW1’s and DW2’s oral testimony. 13.Mr McCoy SC submits there are 2 main inconsistencies/ discrepancies between PW1’s and DW2’s evidence, namely:-
Ground 2 — The learned Magistrate erred in law in finding beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant must have deliberately intended or recklessly caused grievous bodily harm. 14.The principal submission advanced under Ground 2 is that there is insufficient evidence for the Magistrate to infer that the appellant had the specific intent to cause injury to PW1, or foresaw the risk of such an injury. 15.Mr McCoy SC submits that for the appellant to be convicted on the basis recklessness, it must be proved that he consciously saw the risk of injury to PW1 and went ahead with his actions, i.e. the grabbing and twisting of PW1’s fingers, in any event. The evidence and split second context showed only a general intent on the part of the appellant to grab the phone in which he had contacted PW1 but not a specific intent to cause grievous bodily harm (the mens rea for murder). Ground 3 — The learned Magistrate wrongly summarized/misunderstood D’s case. 16.Ground 3 complains that the Magistrate erred to summarize the appellant’s evidence at paragraph 13 of the Statement of Findings as:-
17.Mr McCoy SC submits that the appellant’s evidence was in effect that “he did not know or was not sure whether PW1’s hand was touched or not. It could have been the mobile phone which was grasped to indirectly cause the pressure on the finger. Such a finding is ultimately relevant to the learned Magistrate’s finding on the credibility and reliability of the appellant’s evidence. Had the learned Magistrate properly considered the evidence, it should have led to a reasonable doubt.” (Paragraph 38 of the appellant’s Skeleton Submissions Against Submissions) 18.Mr McCoy SC argues that the Magistrate had “reversed-engineered” from the fact of the fact of the injury of PW1 that the appellant must have been caused it maliciously as opposed to accidentally or negligently. The Respondent’s submission On Ground 1 19.Ms Chan submits that PW1 testified that the appellant’s act of grabbing her fingers took place in extremely short moment and her evidence was supported by her injuries. As for DW2, it is clear from her evidence that she only seen the incident in part. Ms Chan submits that there is no “material and significant discrepancies”, if at all, in the evidence of PW1 and DW2 that “would lead or should lead a tribunal to doubt credibility on central facts” (as per Stock J (as he then was) at paragraph 12 of R v Kwong Wing On and Another HCMA 574/1996). Adequate reasons were given by the Magistrate in his analysis of PW1’s and DW2’s evidence not only why he believed their evidence but also why he did so. On Ground 2 20.Ms Chan submits that the Magistrate addressed the issue of mens rea correctly. He decided whether the appellant intended or foresaw the harm to PW1 by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances, as required by Section 65A of Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221 and came to the conclusion that that the appellant “must have done that deliberately to harm PW1 or recklessly bent PW1’s fingers knowing clearly that by so doing grievous harm would be inflicted on her and yet still did that to her.” 21.Ms Chan submits that the facts in HKSAR v Estrella, Hazim Angelina HCMA 1096/2006, relied upon by the appellant, were very different from the present case. In Estrella,theevidence as to the appellant’s intent, or as to her being recklessly, was purely circumstantial. PW1 was able to give a clear account of how the appellant started the argument and injured her by grabbing her fingers with great force which caused the fracture of her finger when the mobile phone was in the left hand of PW1, not the other hand which the appellant grabbed. 22.Ms Chan submits that there is ample evidence upon which the Magistrate could find the mens rea proven when he convicted the appellant. On Ground 3 23.Ms Chan submits that the Magistrate had not misapprehended the evidence of the appellant. The appellant’s evidence that he was not sure whether or not PW1’s hand was touched should be considered in conjunction with his evidence “(t)here was no physical contact thereafter”. The evidence of the appellant was that there was no physical contact at that stage and there was no contact thereafter. A consideration of the submissions Ground 1 24.It is obvious from the Statement of Findings, which was prepared in Chinese, that Magistrate did not find that the evidence of DW2 corroborated that of PW1, he just found that the evidence of DW2 was more in line with the evidence of PW1. 25.I do not think there is any material discrepancy between the evidence of DW2 and that of PW1. DW2 gave evidence that she told the appellant to leave the café but she did not know if he had left. She had to go back inside to work and she did. DW2 also testified that she did not know how exactly how the appellant and PW1 started pulling and tugging each other, according to DW2, after she had gone back inside the café, she then saw the appellant and PW1 were pulling and tugging each other, and she went out to mediate again. The evidence of PW1 was that the grabbing and twisting of her fingers happened in an extremely short moment. The act of grabbing and twisting could take place after DW2 had gone into the café and before she looked at the appellant and PW1 again. 26.As for the pulling and tugging between the appellant and PW1, I do not think there is much difference between the evidence of PW1, i.e. PW1 grabbed the clothes of the appellant with her left hand to stop him from leaving and said “You cannot go away. (You) are not allowed to go.” and the evidence of DW2 that she saw both PW1 and the appellant were pulling and tugging against each other, pulling hand, PW1 held up one hand, (not as the appellant’s Skeleton Submissions suggest “one of PW1’s hands were (sic.) held (18.4)” complained about the pain to her hand and requested someone should make a report to the police for her. What DW2 witnessed was obviously what took place after the grabbing and twisting of PW1’s fingers and PW1 was then preventing the appellant from leaving, hence the pulling and tugging and the calling for police report. 27.A realistic attitude should be taken, as Stock J (As Stock NPJ then was) said in The Queen v Kwong Wing On & Another HCMA 574/1996:-
28.In my judgment, the discrepancies/inconsistencies identified in Ground 1 are more apparent than real. 29.Ground 1 fails. Ground 2 30.With respect to Mr McCoy SC, the offence of “Inflicting grievous harm” under section 19 of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance does not require proof of specific intent to cause grievous bodily harm (the mens rea for murder). One must not confuse the mens rea required for section 19 with the mens rea required for section 17, i.e. “Wounding with intent”. 31.The House of Lords in D.P.P. v Majewski [1977] AC 443 held that offences of assault (including assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and section 20 offences (the English counterpart of section 19 offences) required no specific intent. Lord Elwyn-Jones adopted the following passage from the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in D.P.P. v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 216-217:-
32.In short, for proof of intent under section 19, the Prosecution only have to prove that a defendant had the foresight of some physical harm to some person, albeit of a minor character, might result. 33.Lord Diplock said in R v Mowatt 19670 51 Cr App R 402:- “ In s.18 the word maliciously adds nothing. The intent expressly required by section is more specific than such element of foresight of consequences as is implicit in the word “maliciously” and in directing a jury about an offence under this section the word ‘maliciously’ is best ignored. 34.It short, for the offence of “Unlawful and Malicious Wounding or Inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm” under Section 19, the mens rea required is either that the defendant either intended to cause physical harm to the victim; or actually foresaw that his act might cause physical harm to the victim, and yet ignoring that risk went on and did the act. This is what is meant by the word “maliciously” in Section 19. The prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant intended or foresaw wounding or serious harm. 35.In the instant case, the Magistrate found at paragraph 17 of the Statement of Findings that “The defendant must have done that deliberately to harm PW1 or recklessly bent PW1’s fingers knowing clearly by so doing grievous bodily harm would be inflicted on her yet still did that to her. As a matter of fact, PW1’s right middle finger was seriously injured as a consequence.” In the above passage, the Magistrate by finding that the appellant did the act under complaint, i.e. the deliberate bending and twisting of PW1’s fingers, knowing clearly by doing so grievous bodily harm would be inflicted on PW1, found that the appellant had the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on PW1 (as said, in law, the prosecution only has to prove the defendant intended to cause physical harm to the victim). 36.For the alternative finding that that the appellant was acting recklessly, it would have been better for the Magistrate, having found that the appellant intended to cause grievous bodily harm on PW1, to go on to explain why he also found in the alternative that the appellant was acting recklessly. The Magistrate’s failure to explain his alternative findings on recklessness, in my judgment, is not fatal if his conclusion on the appellant’s intention is correct. 37.The Magistrate found PW1 an honest and reliable witness after a careful consideration of the evidence. PW1 gave evidence that as she took out her mobile phone trying to take picture of the appellant, who was making a scene, the appellant lunged towards PW1. PW1 used her left hand to put her mobile phone away and raised up her right hand to protect her face. It was at this juncture that the appellant grabbed her fingers of her right hand with all his might. The Magistrate found that whether the fingers were bent outward or downward made no material difference. 38.The Magistrate heard and rejected the evidence of the appellant that he was focusing on getting PW1’s mobile phone at all times and that he did not know whether it was PW1’s mobile phone or her hand that he had touched. The Magistrate rejected the appellant’s evidence that PW1’s injury was an accident. 39.I agree with the respondent’s submissions that the facts of the instant case were very different from the facts in Estrella. In the present case, PW1 was not holding her mobile phone with her right hand, PW1 was putting away her mobile phone with her left hand and using her right hand to protect her face at the time. There was no room for confusion of which hand of PW1 was grabbed; there was no room for mistake on the part of the appellant that in trying to reach out for the mobile phone of PW1, which was in PW1’s left hand, the appellant grabbed and twisted the right fingers of PW1 by accident. 40.In my judgment, the appellant, by grabbing and bending the fingers of PW1 with great force, albeit in a moment of anger, must have intended to cause physical harm to PW1. The Magistrate in fact found that the appellant deliberately bent PW1’s fingers knowing clearing by so doing grievous bodily harm would be inflicted on her. The finding that the appellant intended to inflict grievous bodily harm is more than enough for “Unlawful and Malicious Wounding or Inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm” under Section 19. In the present case, there is ample evidence to support the findings by the Magistrate. It is difficult to see how the appellant, by deliberately bending and twisting the fingers of PW1 with great force, could possibly suggest that he did not intent to cause some physical harm to PW1. 41.As said, it would have been better for the Magistrate to explain why he found in the alternative that the appellant was acting recklessness. In my judgment, the failure is not material as the Magistrate findings on the appellant’s intention are unassailable. 42.Ground 2 fails. Ground 3 43.The following is an extract of the appellant’s evidence in chief:-
44.The following is an extract of the appellant’s evidence under cross-examination:-
45.The evidence of PW1 was that she used her left hand to put away her mobile phone when the appellant ran up to her. She raised her right hand in front of her face to protect herself (Pages 166I to 170E of the Appeal Bundle) 46.Given the appellant’s evidence that he was not sure whether he had touched anything and any contact between the hands of the appellant and PW1 must have taken place within a very short duration, the Magistrate was right to summarize the appellant’s evidence as “The appellant and PW1’s hands, at most, were in brief contact; the appellant never grabbed PW1’s fingers” 47.I agree with the respondent’s submissions that taking into consideration the evidence of the appellant as a whole, the Magistrate had not misapprehended the evidence of the appellant. He was quite entitled to reject the evidence of the appellant. 48.The appellant was not acting in self-defence. The way that he described how he reached out his hand for the mobile phone of PW1 could not have caused a fracture to the right middle finger of PW1. The Magistrate accepted the evidence of PW1 that the mobile phone was in her left hand when her right fingers were bent and twisted, hence ruling out the possibility that it was the mobile phone grasped which caused the pressure on the right middle finger indirectly, as suggested by Mr McCoy SC. In my judgment, the Magistrate was correct to find that the injury to PW1’s right middle finger tallied with her evidence it was caused by bending and twisting with great force. 49.The Magistrate rightly ruled out the possibility that the injury to the right middle finger was the result of accident. There was no possibility that PW1’s injury was caused by self-mutilation as DW2 confirmed that PW1 cried out in pain at the time of the incident. 50.Ground 3 fails. Conclusion 51.The Magistrate had made no error of law and of facts. The grounds put forward by the appellant all fail. I perform my statutory duty of conducting a rehearing. I have the benefit of the full transcripts of the trial. Having considered the evidence, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 52.The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
Ms Chan Shuk Yi Bertha Christal, SPP of the Department of Justice, for the respondent Mr Gerard McCoy SC, leading Mr Kim J McCoy, instructed by Tsang Chan & Woo, for the appellant | |||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment