Oriental Press Group Ltd and Others v. Google Inc.
Read the full judgment text of HCA 2474/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 December 2016.
1. Public concern about some media institutions is largely concentrated upon the need for integrity, honesty, reliability and the capacity to report objectively. It is also rightly alert to scurrility and other offensive material.
Cited by 1 case
|
HCA 2474/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTIONS NO 2474 OF 2015 _______________________
_______________________ HCA 2476/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTIONS NO 2476 OF 2015 _______________________
_______________________ HCA 2477/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTIONS NO 2477 OF 2015 _______________________
(Heard Together)
_______________________ JUDGMENT _______________________ 1.Public concern about some media institutions is largely concentrated upon the need for integrity, honesty, reliability and the capacity to report objectively. It is also rightly alert to scurrility and other offensive material. 2.The public has come to use social media, in particular, in a sense of trust. But social media is open to abuse. Its ability to control and discipline the material which it disseminates is highly questionable and sometimes wholly absent. Some would argue that it has abdicated a sense of responsibility in that regard. 3.On occasions it has regarded challenges to it with an arrogant disregard of its obligations, or perhaps because it simply does not know how to regulate itself, or even because of the immense potential financial return, it does not want to exercise self‑regulation. 4.It is in the public interest that modern technological means of disseminating offensive material, which may or may not be actionable, should not be free to use subterfuge, camouflage and secret methods to hide the sources of and full nature of its published information, so as to conceal those sources or withhold the means of access to the information and thereby defeat remedial action. To be able to do so with impunity would bestow upon such organs of the media a protection from accountability and create a barrier to individual freedom. 5.Some argue, with force, that the essential freedom of the press is a luxury indulged in with frequent examples of unwarranted harm to an individual’s basic human rights. To allow an organ of the media the right to withhold details of publication — the sources of potentially, offensive material and the extent to which members of the public have had access to it — is to accord to it an immunity from litigation and offend all notions of justice with the inevitably dangerous consequences. 6.Google — in this case — has admitted the fact of publication, now said to be in limited circumstances, somewhat belatedly in the hearing before me on 20 October 2016. Prior to that it was seeking to argue what was patently unarguable. 7.It contends that the extent of publication is limited, trivial and therefore should not be litigated. 8.Who is in possession of the source, nature and extent of this publication to as to be able to determine this? It is the defendant. 9.Who ought to be in possession of the material in order to make the independent objective judgment? The court. 10.The defendant’s argument, stripped bare of its verbiage, and it is notably devoid of legitimate clothing, is that it should be the judge in its own cause, sadly a frequent contention in litigation or inquiries involving organs of the media. It is not an argument to be tolerated. 11.There are many circumstances in which a plaintiff is without the evidence to support its case simply because the alleged tortfeasor is in exclusive possession of it and has to be forced to divulge it. 12.It is also contended that access to the offending material can only be obtained by using some key words, as if somehow the generality of those words and the absence of a specific identity, diminished the force and effect of the material ultimately received. That is, I regret to have to say, nonsense. The material revealed by the keyed in words is unarguably libellous, imputing to the plaintiff criminal, illegal, immoral and unethical activities. It is offensive and actionable material, however directly or indirectly a member of the public gains access to it. 13.I do not propose to comment in detail on the other grounds save to say they lack logic and/or proceed from a misunderstanding of my findings or my language. It is not helpful to read into my judgment what is not there for the purpose of embellishing an argument. I make the following comments in order to illustrate this.
14.Not only is it my view that there are no reasonable grounds for an appeal and it would not be in the interests of justice for leave to be granted but also that the defendant is wasting time and effort when it should be serving and filing its defence if it has one, so that the action can proceed. 15.This application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
Mr Lawrence Ng, instructed by Iu, Lai & Li, for the plaintiffs in HCA 2474/2015, HCA 2476/2015 & HCA 2477/2015 Ms Queenie Lau, instructed by Deacons, for the defendant in HCA 2474/2015, HCA 2476/2015 & HCA 2477/2015 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 2474/2015