Lai Wai Kwong By His Wife and Next Friend Ho Lai Fan v. Yu Wok Man
Read the full judgment text of DCEC 1171/2015 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 27 July 2017.
1. Mr Lai (“ the Injured ”) is a mentally incapacitated person (“ MIP ”) [1] within the meaning of the Mental Health Ordinance. Through his wife and next friend, Mdm Ho (“ Next Friend ”), the Injured (who together with the Next Friend are jointly referred to as the “ applicant ”) brought these employees’ compensation proceedings against the respondent pursuant to the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (“ Ordinance ”). (All references in this Judgment unless otherwise stated are references to the
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DCEC 1171/2015 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO 1171 OF 2015 -------------------------
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------------------------- J U D G M E N T ------------------------- A. BACKGROUND 1.Mr Lai (“the Injured”) is a mentally incapacitated person (“MIP”)[1] within the meaning of the Mental Health Ordinance. Through his wife and next friend, Mdm Ho (“Next Friend”), the Injured (who together with the Next Friend are jointly referred to as the “applicant”) brought these employees’ compensation proceedings against the respondent pursuant to the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (“Ordinance”). (All references in this Judgment unless otherwise stated are references to the Ordinance.) 2.The Injured suffered severe head injuries and was rendered a MIP as a result of an accident which occurred on 24 July 2013 in the course of and arising from the Injured’s employment with the respondent. 3.The respondent did not participate in these proceedings despite having been served with the application. Interlocutory judgment on liability was entered on 30 September 2016. 4.This was a trial for the assessment of the compensation. At the trial, the applicant was represented by counsel, Mr Walker Sham (who was assigned by the Director of Legal Aid), and the respondent was absent. Upon being satisfied that the respondent was properly served with my order for trial, I proceeded to trial in the respondent’s absence. B. COMPENSATION CLAIMED AND ISSUES B.1 Compensation claimed 5.Apart from claiming compensation under ss.7 (permanent total incapacity), 8 (the costs of attention provided by another person), 10 (temporary incapacity) and 10A (medical expenses), the applicant has also included in the application a claim for compensation under s.36B (costs of supplying and fitting prosthesis or surgical appliance). However, as reflected in the “Particulars of the items of claim” the applicant was directed by this court to serve on the respondent, the claim for s.36B compensation is no longer pursued. B.2 Form 7 certificate 6.By a Form 7 certificate (“Form 7”) issued by the Employees’ Compensation (Ordinary Assessment) Board of the Labour Department, the Injured’s loss of earning capacity permanently caused by the injury was assessed to be 100 percent, and the duration of sick leave was assessed to be in the total of 522 days (comprising two periods of sick leave). 7.No appeal was issued against the Form 7 assessment. Hence, in the absence of an appeal, the total number of 522 days of sick leave and the 100 percent loss of permanent incapacity stated in the Form 7 certificate by virtue of s.16H[2], constitute conclusive evidence as to quantum. 8.Since, the Injured has been assessed to have suffered 100 percent loss of permanent total incapacity, he is entitled to compensation under s.7: s.7(3)(b)[3]. 9.In addition, the compensation under s.10 shall also be calculated in accordance with the number of days of sick leave stated in Form 7. Yet the applicant in apparent disregard of the binding effect of Form 7, has claimed in the Particulars of the items of claim an amount for s.10 on the basis of 36 months of sick leave the applicant averred was granted to the Injured. The period of 36 months was continued to be relied on by Mr Sham in his written submission in relation to s.10 compensation. 10.The claim for 36 months of sick leave was later withdrawn when this court drew counsel’s attention to the effect of s.16H. At the end, the number of 522 days for sick leave as stated in Form 7 was agreed to be used for calculating the s.10 compensation. B.3 Issues 11.As for the s.10A compensation (the amount of medical expenses), this is uncontroversial and only a matter of strict proof. In the result, only two issues require the determination of this court for the compensation under ss.7, 10 and 8, namely:
C. COMPENSATION UNDER SS. 7 AND 10 C.1 The Injured’s monthly earnings at the time of the accident 12.It is averred that the Injured’s monthly earnings at the time of accident were $24,700 (para 3(6) of the application). 13.After having considered and evaluated the following evidence, I find that the applicant is able to prove on the balance of probabilities the amount of $24,700 as averred. The reasons are as follows: 14.First, the credible evidence of the Next Friend. The only witness testifying at the trial was the Next Friend who adopted the contents of her witness statement dated 31 October 2016. The Next Friend testified that the Injured was employed by the respondent as a carpenter in the decoration business around May 2013. He was paid a daily wage of $950 and only took rest on Sunday. Hence, the total number of monthly work days was 26, making the Injured’s monthly earnings $24,700 (i.e. $950 x 26). 15.The Next Friend stated that the Injured’s earnings were sometimes paid by cash and sometimes by cheque. There is however no direct evidence such as wage receipts to support the Injured’s earnings as the applicant averred. Nonetheless, I am able to find some evidence that lends credence to the said assertion, which is a copy of a one-page extract of the Injured’s bank passbook record that the Next Friend referred to in her testimony. Relevant to the earnings are two cheque deposits dated 9 and 17 July 2013 in the respective sums of $9,500 and $10,450 which, the Next Friend stated, were the Injured’s earnings received from the respondent. The first deposit of $9,500, the Next Friend stated, represents 10 days’ wages (i.e. $950 x 10 days) while the second deposit of $10,450 was 11 days’ wages (i.e. $950 x 11 days). In the absence of any contradictory evidence, and further for the reason that the amounts have appeared to have matched the number of work days, I’m inclined to accept that these cheque deposits in the total sum of $19,950 were likely to have been the Injured’s earnings for 21 days for the part of July 2013 before he met the accident on 24 July 2013. 16.In light of the nature of the Injured’s job, I further find it credible that the Injured worked 26 days a month for the respondent as the Next Friend stated. 17.Second, there is other corroborative evidence. According to a table set out in the “Press conference on the announcement of wages of the construction industry employees for 2015-2016”[4] compiled by the Hong Kong Construction Industry Employees General Union (香港建造業總工會), the daily wages for a carpenter in the decoration business (same field as the Injured) were $950 and $1,000 respectively for the months of November and December 2012 and November 2013. These reported daily wages are, in my view, cogent corroborative evidence in support of the asserted daily wage of $950. 18.For these reasons, I find on the balance of probabilities that the Injured’s monthly earnings before the accident were $24,700, notwithstanding that the Injured had purportedly stated a lower daily wage of $750 in a record of interview dated 20 November 2013 prepared by a Labour officer. Given the state of the Injured at the time of the giving of the statement - that he was, according to the Next Friend, still confined to a hospital bed, and suffered from a lot of pain from the serious injuries, I consider that no weight should be attached to this inconsistent statement. 19.Hence, the monthly earnings of $24,700 will be adopted for the calculation of the compensation under ss.7 and 10. C.2 Compensation under s.7 20.The Injured was born on 9 November 1954 and was 58 years of age at the time of the accident and is now 62. Thus, the applicable section for the calculation of compensation is found in s7(1)(c), which allows the Injured to receive compensation in “a lump sum equal to 48 months’ earnings or 48 times the amount specified in the second column of the Sixth Schedule whichever is the less”. 21.According to the relevant Schedule 6 applicable to the date of the accident (the 2 August 2012 version), the maximum amount specified was $23,580, which is less than the Injured’s monthly earnings of $24,700. Hence, $23,580 should be applied for the calculation of the amount. 22.I therefore award the applicant $1,131,840 (i.e. $23,580 x 48) as compensation under s.7. C.3 Compensation under s.10 23.In his further written submission, Mr Sham calculates the compensation under s.10 by adopting the daily wage of $950 rather than the monthly earnings of $24,700 to arrive at the sum of $396,720 (i.e. $950 x 522 x 4/5). Although the difference in the amount is relatively small, I’m disinclined to adopt the following method of calculation rather than the counsel’s. 24.As I have previously stated in Tsang Chi Chung v Yu Kin San trading as Yu’s trading Co & Anor[5], the calculation should be based on the provisions in s.10(1) that specifies that the compensation be calculated “at the rate proportionate to, a monthly payment of four-fifths of the difference between the monthly earnings which the employee was earning at the time of the accident and the monthly earnings which he is earning…” (emphasis added). 25.Hence, applying the monthly earnings of $24,700 to the total number of days sick leave of 522 certified in Form 7, I award the applicant $339,114 (i.e. $24,700 x 12 ÷ 365 x 522 x 4/5) as compensation under s.10. D. COMPENSATION UNDER S.8 D.1 Relevant criteria 26.Section 8 provides as follows:
27.The criteria for awarding compensation for constant care and attention under s.8 have been helpfully summarized by Judge P. Cheung (as he then was, now Justice of Appeal) in Lau Ka Shui v Yiu Wing Construction Co Ltd & Anor[6].
28.Accordingly, before this court is able to award compensation under s.8, the applicant needs to satisfy this court that:
D.2 Evidence D.2.1 Medical expert evidence 29.For the purpose of the s.8 claim, the applicant was granted leave to adduce the evidence of a neurologist, Dr. Brian Choa by way of his report dated 9 July 2016 and of an occupational therapist, Mrs Alice Tsang by way of report dated 9 December 2016. D.2.1.1 Dr Choa’s findings and opinion 30.Dr Choa examined the Injured on 8 July 2016. In his report[8], Dr Choa set out at length the condition of the Injured (referred to as Lai in Dr Choa’s report) as follows:
31.In the opinion of Dr. Choa, given that the Injured was found to “have been left totally blind and with left sided weakness, significant impairment and post-traumatic epilepsy which remains uncontrolled”, there is no prospect of the Injured undertaking any remunerative work. D.2.1.2 The findings and opinion of Mrs Tsang 32.Mrs Tsang examined and interviewed the Injured at his home on 4 August 2016. In her report[9] , Mr Tsang states that:
33.Mrs Tsang further identifies in her report[10] a host of problems of the Injured from the view of the occupational therapist and lists out in tabular form the required actions in respect of each of the problems. In the below, I extract from the said table the items of suggested actions that I consider relevant to my determination of the s.8 compensation.
34.For the future care regime, Mrs Tsang is of the opinion that the following care arrangement[11] is required for the Injured:
D.2.2 Factual evidence 35.The Next Friend stated that the Injured was hospitalized until 27 January 2014. Since his discharge home, the Next Friend has provided full-time care to the Injured who has become paralysed on his left side, blind and who suffers from seizures. As a result, he has not only completely lost his earning capacity, but is wheel-chair bound and totally dependent on others for his daily activities including taking him to the toilet and washing him. 36.In order to enable the Next Friend to provide full time care to the Injured, the Next Friend quit her job in July 2013 as a salesgirl (for which she earned about $8,000 to $10,000 a month). D.3 Court’s findings 37.The evidence given by the Next Friend is straightforward and I accept it. Her evidence that the Injured is totally dependent on her in the daily essential activities of life are overwhelmingly borne out by the medical expert evidence of Dr. Choa and Mrs Tsang that I summarize above. 38.I also accept the findings and opinions of the medical experts as they are supported by the government medical reports. 39.In the circumstances, I find that the applicant has satisfied the essential criteria for the s.8 compensation:
40.All in all, the evidence the applicant adduced in my finding satisfies the essential requirements for compensation under s.8. D.4 Whether maximum award should be made D.4.1 Relevant considerations 41.On behalf of the applicant, Mr Sham advocates an award for the maximum amount of compensation specified in the second column of Schedule 6, which is $462,890, the amount applicable to the date of the accident (See 2 August 2012 version). 42.By further relying on the reasons (stated below) given by the learned Judge in Lau Ka Shui for awarding the maximum amount under s.8, Mr Sham urged this court to similarly grant the statutory maximum award to the applicant.
43.From the passage Mr Sham quoted from Lau Ka Shui, and the language used in s.8, I can derive some useful guidelines when determining the amount to be awarded for the s.8 compensation as follows:
D.4.2 The Injured is entitled to the maximum award 44.Having regard to the Injured’s permanent incapacity and the extent of the constant help required, I am satisfied that this is a case where the statutory maximum award should be made. My reasons are as follows. 45.First, the severity of the Injured’s incapacity requires wide- ranging care and attention. Based on the evidence (Section D.2) that I have accepted, I find that the Injured due to his blindness and paralysis requires extensive constant care in the form of ambulatory assistance, helping him to go to the toilet and washing his body before he is able to perform the essential activities of life. 46.Second, the Next Friend has evidently incurred loss of wages in order to provide the care at home. Since the Injured’s discharge from hospital on 27 January 2014, he has been cared for at home by the Next Friend who as a result had given up her $8,000 to $10,000 a month’s full time job as a salesgirl. Thus up to now, her loss of wages as a result of providing constant care to the Injured is already in the total sum of around $380,000. This amount has not even taken into account the continuing needs in the future. 47.Third, the Injured’s lifespan. Even though I am not assisted as to the Injured’s life span, on the medical evidence, I note however in Dr Choa’s report he stated that the Injured is at risk of a sudden death from epilepsy, a condition which the Injured is suffering from. Given the Injured’s age (now 62), and the risk of sudden death, I believe that the Injured’s lifespan will likely be substantially shorter that of the injured claimant in Lau Ka Shui (who was 34 at the time of the accident and would have been 36 at the time of trial, and was found by the court to have another 20 years to live). In the present case, even if I were to adopt the most conservative assessment by assuming that the Injured has another year to live (which is highly speculative and not supported by any evidence), I find that the applicant should at the very least be entitled to compensation for an additional sum of about $100,000 representing the loss of wages for the Next Friend in rendering the constant care would be incurred. This additional sum has not even taken into account the estimated cost of $12,729.92 per month Mrs Tsang states the Injured requires to incur for the hiring of a live-in foreign domestic helper with local part-time helper service for leave relief (Mrs Tsang’s report, para 4.2.3.2, see para 34 above). 48.Thus, I award the applicant the maximum amount of $462,890 under s.8. E. COMPENSATION UNDER S.10A 49.A total sum of $21,823 is being claimed, which amount is arrived at by having regard to the maximum daily rate of $200 per day specified by Schedule 3. The total allowable amount is in respect of medical expenses incurred by the Injured in Hong Kong, and is supported by receipts. I hence award the sum of $21,823 under s.10A. F. SUMMARY OF AWARDS AND JUDGMENT 50.I award the applicant the following sums of compensation:
51.I therefore award judgment in favour of the applicant for the total sum of $1,955,667 together with interest at half the judgment rate from the date of accident on 24 July 2013 to the date of judgment, and thereafter at the judgment rate until payment. 52.I further make a costs order nisi that the respondent do pay the costs of these proceedings including certificate for counsel. Since Mr Sham has in his further supplemental submission stated that he is no longer pursuing his earlier argument for costs to be awarded on a common fund basis, I therefore order costs to be taxed on the usual party-and-party basis if they cannot be agreed. I order that the applicant’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations. 53.Lastly, I wish to thank Mr Sham for his assistance.
Mr Walker Sham, instructed by the Director of Legal Aid, for the applicant The respondent was not represented and did not appear [1] Trial Bundle (“TB”) 49, a Medical Report from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital dated 26 January 2015. [2] Section 16H: “A certificate purporting to be issued- (a) under section 16F, other than a certificate cancelled under section 16G(4) or (7) or section 16GA(5) or (8); or (b) under section 16G(3) or section 16GA(4), and to be signed by or for an Ordinary Assessment Board or a Special assessment Board, as the case may be, shall be admitted in evidence without further proof on its production in any court and— (i) until the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the certificate is so issued and signed; and (ii) shall be evidence of the matters stated therein.” [3] Section 7(3): “For the purposes of this section, permanent total incapacity shall be deemed to result from an injury where the percentage or aggregate percentage of the loss of earning capacity amounts- (a) …; or (b) in the case of an incapacity of a permanent nature which results from an injury not specified in the First Schedule, to 100 per cent or more as assessed by an Ordinary Assessment Board, a Special Assessment Board or the Court, and a reference in this subsection to an injury shall include a reference to a combination of injuries whether they are mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) or in both those paragraphs.” [4] “2015-2016年度建造業工人薪酬發佈會”, TB p202. [5] Unreported, DCEC 701/2015, 9 May 2016, at para 50. [6] [1991] 2 HKC 644. Counsel has however instead cited and provided to this court the unreported decision, DCEC 129/1990. [7] [1991] 2 HKC 644 at 648E-G. [8] TB, pp68-70. [9] TB p.78. [10] TB pp.80-81. [11] TB pp.83. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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