The Joint and Several Provisional Liquidators of China Medical Technologies Inc. v. Kpmg (A Firm) and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCCW 435/2012 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 May 2017.
1. There are two summonses before the Court. A summons issued on 28 April 2017 by the Liquidators seeking an order for cross-examination of Chung Kam Ming and Bruce Zirlen of KPMG Hong Kong at a hearing before me to commence on 6 July 2017. A summons issued on 5 May 2017 by KPMG Hong Kong seeking effectively to stay an order requiring them to produce copies of documents to the Liquidators in the Mainland. I deal with them in turn.
Cites 1 case
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HCCW 435/2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO 435 OF 2012 _________________
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______________________________ REASONS FOR DECISION ______________________________ 1.There are two summonses before the Court. A summons issued on 28 April 2017 by the Liquidators seeking an order for cross-examination of Chung Kam Ming and Bruce Zirlen of KPMG Hong Kong at a hearing before me to commence on 6 July 2017. A summons issued on 5 May 2017 by KPMG Hong Kong seeking effectively to stay an order requiring them to produce copies of documents to the Liquidators in the Mainland. I deal with them in turn. Cross-examination 2.The hearing in July is to consider the Liquidators’ application by summons issued on 31 October 2016 principally for orders that:
3.Paragraph 2 of my order of 24 February 2016 ordered that:
4.In short the Liquidators are not satisfied that the Respondents have complied with [2]. They complain that the various affirmations the Respondents have filed purporting to address the access issue leave it unclear precisely what the position is. 5.When the October summons first came on before me I made directions for KPMG Hong Kong to file further evidence. I explained that it seemed to me that if it is KPMG Hong Kong’s position that they have complied with [2] of the 24 February 2016 order it should be possible for this to be stated very clearly and avoid a forensic analysis of the discursive evidence filed to date. 6.KPMG Hong Kong filed a number of further affirmations, which touch on this subject. The two most important in my view are the 9th affidavit of Jacqueline Wong, who is a partner in KPMG Hong Kong and in the Quality and Risk Management Department, and the 3rd affirmation of Chung Kam Ming who is a director in KPMG Hong Kong’s IT Department. Ms Wong’s 9th affidavit summarises her evidence in [7]:
7.Ms Wong then goes on to explain at some length her reasons for holding that view. Mr Chung says something similar in [10] of his 3rd affirmation and explains rather more succinctly his reasons for so stating. Mr Shieh who appeared for KPMG Hong Kong, confirmed that it was his instructions that at the material times none of the Respondents could access the relevant stored documents on KPMG Huazhen’s server in the Mainland. 8.I asked Mr Manzoni if it was the Liquidators’ case that KPMG Hong Kong did have access to the documents stored on KPMG Huazhen’s server. He replied that it was the Liquidators’ case that they had not been provided with confirmations that [7] of the February order and [6] of a subsequent order of 2 September 2016 required. Paragraph 6 provides:
9.As I understand it, it is the Liquidators’ position that if one scrutinises the various affirmations that have been filed one can find inconsistencies and evidence that raises questions that are unanswered. 10.I do not understand there to be any material dispute between the parties as to the relevant principles. They are summarised by Fuad JA (as he then was) in Wendy Wenta Seng Yuen v Philip Pak-yiu Yuen [1]. He says this:
11.The relevant question is whether cross-examination might be helpful in resolving the issues to be determined at the hearing in July. Mr Manzoni suggested that the cross-examination would be helpful in establishing whether or not the documents on the servers in the Mainland could be accessed at the relevant times. I disagree. 12.KPMG Hong Kong’s position it seems to me is quite clear. The documents could not be accessed. Mr Manzoni did not point to any evidence to suggest that this was in some respect wrong. What it seems to me the Liquidators have done is carry out a careful forensic analysis of the evidence and identified various paragraphs of various of the affirmations that they suggest leave in doubt whether KPMG Hong Kong’s position is strictly correct. Even assuming, and I tend to the view that Mr Manzoni’s reading of much of the evidence is excessively pedantic, there are matters about which questions can be asked, the fact is that I can see no reason at all to think that either Mr Zirlen or Mr Chung are likely to be able to give anything other than fairly general answers that will be consistent with KPMG Hong Kong’s case. For example, the Liquidators point to the evidence of Ms Wong in [26] of her 6th affidavit, which reads:
13.The Liquidators complain that these documents are not referred to in Ms Wong’s 9th affidavit and that the evidence filed to date only addresses access to those documents by KPMG’s audit engagement team and does not expressly state that no other partner or employee of KPMG Hong Kong could access them from overseas. It seems to me that [7] of Ms Wong’s 9th affidavit must be read as applying to all documents including those referred to in [26] of her 6th affidavit. The Liquidators do not point to any evidence that suggests that the scanned documents are not covered by [7]. Further no reason has been identified for thinking that either Mr Zirlen or Mr Chung would be able to say anything other than that they are not aware of any partner or employee of KPMG Hong Kong having access to the scanned documents. I cannot see any sensible reason for reading Mr Chung’s 3rd affirmation as leading to any other conclusion. 14.In my view cross-examination is unlikely to assist in the determination of the summons in July and I dismiss the Liquidators’ summons and make a costs order nisi that the Liquidators and the Respondent’s costs of the summons be paid out of the assets of the company. Production of Documents 15.On Friday 5 May 2017 the Respondents sought leave to issue a summons returnable on Monday 8 May 2017 seeking an order that paragraph 3(1) of my order dated 24 February 2016 be varied and paragraph 3(2) be stayed. 16.Paragraphs 3(1) and (2) provide:
17.These paragraphs were introduced into the Order by a variation to its original terms made on the application of the Liquidators on 12 January 2017. I shall refer to the February 2016 order as varied on 12 January 2017 as the “Order”. The decision to make that variation was unsuccessfully appealed. The appeal was held on 3 April 2017 and judgment handed down on 12 April 2017. 18.Paragraph 3(8) of the Order gave the Respondents liberty to apply specifically to allow them to seek a variation of the Order in the event that the Ministry of Finance took steps to prohibit provision of copy documents to the Liquidators in the Mainland as paragraph 3(1) required. By the time the appeal came on for hearing the Supervision and Inspect Bureau of the Ministry of Finance had written a letter to KPMG Hangzhou, which is dated 6 March 2017, the material parts of which read as follows:
19.The Court of Appeal took this development into account in reaching their decision. 20.When the Respondents’ application came on before me on 8 May 2017 I asked Mr Manzoni whether he accepted that I should hear the application rather than the Court of Appeal as it seemed at least arguably to be seeking an alteration in the decision reached by the Court of Appeal. Mr Manzoni said, fairly I think as the matter had come on quickly, that he was not sure, but did not object to me hearing it. Having subsequent to the hearing given the matter further thought it seems to me unclear whether it is appropriate for me to deal with the application, but be that as it may having heard the application and the time for compliance with paragraph 3(1) expiring on 17 May it seems to be expedient for me to determine it. 21.Paragraphs 35 to 39 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment addressed the MOF letter of 6 March 2017 and its impact on the conclusion that I had reached, namely, that no real risk of the MOF imposing a serious sanction against KPMG Hong Kong or KPMG Hangzhou had been demonstrated and that in the absence of a real risk the need for the Liquidators to have meaningful and effective access to the documents prevailed and justified paragraph 3(1) of the Order:
22.Consequently the Court of Appeal dismissed the Appeal, but extended the time for compliance. 23.It is understandable that following this decision KPMG Huazhen might have thought it appropriate to send a copy of the decision to the MOF and informing them that that they and KPMG Hong Kong intended to comply with it. KPMG Hong Kong, however went further than this. 24.KPMG Hong Kong drafted a letter, which is dated 26 April 2017 referring to the MOF’s letter of 6 March 2017, reporting on the progress of the Appeal. The letter says this:
25.The letter seeks “clarification” of whether the interpretation of the Court of Appeal was right or wrong. It seems to me that this was not a legitimate way to proceed. The matter had been determined and it was inappropriate for KPMG Hong Kong to try and, as they now do, reopen the matter by getting something new from the MOF. 26.The letter was delivered to Director Wang of the MOF on 26 April 2017 by Len Jui, who is a partner in KPMG Huazhen familiar with the matter, and his colleague Priscilla Miao. Mr Len explains that he took Director Wang through the letter. He then says this in [12] to [15] of his affirmation.
27.Director Wang does not say that provision of copies of documents would infringe any law or regulation in the Mainland. He seems to have said that he would like the matter to be left until the direction referred to in [12] had been issued. 28.In [38] of their judgment the Court of Appeal state that if the MOF really intended to impose sanctions for any breach of an instruction, they would have set this out in writing. The present position is no different in that regard from when the matter was before the Court of Appeal on 3 April 2017. There is no written instruction or statement from the MOF stating that copies of the documents should not be provided and that if they are the MOF may instigate some form of disciplinary action against KPMG Huazhen. All the Court has been provided with is Mr Jen’s apparent understanding of what Director Wang would like to happen. 29.It seems to me that in order for KPMG Hong Kong to succeed in the present application it is necessary for them to demonstrate that something has taken place since the hearing of the appeal, which materially alters the position that was before the Court of Appeal. It does not seem to me that it has. I, therefore, dismiss the application and make an order nisi that the Respondents pay the Liquidators costs.
Mr Charles Manzoni SC, instructed by Lipman Karas, for the applicants Mr Paul Shieh SC and Mr Wilson Leung, instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain, for the respondents | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCCW 435/2012