Wah Sun Hong Ltd v. Wong Lee Yuk Ping Agnes
Read the full judgment text of HCA 333/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 22 August 2017.
1. This is an application by the Defendant to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim in this action.
Cites 1 case
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HCA 333/2016 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 333 OF 2016 _____________
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___________________ DECISION ___________________ 1.This is an application by the Defendant to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim in this action. BACKGROUND 2.The Plaintiff’s case as now pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim can be summarised as follows:
3.In the Defence, the Defendant pleads that she was never responsible for the Plaintiff’s accounting, and she denies that she was the only person in charge of the Plaintiff’s business, operations or finance. Rather, she worked closely with one Mr Willie Chieng (“Chieng”). 4.The Defendant admits that between 23 March to 8 April 2011, sums totalling $19,139,209 were transferred from the Plaintiff to Deng. However, she avers that:
5.In support of her striking out application, the Defendant filed her 1st Affidavit on 24 September 2016. In that 1st Affidavit:
6.One Ms Judy Chieng filed her Affirmation on behalf of the Plaintiff in opposition on 17 October 2016. According to her, she had discussed the matter with Chieng and Ms Maggie Mak (“Mak”), who is the Office Manager of the Plaintiff, before making her Affirmation. 7.On 31 October 2016, the Defendant filed her 2nd Affidavit in reply, where she complains that Chieng and Mak have not put forth the true version of events. She also disclosed for the first time the particulars of the alleged investment, including:
8.About 2 weeks before the hearing, the Plaintiff made an application to file 2 respective Affirmations by Chieng and Mak. In his Affirmation, Chieng positively denies any agreement to invest in Jinbaoli, with documentary evidence in support showing that neither Deng, Well Faith, the Defendant nor Chieng has had any interest in Jinbaoli. He also explains the circumstances under which he initialled the transfer vouchers. Mak, on the other hand, confirms the evidence given by Chieng and Ms Judy Chieng. 9.One may argue that the Plaintiff could have asked Chieng and Mak to make their affirmations in opposition in the first round of exchange of affirmations. However, one may also contend that the Defendant, knowing full well the claim of the Plaintiff as pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim, could have supplied more particulars about the alleged investment in Jinbaoli in her first affirmation in support of the striking application. In any event, I take the view that the Defendant did in her 2nd Affidavit reveal for the first time particulars about the alleged investment, and as a result the Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to file further evidence to deal with these new allegations. In particular, the Plaintiff could only have produced the search records of Jinbaoli after the Defendant had identified the investment involved. Further, a successful striking out application would bar the Plaintiff from pursuing its claim without a proper trial. With such draconian effect, the Plaintiff should be given reasonable opportunity to substantiate its claim. I therefore allowed the Plaintiff’s application for the filing of additional evidence. MERITS OF THE STRIKING OUT APPLICATION 10.According to the Defendant’s striking out summons, she is relying on all the grounds contained in O 18 r 19(1) for the striking out application. However, I cannot see how the Defendant can possibly advance the argument that the action discloses no reasonable cause of action. It is trite law that, for such ground, the court will simply assume the facts as pleaded in the statement of claim to be proved and determine, on that basis, whether the pleading discloses a reasonable cause of action. The Defendant’s complaint herein is not related to the pleading itself, but rather she is contending that the Plaintiff’s allegations cannot possibly be true. This is not a proper basis for striking out the Plaintiff’s claim on the ground of disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and Mr Hingorani, counsel for the Defendant, quite sensibly does not pursue such ground in the hearing. 11.According to Mr Hingorani, the Defendant advances her application primarily under r 19(1)(b), i.e. the Plaintiff’s claim is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious. 12.The Defendant’s arguments can be summarised as follows:
13.I will deal with these arguments in turn. (i) Harassment caused by proliferation of actions 14.For the complaint relating to the harassment caused by proliferation of actions, there is simply no evidence to support such complaint. In particular, the court is not informed as to the background of the other actions which involve different parties and possibly different claims. Bare allegation is not sufficient to substantiate such kind of complaint and so there is no merit in such argument. (ii) Whether the Plaintiff’s case is bound to fail? 15.Arguments mentioned in §§12 (ii) to (iv) above relate to the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim. With a view to establish a case for striking out the Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s claim is bound to fail on the facts. 16.I agree that there are some arguments in favour of the defence case, for example, it was odd for certain payments to Deng and part-payments by the Defendant to have occurred on the same day. Yet there are still a lot of factual disputes which require the adjudication of the court. 17.It is the Plaintiff’s case that:
18.It is trite that the court should not conduct a mini trial at this stage and a claim should only be struck out in a clear and obvious case. In my judgment, the evidence adduced by the Defendant is far from being sufficient for her to argue that the Plaintiff’s case is bound to fail. The factual disputes can only be resolved at the trial after cross examination of the witnesses. 19.I also accept the argument of Mr Lam SC, counsel for the Plaintiff, that even if the Defendant’s factual allegations were to be believed, the Plaintiff would still have an arguable case against the Defendant for breach of her duties owed to the Plaintiff. On the Defendant’s own case, the investment in Jinbaoli was made by Chieng personally. Assuming that the transfers to Deng were made with Chieng’s approval and knowledge, it does not mean that the Defendant has not breached her duties owed to the Plaintiff. In particular, Chieng is neither the sole director nor the sole shareholder of the Plaintiff, and so Chieng’s approval is not equal to the Plaintiff’s approval. Hence, whether the Plaintiff has approved those transfers deserves serious investigation by the court at the trial. If the court were to find that the transfers were indeed made without the Plaintiff’s approval, it is certainly arguable that the Defendant might have breached her duties to the Plaintiff. 20.For these reasons, there is no basis for the Defendant to say that the Plaintiff’s claim is bound to fail. The striking out application therefore cannot possibly succeed. (iii) Lack of particulars for the fraud claim 21.The final complaint relates to the lack of particulars for the fraud claim, which is mainly formulated in §§11, 12 and 23 of the Amended Statement of Claim:
22.The Defendant raised the complaint relating to the lack of particulars for the fraud claim for the first time in the written submissions filed for the hearing of the striking out application, and so the Plaintiff would not have had the opportunity to deal such complaint in the opposing affirmations. In any event, assuming that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations were to be accepted by the court, there is certainly a prima facie case that the Defendant had obtained money from the Plaintiff in a fraudulent manner. If the Defendant thinks that insufficient particulars have been included in the pleading, the proper way is for her to ask for further and better particulars in support of such claim. At this stage, the Plaintiff’s fraud claim is one capable of being pursued and so I refuse to strike out the fraud claim pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim. 23.For the above reasons, I dismiss the striking out application. I also make a costs order nisi that the costs of the application, including the costs of the application for leave to adduce the Affirmations of Chieng and Mak, be to the Plaintiff in any event with certificate for 2 counsel, which shall be made absolute 14 days after the date of the handing down of this Decision.
Mr Douglas Lam, SC and Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by Henry Wai & Co, for the Plaintiff Mr Jeevan Hingorani and Mr Lawrence Cheung, instructed by W L Yuen & Co, for the Defendant | |||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 333/2016