HKSAR v. Wong Chou, Johnny
Read the full judgment text of CACC 364/2016 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 1 September 2017.
1. The applicant, who appears in person having been refused the grant of legal aid on 15 February 2017, seeks leave to appeal against his conviction after trial by Deputy District Judge Bina Chainrai, on 28 October 2016 of a charge of fraud, contrary to section 16A of the Theft Ordinance, Cap 210. He gave notice of that application by filing Form XI with the Court on 28 November 2016. By a letter filed with the Court on 3 April 2017, the applicant purported to advance grounds of appeal against s
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CACC 364/2016 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 364OF 2016 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO. 193 OF 2015) ____________
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__________________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT __________________________________________ 1.The applicant, who appears in person having been refused the grant of legal aid on 15 February 2017, seeks leave to appeal against his conviction after trial by Deputy District Judge Bina Chainrai, on 28 October 2016 of a charge of fraud, contrary to section 16A of the Theft Ordinance, Cap 210. He gave notice of that application by filing Form XI with the Court on 28 November 2016. By a letter filed with the Court on 3 April 2017, the applicant purported to advance grounds of appeal against sentence. Clearly, that application is substantially out of time. Although directed by the Court by letter dated 6 July 2017, to file a supporting affirmation explaining the delay in making the application for leave to appeal against sentence, none has been received by the Court. At the hearing, the applicant indicated that he did not wish to proceed with an application in respect of sentence. The trial 2.There was no dispute that in November 2010, while a District Director of Manulife (International) Limited (“Manulife”), the applicant was approached by a rival company, American International Assurance Company (Bermuda) Limited (“AIA”), as a result of which he was offered the position of District Director [1]. 3.In December 2010 and January 2011, several meetings took place amongst AIA’s senior representatives, including Marcus Wong (PW 4), Stewart Lee (PW 5) and Terry Lung (PW 6), and the applicant to negotiate the terms of AIA’s recruitment package [2], including inter alia an entitlement to a ‘signing fee’, the calculation of which was required to be based on his actual income at Manulife over the two years. Prosecution case 4.It was the prosecution case that the applicant submitted or caused to be submitted various documents to AIA, in proof of his purported income, which stated his income falsely. Those documents, including various ‘statement of agent’s account’, a ‘notification of remuneration’ and a ‘statement of advisor’s account summary’, purported to be his ‘income proof’ from December 2008 to November 2010. Those documents represented falsely that he had enjoyed a total income in the period of $5,875,702.28, whereas his actual total income was $4,074,022.84 [3]. There was no dispute that the records of Manulife were identical to the income proof documents submitted to AIA, except that all of them stipulated significantly lower levels of income. 5.The applicant signed a Letter of Understanding (“LOU”) [4], dated 16 February 2011. It was the prosecution case that it had been read to him on that date by Terry Lung, an employee of AIA, and that the applicant had read it himself. In signing the document, the applicant acknowledged his acceptance of a clause in the document, which stated:
6.Terry Lung testified that before the applicant signed the LOU, he had placed before him the documents provided to AIA as proof of the applicant’s income and the applicant had confirmed them to be correct. 7.At the request of the applicant a personal loan of $2 million was approved and advanced to him, against the signing fee, by a cheque dated 30 March 2011 [6]. The balance of the signing fee after deduction of loan interest, namely $2,400,231.28 was paid to the applicant by a cheque dated 19 May 2011. 8.Having searched the applicant’s home in the early morning of 10 April 2013, officers of ICAC searched the applicant’s office later that morning at Unit 502, 5/F, Cornwall House, Tai Koo Place, 979 King’s Road, Quarry Bay, in the applicant’s presence and that of his legal representatives. In the course of the search they seized various documents some of which were identical[7] to the purported ‘income proof’ documents submitted earlier to AIA. They were found in a blue folder on top of a cabinet [8] and inside a brown envelope inside another cabinet [9]. 9.In a video-recorded interview conducted of the applicant on 10 April 2013, although he was responsive to some questions, the applicant exercised his right to remain silent in response to the questions whether he had submitted any ‘income proof’ documents to AIA. Defence case 10.At trial, the applicant availed himself of the right to testify and called two other defence witnesses. The applicant was 45 years of age. Having lived in Canada from 1985, the applicant married, Sarah Gee, his former wife, in 1995, after which they lived in Australia, returning to Hong Kong in 2002. Then the applicant embarked on a career in the insurance industry at Manulife where he was promoted ultimately to the position of District Director in 2010. 11.The applicant said that he relied heavily on his personal assistants in conducting both his professional and personal affairs. At or around the time he was approached by AIA, Sarah Gee was one of his personal assistants. She handled his personal financial affairs and was solely responsible for gathering all the ‘income proof’ documents to be submitted to AIA. They separated in August/September 2011 and were divorced in May 2015. 12.The applicant acknowledged that in his negotiations with AIA he had been asked to provide ‘income proof’ documents. He knew that they would be used for AIA to assess the financial package to offer the applicant. However, he testified that he had never handed such ‘income proof’ documents to AIA. It was suggested in the defence case that Sarah Gee had submitted those documents to AIA. For his part, he did not know that those documents were false. The applicant accepted that the income stated on the ‘income proof’ documents submitted to AIA did not reflect the income that he had actually earned at Manulife. 13.The applicant denied signing the LOU on 16 February 2011. Rather, he had signed it at his home on the evening of 15 February 2011, to which it had been brought by Marcus Wong (PW 4) a District Director of AIA, who told him that the LOU was not a legally binding document. As a result, he had read the document very quickly. He did not notice that Clause 7 of the document stated that his “Annual Income HK$2,937,851.14 (had been) determined on the basis of the income proof provided by the Applicant”. 14.Ms Hilda Fung (DW 2) confirmed that the applicant delegated all his administrative work to one of his three assistants, of whom she was one and Sarah Gee another. 15.Mr Dicky Poon (DW 3) testified that he was a former employee of Manulife. Having been approached by the applicant, he changed employers and joined AIA in October/November 2011, where he worked in the applicant’s team. Having been told by the applicant that documentation would be required to facilitate the new employment, he said that Sarah Gee told him specifically that ‘income proof’ documents were required. Grounds of appeal 16.Attached to Form XI, filed with the Court on 28 November 2016, was a handwritten document in which the applicant asserted simply that the “conviction is unsafe and unsatisfactory”. 17.By a letter filed with the Court on 3 April 2017, the applicant set out what he stated were “initial grounds of appeal”, namely:
18.By a 13 page letter filed with the Court on 26 June 2017, the applicant advanced grounds of appeal against conviction. By Ground 1, it was argued that the ‘false’ documents seized in his office had been seized from an unsecured place. There was no evidence to show that the applicant physically dealt with the false documents or knew of their falsity. Further, he was not the sole beneficiary of the ‘fraud’. AIA benefited from the higher sales figure generated by his ‘district’. Marcus Wong and Francis Wong, both prosecution witnesses at trial, received promotion opportunities. 19.By Ground 2, the applicant asserted that no witness testified that he or someone on his behalf had submitted ‘false’ documents to AIA. Next, he said that the ‘income proof’ documents submitted to AIA and relied upon by the prosecution had not been signed certifying that they were true. That was in contravention of Clause 13 of a document entitled “Defensive Recruitment Package (LOU) for Experienced Agents and Wealth Management Elites.” [10] AIA had a duty to check all ‘income proof’ documents submitted in his case to ensure that they were genuine. 20.By Ground 3, it was argued that the judge refused wrongly to accept that the applicant’s yearly income was $3 million. The judge confused “annual income” with “average annual income”. The former was the term used in the LOU. Finally, it was contended that the judge erred in relying on the evidence of Terry Lung (PW 6) in respect of the meeting with the applicant at which the LOU had been signed. There was no such meeting with Terry Lung. 21.By Ground 4, the applicant referred to HKSAR v Mosen [2011] 1 HKLRD 45 to support the proposition that in analysing the evidence the judge was required to give herself a Liberato direction, namely that even if she did not positively believe the evidence of the defendant, she could not find an issue against him contrary to that evidence if that evidence gave rise to a reasonable doubt as to that issue. In the present case, it was possible that someone else had fabricated the false documents and submitted them to AIA without his knowledge. It was also argued that the judge failed to sufficiently consider the testimony of defence witnesses which she did not positively reject. In his oral submissions, the applicant invited the Court to note that Ms Hilda Fung had said that the applicant did no administration work in the office [11] and that the applicant’s former wife, Sarah Gee, was responsible for handling sensitive confidential personal information.[12] It was argued that, having regard to all the circumstances, there was a lurking doubt in the case. The respondent’s submissions 22.In his written submissions, Mr Phil Chau invited the court to refuse the application for leave to appeal against conviction. In his oral submissions, he said that it was the prosecution case that the ‘income proof’ came into the possession of AIA either from the applicant directly or from someone acting on his behalf. In the respondent’s written closing submissions it had been acknowledged “Quite how Terry Lung came by these documents is not quite clear as Marcus Wong, Francis Wong and Stewart Lee were not able to say definitively how or who receive these documents.” [13] In those circumstances, the respondent had submitted:[14]
23.He submitted that the judge’s concluding determination in her reasons for verdict was to be viewed in that context:[15]
24.Mr Chau submitted that the only prosecution witness with whom real issue was taken was Terry Lung. He was an important witness, whose evidence was accepted by the judge. He testified that at a meeting with the applicant on 16 February 2011 he had explained the LOU to the applicant, who had signed the document on every page. The applicant’s signature on the first page was immediately beneath clause 5(a), in which it was stated that the signing fee which the company agreed to pay to the applicant had been “determined on the basis of the income proof provided by the applicant, which the applicant hereby warrants and represents to the company to be true, complete and accurate in all respects.” The importance of that clause was the fact that this signing fee to be paid to the applicant was stipulated to be HK$4,406,776. 25.By contrast, the applicant testified in his evidence‑in‑chief that he had signed the LOU on 15 February 2011, after it had been brought to his home in the early evening by Marcus Wong. He said that when he signed the LOU beneath clause 5(a) he did notice the signing fee was stipulated to be $4,406,776. However, he said he did not know how the figure had been calculated.[16] In cross‑examination, he said that he had read the document very quickly because it was not very important. Far from having checked the ‘income proof’ documents he had never even seen the documents before.[17] 26.Of the date on which the LOU signed, Mr Chau invited the Court to note that it was an admitted fact that “The Defendant signed a letter of understanding on 16th February 2011”.[18] A consideration of the submissions 27.In her reasons for verdict, the judge said of the witnesses called for the prosecution:[19]
28.The judge went on to determine:
29.By contrast, she determined of the applicant:
30.Of the issues between the prosecution and the applicant, the judge said:[20]
31.In her recitation of the evidence of Terry Lung, the judge said of his testimony:[21]
32.Of the issues taken in cross-examination on behalf of the applicant, the judge said:[22]
33.In that context, the judge summarised the differences in the evidence of Terry Lung and the applicant in respect of the circumstances in which the LOU had been signed. Of that, she said:[23]
34.Of her resolution of the conflicting testimony, the judge said:[24]
35.Of the significance of those findings, the judge went on to say:[25]
36.Of the applicant’s evidence that he had “left all financial matters to his ex-wife Sarah” the judge said:[26]
37.Of the point made in favour of the applicant that the internal AIA guidelines for the making of an LOU required that the income proof documents be submitted and signed and certified by the applicant and the AIA recruiting manager, the judge acknowledged that the false documents received by AIA were not signed and certified. Of that she said:[27]
38.In the result, the judge concluded “I am satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant submitted these falsified documents in order that a larger signing (fee) would be paid to him”. It is clear that the context in which that finding is to be understood is by regard to the position taken by the prosecution in its closing speech, namely that the uncertain evidence did not permit a finding that the applicant himself had handed over the false documents to AIA, but that it was the prosecution position that at least the applicant had caused that to be done. 39.As Mr Chau submitted, the important finding of the judge was her acceptance of the evidence of Terry Lung and the rejection of the applicant’s evidence of the circumstances in which the LOU was signed on 16 February 2011. Clearly, the judge was accepting that the income proof had been discussed with the applicant in that meeting, in the context of the statement in Clause 5(a) that the applicant “warrants and represents” them to be “true, complete and accurate in all respects.” Conclusion 40.In all the circumstances I was satisfied that the applicant had not advanced any reasonably arguable grounds of appeal against conviction. Accordingly, I refused the application for leave to appeal against conviction. 41.The applicant is advised that he has the right to renew his application for leave to appeal against conviction to the Full Court, but is informed that if he does so, and the Full Court determined that the renewal is without justification, the Full Court may order that some of the time that the applicant spent in custody pending the determination of his application shall not be reckoned as part of the term of his sentence.
Mr Phil Chau, counsel on fiat, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the respondent The applicant appeared in person [1] Admitted Facts, paragraph 5: Appeal Bundle page 41. [2] Admitted Facts, paragraph 11: Appeal Bundle page 42. [3] Further Admitted Facts, paragraph 5: Appeal Bundle page 46. [4] Exhibit P18. [5] Clause 5(a): Appeal Bundle pages 606 – 607. [6] Appeal Bundle page 34. [7] The identical documents are:-
[8] Exhibits P80-P90 – documents; Exhibit P156 – the blue folder. [9] Exhibits P91-P97 – documents; Exhibit P157 – the brown envelope. [10] Exhibit D1. [11] Appeal Bundle, page 733 P-Q. [12] Appeal Bundle, page 737 B-C. [13] Appeal Bundle, page 767, paragraph 27. [14] Appeal Bundle, page 768, paragraph 28. [15] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 107. [16] Appeal Bundle, page 652 B-O. [17] Appeal Bundle, page 712. [18] Appeal Bundle, page 42, paragraph 12. [19] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 92. [20] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 92 [21] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 60. [22] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 60. [23] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 97. [24] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 97. [25] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 99. [26] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 103. [27] Reasons for Verdict, paragraph 106. | ||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment