Lucy Michaels v. Citybase Property Management Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCPI 899/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 29 September 2017.
1. On 27 January 2017, the master heard an application by Mrs Michaels for summary judgment under Order 14. At the same time he heard an application by the defendants to strike out the proceedings under Order 18, rule 19. The application for summary judgment was granted. The application to strike out was refused, however Mrs Michaels was given 28 days to amend the statement of claim providing further particulars.
Cited by 2 cases
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HCPI 899/2016 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 899 OF 2016 ___________
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______________ DECISION ______________ 1.On 27 January 2017, the master heard an application by Mrs Michaels for summary judgment under Order 14. At the same time he heard an application by the defendants to strike out the proceedings under Order 18, rule 19. The application for summary judgment was granted. The application to strike out was refused, however Mrs Michaels was given 28 days to amend the statement of claim providing further particulars. 2.Mrs Michaels did not submit any draft statement of claim in the matter came before the master again on 11 May 2017, when Mrs Michaels applied for an extension of time to lodge the draft amended statement of claim. Mrs Michael said that she had appealed against the decision refusing summary judgment, and had been concentrating on preparing the appeal. Further she said she was not legally trained and did not understand the procedure. 3.On 2 June 2017, the master handed down a decision in which he refused any extension of time and struck out the statement of claim. 4.Mrs Michaels now appeals to this court against the refusal of summary judgment, and the striking out of the claim. 5.The master was quite right to dismiss Mrs Michaels’ application for summary judgment. The law is clear. Summary judgment is only to be allowed in cases where there is no serious material factual dispute, or if there is a legal issue, the answer to that issue so plain that the issue could be decided summarily. 6.I have no doubt at all that Mrs Michaels is completely confident that the facts, as she states them, are true. But her confidence in her factual situation alone is not sufficient to justify summary judgment in circumstances where there is a genuine and serious dispute as to the facts. The defendants do not accept the facts as Mrs Michaels alleges them. Consequently, it will be necessary for her, if she is to establish a claim, to go to court and to prove those facts. 7.Mrs Michaels has now filed an amended statement of claim. It runs to 20 pages and, as is to be expected in respect of a document prepared by a layperson, is prolix and pleads evidence rather than facts. Notwithstanding that, the facts upon which Mrs Michaels rely can be adequately discerned, as can the legal basis for her claim. 8.I am firmly of the view that the court must make allowances for litigants in person, and that whilst a lay person must be required to supply sufficient information to enable a defendant to understand the case against the defendant, a litigant in person need not be held to strict legal niceties, particularly in pleading, in circumstances where the facts and the legal basis for a claim may be sufficiently seen. 9.Mrs Michael says that she did not file the amended statement of claim because she was confused and was concentrating on the appeal against the refusal of summary judgment. In the whole of the circumstances I think it just to allow Mrs Michaels the benefit of the extra time, and in the light of the amended statement of claim that has been filed, to set aside the striking off order, and allow the claim to continue. 10.In the course of the hearing Mrs Michael said that she would be seeking damages in the sum of $5 million. In regard to the particulars contained in the amended statement of claim I am quite satisfied that any damages to which Mrs Michaels might be entitled, assuming she is able to establish both the events giving rise to the alleged injury, and that the injury has the medical consequences claimed, damages would not exceed the sum of $1 million. 11.Pursuant to section 43(1) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336, there will be an order transferring the proceedings to the District Court. 12.Mr Lok takes the point that “The Apex Horizon is not itself a legal entity but simply a trade name under which Horizon Hotels and Suites Ltd (‘HHSL’), operated the business.” Having regard to the fact that Mrs Michaels is acting in person I do not allow this point. There will be an order substituting “Horizon Hotels and Suites Ltd trading as Vianni Cove Management Services” as the 2nd defendant in the proceedings. 13.Mrs Michaels has failed in her appeal against the dismissal of the application for summary judgment. She has succeeded in repealed proceeding should be struck out. There will be an order nisi that there be no order as to costs.
The plaintiff appeared in person Mr Michael Lok, instructed by Woo Kwan Lee & Lo, for the defendants | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under HCPI 899/2016