Yanfull Investments Ltd v. Datuk Ooi Kee Lian
Read the full judgment text of FAMV 29/2017 on BabelCite. This Court of Final Appeal judgment was delivered on 31 October 2017 before Ribeiro PJ, Tang PJ, Fok PJ.
Civil procedure – leave to appeal – whether questions of great general or public importance – tort of deceit – fraudulent misrepresentation – cross-undertaking in damages given to court – abuse of civil process – malicious prosecution – limitation period – when cause of action accrues – striking out of own motion – service out of jurisdiction – forum non conveniens – Mareva injunction obtained through allegedly bogus derivative action – Undertakings Representations and Consent Judgment Representations – whether undertaking in damages can found cause of action – whether time runs from discontinuation of antecedent action or from quantification by consent judgment – whether court can strike out of own motion on limitation ground – whether Hong Kong court can be forum non conveniens in action alleging abuse of its own procedure – Court of Final Appeal holds that cross-undertaking is given to the court and cannot ground a tort of deceit and that no reliance was established – time for malicious prosecution and abuse of civil process runs from the discontinuance of the antecedent action in February 2008, not from the April 2009 Consent Judgment which merely quantified pre-existing loss – judge may strike out of own motion on clear limitation bar – Court of Appeal's forum non conveniens remarks were obiter and did not warrant "or otherwise" leave – SPH v SA and DGC v SLC (née C) provide current restatement of principles – application dismissed with costs.
Legal issues: Whether leave to appeal should be granted on questions concerning deceit, abuse of civil process/malicious prosecution time-bar, striking out without notice, and forum non conveniens
Outcome: Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs
Cites 5 cases
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FAMV No. 29 of 2017 IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 29 OF 2017 (CIVIL) (ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM CACV NO. 114 OF 2016) ____________________ BETWEEN
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_____________________________________ REASONS FOR DETERMINATION _____________________________________ Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ: 1.At the hearing, we dismissed this application for leave to appeal with costs, reserving our reasons which we now provide. A. The parties 2.The applicant Yanfull is a Hong Kong company owned by Golden Plus Holdings Berhad (“Golden Plus”), a listed Malaysian company.[1] Yanfull in turn wholly owned Yanfull (Shanghai) Co Ltd (“Yanfull Shanghai”) which was, with a Hong Kong company called China Idea Development Ltd (“CIDL”), engaged in a property development in Shanghai. 3.Pembangunan Qualicare Sdn Bhd (“PQSB”) and Indian Corridor Sdn Bhd (“ICSB”) were Malaysian companies owned and controlled by Datuk Ooi Kee Liang (“Ooi”) who acted as CEO of each of them. Between August and December 2007, Ooi caused them together to acquire a total of 19.745% of the shares in Golden Plus, 100% funded by loans from Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Bhd (“Kuwait Finance”) which was granted a debenture over those shares. ICSB and PQSB had no other assets. B. Yanfull’s case against Ooi 4.Yanfull pleaded that, aiming to seize control of Golden Plus, Ooi caused ICSB and PQSB to requisition an EGM to replace the existing directors with his nominees. To discredit the existing board and thus in the hope of attracting support for his EGM motion, he caused ICSB and PQSB to launch bogus derivative actions purportedly on behalf of Golden Plus both in Malaysia and in Hong Kong, accusing Yanfull and CIDL of misappropriating Golden Plus assets. They obtained ex parte Mareva injunctions freezing very substantial monies in the hands of Yanfull and its subsidiary. The Hong Kong injunctions were granted on 31 December 2007 and the writ was issued on 2 January 2008. Yanfull alleges that Ooi never meant those actions to go to trial and intended, once control of the Golden Plus board had been seized, to discontinue them. Control was not achieved since the EGM notice was held by the Malaysian court to be invalid and a later resolution was voted down. 5.Yanfull alleges that when obtaining the injunctions, Ooi offered undertakings in damages from ICSB and PQSB, falsely representing that they were substantial companies able to honour those undertakings, well knowing that they had no assets, their Golden Plus shares having been fully mortgaged to Kuwait Finance. On 31 January 2008, the day before ICSB and PQSB were due to provide HK$8 million by way of fortification ordered by Reyes J, they served notice of discontinuation of the actions. On 4 February 2008, DHCJ Carlson discharged the Marevas, ordered an inquiry as to damages and granted ICSB and PQSB leave to discontinue the actions. 6.On 20 April 2009, the first day of the inquiry as to damages, ICSB and PQSB agreed to settle the claim, resulting in a Consent Order that they pay Yanfull HK$35m damages plus HK$5m costs. However, no payment was ever made. 7.On 28 June 2010 and 4 April 2013 respectively, ICSB and PQSB were wound up in proceedings which Yanfull says were collusively arranged by Ooi. Yanfull filed a proof in ICSB’s winding-up, but Kuwait Finance intervened as a secured creditor owed debts far exceeding the value of ICSB’s assets. 8.On 30 March 2015, Yanfull issued a writ in Hong Kong alleging that, in orchestrating the events described above, Ooi had committed the torts of (i) malicious prosecution; (ii) abuse of civil process; and (iii) deceit. On 15 May 2015, Yanfull obtained leave to serve a concurrent writ on Ooi in Malaysia. C. The decisions below 9.L Chan J[2] held that the deceit claim did not raise a serious question to be tried and that the malicious prosecution and abuse of civil process claims were time-barred. He set aside service and dismissed the action. He said that he would otherwise have stayed the action on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Court of Appeal[3] upheld the Judge and dismissed the appeal. Leave to appeal to this Court was refused. D. This leave application 10.Yanfull seeks leave to appeal on the following questions said to be of the requisite importance:
Leave is also sought on the “or otherwise” basis. D.1 Question 1(a): Deceit 11.Yanfull relies on two sets of misrepresentations referred to as the “Undertakings Representations” and the “Consent Judgment Representations” made by Ooi, knowing them to be false. D.1a The Undertakings Representations 12.By the Undertakings Representations, Ooi is alleged to have asserted that ICSB “were companies of financial substance, with substantial unencumbered assets which, if required, could be made available to fortify their undertakings in damages or to pay any damages pursuant to their undertakings in damages”.[4] Yanfull pleads that DHCJ To relied on those misrepresentations in granting the Mareva injunction and accepting the undertakings in damages[5]; and that Yanfull itself relied on them in complying with the injunction and suspending the Yanfull Shanghai operations.[6] 13.L Chan J held that this was not reasonably arguable: the representations were made to the court and not to Yanfull and, in any event, it was clear that Yanfull did not rely on them regarding the financial standing of ICSB and PQSB.[7] He pointed out that at a hearing on 18 January 2008:
14.The Court of Appeal affirmed the Judge, endorsing the view that the undertakings were given to the Court and not to Yanfull, and applying Wingames Investments Ltd v Mascot Land (No 2)[9] where Fok JA held that it is well established that an undertaking in damages does not found any cause of action. 15.We do not think it reasonably arguable that the Judge and the Court of Appeal were wrong. As the authorities cited by Fok JA show, the cross-undertaking as to damages is given to the court, not to any opposite party and no action, set-off or counterclaim can be founded upon it. Where a party is injured by an injunction which should not have been granted, the only remedy is enforcement of the undertaking which is subject to the court’s discretion. That is of course what Yanfull actually did, leading to the Consent Judgment. In any event, Mr Barlow SC[10] had no answer to the fact that there had plainly been no reliance on the alleged Undertakings Representations. D.1b The Consent Judgment Representations 16.Yanfull pleads that the Consent Judgment Representations were made by Ooi in causing ICSB and PQSB to enter into the settlement agreement incorporated in the Consent Judgment dated 20 April 2009. He thereby represented that ICSB and PQSB “could and would perform their joint and several contracts to pay the agreed sum of HK$40m to Yanfull” when he well knew that ICSB and PQSB could not pay.[11] The loss complained of is constituted by ICSB and PQSB defaulting on their contract. 17.The Judge held that Yanfull’s failure to recover from ICSB and PQSB was not due to reliance on the Consent Judgment Representations but to the fact that ICSB and PQSB were impecunious. If there had been no reliance and no settlement agreement so that the inquiry as to damages proceeded to a judgment, there would still have been no recovery.[12] The Court of Appeal agreed.[13] We do not think that it is reasonably arguable that that was wrong. D.2 Question 1(b) 18.This involves the complaint that the action was dismissed without any application for dismissal and without prior notice to Yanfull (CA§§30, 35-37). The Court of Appeal held that the limitation issue was clearly raised and that Yanfull had had an adequate opportunity to respond.[14] Upon the Judge being satisfied that because of the time-bar there was no serious question to be tried, he could of his own motion strike out the suit as an abuse of process.[15] We agree. This in any event raises a fact-specific question that does not qualify for leave to appeal. D.3 Question 2(a) 19.This seeks to challenge the time-bar ruling by calling into question the time when the causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of civil process accrued and the period of limitation started running. 20.As the Court of Appeal noted, the gravamen of those claims lay in the bringing of the 2008 Action and the obtaining of the Mareva injunctions maliciously, without reasonable cause, and for an ulterior and improper purpose.[16] Three possible starting dates were considered: (i) 31 December 2007 when the injunction was granted; (ii) 4 February 2008 when the action was discontinued; and (iii) 20 April 2009 (the date championed by Yanfull) when the parties agreed to the Consent Judgment. 21.The Judge and Court of Appeal held that time started running when the action was discontinued on 4 February 2008 so that the claims were barred when the writ was issued on 30 March 2015, well after 4 February 2014. The Consent Judgment issued on 20 April 2009 merely quantified the loss flowing from causes of action that had already accrued. In so holding, they applied Kensland Realty Ltd v Tai, Tang & Chong[17] and we do not consider it reasonably arguable that they were wrong on this point. D.4 Question 2(b) and “or otherwise” 22.Yanfull seeks to contend that on a claim like the present, alleging that the Hong Kong court’s procedure has been abused, the Hong Kong court cannot be forum non conveniens, relying also on various factors connecting the case to Hong Kong.[18] The Court of Appeal held that, in seeking leave to serve outside the jurisdiction, Yanfull has the burden of showing that Hong Kong is clearly the more appropriate forum and that, looking at all relevant factors, that burden had not been discharged.[19] As the Court of Appeal pointed out, its remarks concerning the appropriate forum were obiter. They do not provide any basis for granting leave on the exceptional “or otherwise” basis. We do not accept Mr Barlow SC’s suggestion that this leaves the law on forum non conveniens in disarray. In SPH v SA,[20]this Court recently endorsed a restatement of the relevant principles by the Court of Appeal in DGC v SLC (née C).[21] 23.The application was accordingly dismissed.
Mr Barrie Barlow SC and Mr David Chen, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the Plaintiff (Applicant) Mr Kenny C.P. Lin and Mr Lincoln Cheung, instructed by YTL & Co., for the Defendant (Respondent) [1] It was apparently de-listed in Malaysia on 19 April 2016 for failure to issue outstanding financial statements: J §3. [2] HCA 687/2015 (15 April 2016). [3] Lam VP, Kwan JA and Macrae JA, CACV 114/2016 (15 March 2017). [4] Statement of claim (“SOC”) §14. [5] SOC §16. [6] SOC § 27. [7] J §§39-40. [8] J §39. [9] [2013] 1 HKLRD 1186 at §§22-23 citing Prosperous Tone Ltd v Pearl Fame Development Ltd [2002] 3 HKC 578 at §5, applying Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society v Ricketts [1993] 1 WLR 1545 at 1551E; and CT Bowring & Co (Insurance) Ltd v Corsi & Partners Ltd [1994] BCC 713 at p 729-731. [10] Appearing with Mr David Chen for the applicant. [11] SOC §§38-39. [12] J §§41-42. [13] CA §73. [14] CA §§44-45. [15] CA §41. [16] CA §52. [17] (2008) 11 HKCFAR 237: see §§51, 157 and 160. [18] CA §§80-81. [19] CA§§82-83. [20] (2014) 17 HKCFAR 364 at §50. [21] [2005] 2 HKC 293. |
Cases cited in this judgment