Tai Yuk Cheung v. Hung Sing Construction Engineering Co. and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCPI 298/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 November 2017.
1. This is the plaintiff’s second application for specific discovery. I have already dismissed the plaintiff’s first application in a Decision dated 1 June 2016 (the “Previous Decision”). The background of the case has been set out in some details in the Previous Decision so I need not repeat here.
Cites 1 case
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HCPI 298/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 298 OF 2015 _________________________
_________________________ Before: Master Leong in Chambers Date of Hearing: 1 November 2017 Date of Decision: 30 November 2017 ___________________ D E C I S I O N ___________________ 1.This is the plaintiff’s second application for specific discovery. I have already dismissed the plaintiff’s first application in a Decision dated 1 June 2016 (the “Previous Decision”). The background of the case has been set out in some details in the Previous Decision so I need not repeat here. 2.Incidentally, the plaintiff made the application under “Order 24 Rule 7A of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4” which is wrong: it should be under Order 24 Rule 7. 3.In this application, the plaintiff is seeking discovery of 3 “classes” of documents. Documents on “instruction or training” 4.The plaintiff firstly sought:
5.Paragraph 8 of the witness statement of Chu Kau dated 5 January 2016 stated, as translated into English:
6.Paragraph 5of the witness statement of To Cheuk Hon dated 5 January 2016 stated, as translated into English:
7.In short, what both statements stated was no more than: when building materials impede work, the worker is expected to apply his common sense to ask someone responsible to move them etc. 8.The plaintiff’s application cannot be more misconceived: nowhere in these paragraphs can one find any “contention by the 1st and 2nd defendants that the plaintiff had been instructed or trained – to arrange himself the removal of the glass window panes himself”, let alone any evidence that there are documents for such “instructions or trainings”. 9.Suffice to say, in the Third Affidavit of Patrick Michael Burke (the plaintiff’s solicitor) filed on 12 May 2017, he raised no evidence to support any belief that there was such “instructions and trainings” and further that documents on such existed. 10.One would have thought that if the plaintiff had received “instructions and trainings” and had come across any documents on the matter, he himself, and not Mr. Burke, should have made the affidavit. In fact, Mr. Burke stated in his Third Affidavit (in paragraph 20) that “The plaintiff does not agree that there was such a system” of training. 11.I am baffled as to the logic of Mr. Burke in seeking specific discovery of documents of training when the plaintiff stated that there was no system of training and the defendants never said that there was. 12.In the Previous Decision, I have raised concern about the handling of this case by Mr. Burke and this is another example. One concern is whether Mr. Burke has failed to read the witness statements properly, or whether he has failed to understand the basic concept of specific discovery that he needed to produce evidence to support the belief that “the party from whom discovery is sought under this rule has, or at some time had, in his possession, custody or power the documents…described in the application…” (Order 24, r.7(3) Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2018 edition P.631). 13.Either scenario would be troubling given the experience of Mr. Burke, but if Mr. Burke has not misread the witness statements nor misconceived the legal concept of specific discovery, the alternative explanation might be that this was a deliberate attempt to waste time and costs, and to “bully” the other party into an oppressive time and costs wasting exercise at the same time. 14.I understand that the solicitors for the 1st and 2nd defendants have, before the hearing, written to Mr. Burke confirming that there was no such document. Mr. Burke confirmed that he was no longer pursuing such, and the only matter concerned would be costs. 15.Mr. Burke somehow sought to justify this application because “the defendants had neglected to respond to the written request for such documents” and sought costs. 16.It was, of course, Mr. Burke who “neglected” to properly read (or, worst, intentionally misread) the witness statements in the first place. It should be to clear any reasonably competent lawyer that pursuing specific discovery of such documents was futile right from the beginning. I see no reason why the defendants should be “bullied” into a time wasting exercise arguing the obvious. Documents to record “inspection system” 17.The plaintiff also sought:
18.Paragraph 12of the witness statement of To Cheuk Hon dated 5 January 2016 stated, as translated into English:
19.Paragraph 14 stated, as translated into English:
20.First of all, the drafting of the application was ambiguous: Mr. To was talking about 2 different procedures in paragraph 12: a daily morning safety meeting and a safety meeting between the Safety Department and the subcontractors from time to time, and a further procedure in paragraph 14: a daily routine site inspection. Only the last procedure concerned with site inspection. Is the plaintiff asking for documents recording all 3 procedures or just on “inspections of work places”? 21.Secondly, I would also question the relevance: the plaintiff failed to specify a time period for such documents. There are daily safety meetings and inspections so I cannot see how they can all be relevant to the case. 22.Mr. Burke suggested that he would ask for documents covering 3 months prior to the accident and 3 months after. He said he needed these documents to show that the defendants had fallen below the standard in safety. I think this is the very definition of a “fishing exercise”. 23.The only relevant purpose in seeking these “records” is to address this issue: were the defendants aware that there was any (alleged) unsafe storage of the glass panes at the relevant time? 24.During the hearing, Ms. Yuen, the solicitor for 1st and 2nd defendants, submitted that she would not oppose to this application if it was properly redrafted by the court. 25.However, besides the requirements of clarity and relevance, the court still needs to be satisfied that there is evidence to support the belief that such documents existed and in possession of the defendants etc.. Otherwise, the court should not entertain a time and costs wasting exercise. 26.In his Third Affidavit, Mr. Burke stated, in paragraph 10, that:
27.During the hearing, Mr. Burke referred extensively to this “Safe Working Cycle Handbook” (the “Handbook”) including the chapters titled “Hazard Identification Activity”, “Safety Inspection” and “Final Check After Work”. He also referred to the appendix of the Handbook which contains various forms and checklists. 28.In short, Mr. Burke argued that this Handbook specified that various meetings or inspections should take place each day etc. and various forms, records and checklists etc. should be completed. In Mr. Burke’s Third Affidavit, under paragraph 23 (2), after referring to various pages in the Handbook, he stated(my underlining):
29.This was therefore the basis of the evidence for Mr. Burke’s belief that such documents existed and were in the possession of the defendants. 30.Of course, I have gone through this Handbook in the plaintiff’s last application and under paragraph 54 of the Previous Decision, I already stated:
31.I have not explained further then (since Mr. Burke, at the hearing of the last application, did not refer to the Handbook at all) but now, with this being Mr. Burke’s “second bite at the cherry”, I will elaborate. 32.Mr. Burke maintained that the “Safe Working Cycle” in the Handbook“appears to be standard practice” and that the requirements stated there “would be what is required under Part 1 of Schedule 4 of the FIU (Safety Management) Regulation, Cap. 59 AF” and thus “there must be written records with the minimum being….the Check Lists” (paragraphs 10, 23 (1) and (2) of Mr. Burke’s Third Affidavit). 33.However, if Mr. Burke had bothered to read the “Preface” of the Handbook, he would have read this (my underlining):
34.And further, under “An Introduction to the Safe Working Cycle Handbook”, it is stated (my underlining):
35.Thus, it should be clear to anyone reading the Handbook that the “Safe Working Cycle” is meant to be “a concept”, “a model”, “a reference” and only “one of the tools” for individual organisations to tailor and adjust according to individual needs to establish their own safety management systems. The Handbook is not meant to provide a “standard practice” or a set of “regulations” to be strictly abided to. 36.Therefore, the fact that various forms and checklists are mentioned in the Handbook is not evidence that such documents should exist in the current case. (And even if they exist, there is still the question of whether any of those forms and checklists are relevant to the claim.) 37.There was nothing in Mr. To’s evidence that the defendants have produced any such forms and checklists. It might be that the defendants implement the daily site inspection and various safety meetings but did not implement writing Safety Inspection Checklists etc. There was no suggestion in the Handbook that such “adjustments” would be inappropriate. 38.In the Previous Decision (under paragraph 97), I have questioned whether Mr. Burke had actually read the materials he exhibited in his Affidavit, including this 66-pages-long Handbook. 39.The Previous Decision was dated 1 June 2016. Mr. Burke took out the current application almost one year later on 12 May 2017. It would appear that he still has not read the Handbook properly. 40.As stated above, the only purpose for seeking such “records” was to establish whether the defendants were aware that there was any (alleged) unsafe storage of the glass panes at the relevant time. 41.Given what Mr. To had stated in his witness statement, I would think that a much simpler and cheaper way forward is to raise interrogatories along the lines of whether, during any of the safety meetings or routine inspections at the relevant time of the accident, any safety concerns were raised or detected regarding storage of glass panes and whether any safety measures were implemented as a result. This issue would then be adequately addressed. There was no need to waste time and costs to peruse and produce voluminous materials, and to seek repeated specific discoveries. 42.Of course, I would question whether this was an important issue in the first place. As stated in paragraph 7 of the Previous Decision:
43.Thus, once the plaintiff could establish that there was an unsafe working environment, the question of whether the defendants were aware of this or not might arguably be an academic question: the defendants either failed to detect an unsafe situation or they have detected such but still failed to prevent the current accident. In either scenario, the defendants would likely be found negligent. 44.With the CJR, Mr. Burke must be aware that there should be a sense of time / costs proportionality in addressing such a “non-core” issue. This should be something to bear in mind even if he was simply raising interrogatories. Pursuing a second round of application of specific discovery basing on materials which he (again) failed to read through properly was a travesty of the spirit of the CJR. Documents to record relevant matters in safety meetings 45.Thirdly, the plaintiff also sought:
46.I have already produced paragraph 12 of Mr. To’s witness statement in paragraph 18 above. 47.Suffice to say, my observations in paragraphs 25 to 44 above would apply to this request as well. In short, there is no evidence that such documents existed: the Handbook does not provide a “standard practice” and Mr. To did not give evidence that such documents existed. 48.As pointed out by Ms. Yuen, I have already addressed this particular point in paragraphs 99 and 100 of the Previous Decision:
49.There is no evidence before me that this is the scenario here. This is again Mr. Burke’s “second bite at the cherry”. Order 50.I would accordingly dismiss the plaintiff’s application. 51.In the Pervious Decision, I have already expressed my concern with how Mr. Burke was handling the plaintiff’s case. That should have served as a “fair warning”. However, by taking out this second application on essentially the same matter, it is clear that Mr. Burke did not take heed at all. (Incidentally, Mr. Burke has again exhibited voluminous materials in his affidavit (“UK Pre-Action Protocol” and an entire Chapter from a textbook on construction site safety) which are largely irrelevant.) 52.A further concern is that Legal Aid Department has notified the court that the aided person’s Legal Aid Certificate does not cover the current application. 53.I therefore do not know under what capacity Mr. Burke is acting in this application. I also do not know if the defendants have been made aware of this position before the application. Further, even if the plaintiff is now personally instructing Mr. Burke for this application, I see no reason why the plaintiff should fund the costs. I would think that the plaintiff should be able to rely on the professionalism of his lawyer, as a minimal, to properly read all the documents before embarking on a costly application. 54.Like the first application, I am considering whether it is appropriate to give a wasted costs order. I am inviting the parties to fix a hearing for 30 minutes on the issue of costs, and it would be an opportunity for Mr. Burke to address me on why a wasted cost order should not be considered, as well as the issue of his capacity of representation in this application.
Mr. Patrick Burke of Burke & Company, for the plaintiff Ms. Nora Yuen of William Lee and Associates, for the defendants | |||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCPI 298/2015