Dacheng International Legal Services Ltd and Another v. Yeuk Lung Benedict and Another

HCA 2409/2015

[2018] HKCFI 780

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 2409 OF 2015

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DECISION

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INTRODUCTION

1.This is the Plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment against the Defendants arising out of the latter’s use of the name or mark bearing the words “DACHENG” or “大成”. 

BASIC FACTS

2.The 2^nd Plaintiff (“Dacheng Beijing”), with its head office in Beijing, is a partnership organized and formed under the laws of the PRC in around April 1992 offering and providing legal services to its clients in the PRC and overseas.  According to the Plaintiffs, Dacheng Beijing is one of the largest law firms in the PRC with 168 partners and 2,106 qualified lawyers.  Dacheng Beijing has around 38 offices all over Mainland China, including in particular a branch office in Guangzhou (“Dacheng Guangzhou”).  Over the years, Dacheng Beijing has also entered into association or cooperation agreements with various law firms overseas, including law firms in Singapore, Israel, Ireland, Canada, South Africa and the USA, and has established branch offices in Taiwan, New York, Chicago, Paris and Moscow. 

3.Dacheng Beijing is the registered proprietor of a number of trademarks in the PRC (“the Dacheng PRC Trademarks”) bearing or incorporating the words “DACHENG” and/or “大成”, full particulars whereof are set out in paragraph 14 of the Amended Statement of Claim. 

4.Mr Yang Jinzhu (“Mr Yang”) was formerly a partner of a law firm in Guangzhou, PRC, known as “广东信扬律师事务所/Guangdong Xin Yang Law Firm” (“Xin Yang Guangdong”). 

5.Xin Yang Guangdong had operated a foreign law firm in Hong Kong in the name of “Guangdong Xin Yang Law Firm (Hong Kong)/廣東信揚香港律師事務” (“Xin Yang HK”) since around 2006. 

6.The 1^st Defendant (“Mr Sze”), a qualified lawyer in (inter alia) the PRC and Hong Kong, joined Xin Yang Guangdong and Xin Yang HK in about 2008. 

7.By a written agreement dated 2 April 2010 (“the Merger Agreement”) entered into between (a) Dacheng Beijing, (b) Xin Yang Guangdong, (c) Dacheng Guangzhou, and (d) Xin Yang HK:-

(1)   Xin Yang Guangdong agreed to merge with, and become part of, Dacheng Guangzhou; and

(2)   Xing Yang Guangdong agreed to transfer Xing Yang HK to become the Hong Kong branch of Dacheng Beijing.

8.The name of Xing Yang HK was changed to “Dacheng Law Office/大成律師事務所” in May 2010, which was further changed to “Dacheng Law Offices/大成律師事務所” in May 2013.  Dacheng Law Office(s)/大成律師事務所” shall hereinafter be referred to as “Dacheng HK”. 

9.In June 2010, Mr Sze became a partner of Dacheng HK, then a foreign law firm in Hong Kong. 

10.On or about 10 September 2010, Mr Sze, being the sole shareholder and director of the 2^nd Defendant (incorporated in Hong Kong on 21 February 2008), changed its name from Capital Avenue Limited to “Dacheng Legal Services Limited/大成法律服務有限公司” (“Dacheng LS”).  It is the Plaintiffs’ case that Dacheng Beijing was not aware of this matter until around October 2012 in circumstances more particularly described below. 

11.In or around September 2011, Dacheng Beijing authorized Mr Yang to incorporate the 1^st Plaintiff (“Dacheng Int’s LS”) in Hong Kong with a view to using it as the management company of Dacheng Beijing’s Hong Kong office.  Dacheng Int’s LS was accordingly incorporated in Hong Kong on 16 September 2011, with Mr Yang as its sole shareholder and director.  At all material times, Mr Yang holds his shares in Dacheng Int’s LS on behalf of Dacheng Beijing. 

12.On or about 1 November 2010, Mr Sze procured Dacheng LS to apply for, and subsequently obtained, registration of various trademarks in Hong Kong (“the Dacheng HK Trademarks”) bearing or incorporating the words “DACHENG” and/or “大成” or the logo used by Dacheng Beijing in the Dacheng PRC Trademarks, full particulars whereof are set out in paragraph 15 of the Amended Statement of Claim. 

(1)   It is the Plaintiffs’ case that Mr Sze did so without first obtaining the consent of Dacheng Beijing, and they did not become aware of the same until around October 2012. 

(2)   On the other hand, it is the Defendants’ case that Mr Guo (a partner of Dacheng Beijing) and Mr Yang were at all material times aware of the registration of Dacheng HK Trademarks in the name of Dacheng LS. 

13.It is further the Plaintiffs’ case that:-

(1)   In around October 2012, one Mr Ma, who was then in charge of Dacheng HK, suggested to other partners of Dacheng HK (including Mr Sze) that they should apply for trademark registrations for “DACHENG” and “大成” in Hong Kong. 

(2)   In response, Mr Sze told Mr Ma and other partners of Dacheng HK for the first time that he had already registered the Dacheng HK Trademarks in the name of Dacheng LS. 

(3)   Mr Sze acknowledged that the Dacheng HK Trademarks belong to Dacheng Beijing and explained that he registered the Dacheng HK Trademarks in order to protect the sole and exclusive interests of Dacheng Beijing. 

(4)   Mr Sze also orally agreed to assign the Dacheng HK Trademarks to Dacheng Beijing to reflect the true position. 

14.On the other hand, the Defendants deny that Mr Sze acknowledged that the Dacheng HK Trademarks belong to Dacheng Beijing, or explained that the Dacheng HK Trademarks were registered by him (in the name of Dacheng LS) for or on behalf of Dacheng Beijing.  The Defendants say that the Dacheng HK Trademarks are, and at all materials times were, held by Dacheng LS for and on behalf of Dacheng HK. 

15.Anyhow, by a written partnership resolution of Dacheng HK dated 7 October 2012 which was signed by (inter alia) Mr Sze, it was resolved that Mr Sze should transfer all intellectual property rights held in the name of Dacheng LS, including trademarks, to Dacheng HK or Dacheng Int’s LS for no consideration. 

16.On or about 8 November 2012, Mr Sze procured Dacheng LS to apply to transfer the Dacheng HK Trademarks to Dacheng Int’s LS pursuant to an “Application or notice to register registrable transaction (other than a licence), Request to amend or remove registered particulars of security interest” in Trade Mark Form T10 (“the 2012 Transfer”).  The relevant transfer was registered at the Hong Kong Trade Marks Registry on or about 26 June 2013. 

17.On 23 July 2013, with the approval of The Law Society of Hong Kong, Dacheng HK was converted from a foreign law firm into a local law firm, and Mr Sze became the principal and sole practitioner of Dacheng HK because the other partners of Dacheng HK were not qualified to practise Hong Kong law. 

18.In 2014, differences arose between Beijing Dacheng and Mr Sze regarding a proposed cooperation arrangement between Dacheng HK and Loong & Yeung with the ultimate goal of achieving a global merger between Dacheng Beijing and Dentons LLP in 2015. 

19.Mr Sze was not in favour of the proposed cooperation arrangement between Dacheng HK and Loong & Yeung.  On or about 23 November 2014, he contacted Mr Clement Loong of Loong & Yeung to inform the latter that the cooperation arrangement would not be further pursued.  According to the Plaintiffs, what Mr Sze did was without the prior knowledge or consent of Beijing Dacheng. 

20.A cooperation agreement was eventually signed between Dacheng Beijing and Loong & Yeung on 25 November 2014. 

21.It is the Plaintiffs’ case that on 26 November 2014, at a meeting held at the Hong Kong office of Dacheng HK, Messrs Xiao, Qian, Liu and Xiong (on behalf of Dacheng Beijing) told Mr Sze that his aforesaid conduct had a negative impact on the reputation of Dacheng Beijing and was against the overall development plan of Dacheng Beijing, and demanded Mr Sze to change the name of Dacheng HK and not to use Dacheng Beijing’s brand name (ie, “DACHENG” or “大成”) anymore.  Further, according to the Plaintiffs, Mr Sze did not object to Dacheng Beijing’s demand as aforesaid. 

22.On the other hand, the Defendants say that at the meeting on 26 November 2014, whilst Mr Xiao had complained about Mr Sze’s decision of not agreeing to the proposed cooperation arrangement with Loong & Yeung, he never requested Dacheng HK to change its name or stated anything to the effect that Dacheng HK could not use the brand name of Dacheng Beijing anymore.

23.There is no dispute that the relationship between Beijing Dacheng and Dacheng HK as the former’s branch office in Hong Kong came to an end in or about December 2014.  There is also no dispute Mr Sze has refused to change the name of Dacheng HK or stop using the brand name of “DACHENG” or “大成” despite Dacheng Beijing’s repeated requests or demands.  Indeed, the Defendants admit that they have used the names and marks “DACHENG”, “DACHENG LAW OFFICES”, “大成律師事務所” and ‘DACHENG LEGAL SERVICES” (see paragraph 41 of the Defence). 

24.On or about 2 December 2014, Mr Sze applied to transfer the Dacheng HK Trademarks back to Dacheng LS pursuant to another Trade Mark Form T10 (“the 2014 Transfer”) dated 1 December 2014 which was signed or purportedly signed by Mr Yang as director on behalf of Dacheng Int’s LS. The transfer was registered at the Hong Kong Trade Marks Registry on or about 11 February 2015. 

25.Originally, the Plaintiffs alleged that the 2014 Transfer was not signed by Mr Yang (see paragraph 26 of the Statement of Claim).  This allegation has been deleted in paragraph 26 of the Amended Statement of Claim.  The Plaintiffs’ current case is that Mr Yang had no authority to transfer the Dacheng HK Trademarks back to Dacheng HK. 

26.The Defendants’ case in relation to the transfer back of the Dacheng HK Trademarks from Dacheng Int’s LS to Dacheng LS is set out in paragraph 19 of the Defence, as follows:-

“(a) [The 2014 Transfer] was indeed signed by Yang.

(b) [The 2014 Transfer] was signed by Yang at the same time and on the same occasion when [the 2012 Transfer] was signed.

(c) [The 2012 Transfer] was signed on the condition that the shares of [Dacheng Int’s LS] would be transferred to Ma, who would then hold the shares on trust for [Dacheng HK], i.e. the 1^st Defendant herein.

(d) As a safeguard to the above condition, Yang signed and provided [Dacheng LS] with [the 2014 Transfer] so that [Dacheng LS] could transfer the [Dacheng HK Trademarks] back to itself and hold them on trust for [Dacheng HK] in case of default in the change of shares of [Dacheng Int’s LS].

(e) There has never been any change of shares of [Dacheng Int’s LS] as agreed. As a result, [Dacheng LS] submitted and filed [the 2014 Transfer] with the Trade Marks Registry and had the [Dacheng HK Trademarks] transferred back it itself, and [Dacheng LS] holds the [Dacheng HK Trademarks] on trust for [Dacheng HK], i.e. the 1^st Defendant herein.

(f) Irrespective of whose name appears as the registered proprietor of the [Dacheng HK Trademarks], it is the common intention and understanding of all parties that the [Dacheng HK Trademarks] and the rights thereof should vest in and belong to [Dacheng HK], i.e. the 1^st Defendant herein.  In other words, [Dacheng HK] is and was at all material times the beneficial owner of the [Dacheng HK Trademarks].” 

27.It is also the Defendants’ case that any goodwill in Hong Kong in respect of the name or mark of “DACHENG” or “大成” would have been generated by Dacheng HK, and Dacheng HK should be the owner of such goodwill (see paragraph 36 of the Defence). 

28.The Plaintiffs commenced the present action on 16 October 2015.  A Statement of Claim was filed in November 2015.  The Defendants filed their Defence in February 2016.  The Plaintiffs amended the Statement of Claim in February 2017.  In the Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs raise the following principal complaints against the Defendants:-

(1)   unlawful transfer of the Dacheng HK Trademarks to Dacheng LS;

(2)   passing off; and

(3)   trademark infringement under Sections 18(1) and 63 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, Cap 559. 

29.The Plaintiffs made the present application on 15 March 2017.  There has, undoubtedly, been some delay in making the application for which there is, in my view, no good or sufficient explanation. This delay is relied upon by Mr Philips Wong (counsel for the Defendants).  It is a matter that the court would take into account in the overall evaluation of whether summary judgment ought to be granted in this case, but it is by no means a strong or conclusive factor. 

30.For the purpose of the present application, the evidence before the court consists of:-

(1)   on the Plaintiffs’ side – an affirmation from each of Mr Xiao and Mr Ma, and two affirmations from each of Mr Yang and Ms Kang; and

(2)   on the Defendants’ side – an affirmation from Mr Sze. 

DISCUSSION

31.The applicable principles for an application for summary judgment are well established and do not have to be repeated here. 

32.I shall first deal with the passing off claim.  It is well established that the claimant in a passing off claim must establish a goodwill (in the country or region) in a business in the supply of goods or services distinguished by a name or mark that has been, or likely will be, damaged by conduct of the defendant that is misleading or deceptive to the public (see Re Ping On Securities Ltd (2009) 12 HKCFAR 808, at [17] per Gault NPJ).  There, Gault NPJ quoted the three elements of the tort of passing off as formulated by Lord Oliver in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] RPC 341 at 406, as follows –

“The law of passing off can be summarised in one short general proposition, no man may pass off his goods as those of another. More specifically, it may be expressed in terms of the elements which the plaintiff in such an action has to prove in order to succeed. These are three in number. First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying ‘get-up’ (whether it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff’s goods or services. Second, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff. Whether the public is aware of the plaintiff’s identity as the manufacturer or supplier of the goods or services is immaterial, as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff. For example, if the public is accustomed to rely on a particular brand name in purchasing goods of a particular description, it matters not at all that there is little or no public awareness of the identity of the proprietor of the brand name. Third, he must demonstrate that he suffers or, in a quia timet action, that he is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant’s misrepresentation that the source of the defendant’s goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff.”

33.Further, the claimant in a passing off claim in Hong Kong must establish that it has actual goodwill in this jurisdiction for the products or services in question.  “[W]here the claimant’s business is abroad, people who are in the jurisdiction, but who are not customers of the claimant in the jurisdiction, will not do, even if they are customers of the claimant when they go abroad”: Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc [2015] 1 WLR 2628, at [47] per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC. 

34.In paragraphs 52 to 55 of his judgment in Starbucks, Lord Neuberger further explained the concept of goodwill and the notion that goodwill in the context of passing off was territorial in nature, as follows:-

“[52] As to what amounts to a sufficient business to amount to goodwill, it seems clear that mere reputation is not enough… The claimant must show that it has a significant goodwill, in the form of customers, in the jurisdiction, but it is not necessary that the claimant actually has an establishment or office in this country. In order to establish goodwill, the claimant must have customers within the jurisdiction, as opposed to people in the jurisdiction who happen to be customers elsewhere. Thus, where the claimant's business is carried on abroad, it is not enough for a claimant to show that there are people in this jurisdiction who happen to be its customers when they are abroad. However, it could be enough if the claimant could show that there were people in this jurisdiction who, by booking with, or purchasing from, an entity in this country, obtained the right to receive the claimant's service abroad. And, in such a case, the entity need not be a part or branch of the claimant: it can be someone acting for or on behalf of the claimant…

[53] As to Lord Diplock's statement in the Star Industrial case [1976] FSR 256 that, for the purpose of determining whether a claimant in a passing off action can establish the first of Lord Oliver's three elements, an English court has to consider whether the claimant can establish goodwill in England, I consider that it was correct. In other words, when considering whether to give protection to a claimant seeking relief for passing off, the court must be satisfied that the claimant's business has goodwill within its jurisdiction.

[54] It would be wrong to suggest that there is a rule of law that, whatever the point at issue, goodwill has to be divided between jurisdictions, not least because (unsurprisingly) we have not had an exhaustive analysis of all the circumstances in which goodwill may have to be considered by the court. However, it seems to me that, when it comes to a domestic, common law issue such as passing off, an English court has to consider the factual position in the UK. That is well illustrated by the fact that, even if PCCM's argument was accepted and it was enough for a claimant merely to establish a reputation, that reputation would still have to be within the jurisdiction.

[55] The notion that goodwill in the context of passing off is territorial in nature is also supported by refusal of judges to accept that a court of one jurisdiction has power to make orders in relation to the goodwill in another jurisdiction.”

35.Where, as in the present case, a local entity is permitted to use a name or mark belonging to a foreign entity and goodwill is generated from such use locally, the question of who owns the goodwill is a question of fact to be decided on the evidence before the court.  The agreement between the parties is relevant, and if there are contractual terms governing the ownership of goodwill, the court will give effect to them.  Otherwise, the matter will have to be resolved by way of a factual inquiry and there are no hard and fast legal rules in binding precedents or in factual or legal presumptions (see Guangzhou Green-Enhan Bio-Engineering Co Ltd v Green Power Health Products International Co Limited, HCA 4651/2002, 8 April 2005, at [70] and [82] per Lam J (as he then was)).

36.In the present case, it cannot seriously be disputed that goodwill does exist in the business relating to the supply of legal services in Hong Kong distinguished by the name or mark of “DACHENG” or “大成”.  The fact that a foreign, and subsequently local, law firm in the name of “Dacheng Law Office(s)/大成律師事務所” has existed and carried on business in Hong Kong since around May 2010 would have generated such goodwill in Hong Kong.  The real issue is whether the goodwill belongs to Dacheng Beijing or Mr Sze.

37.As earlier mentioned, the Defendants’ case is that such goodwill belongs to “Dacheng HK”.  It is important to appreciate, however, that “Dacheng HK” (ie, Dacheng Law Office(s)/大成律師事務所) is not a legal entity but merely the name of a law firm.  Prior to 23 July 2013, the firm was a partnership.  Since 23 July 2012 it has become a sole proprietorship, with Mr Sze being registered as the principal of that firm with The Law Society of Hong Kong.  More significantly, it is clear that Mr Sze used, and was permitted by Dacheng Beijing to use, the name or mark of “DACHENG” or “大成” in carrying on the sole proprietorship business of Dacheng HK because, and only because, that firm was regarded as a branch office of Beijing Dacheng.  That Mr Sze carried on the business of Dacheng HK as a branch office of Beijing Dacheng was recognized by him in various documents, including:-

(1)   a confirmation dated 10 May 2013 signed by Mr Sze, in which Mr Sze stated that he would carry out all the proposals and resolutions of the Management Committee of Beijing Dacheng relating to the Hong Kong branch office (ie, Dacheng HK); and

(2)   the minutes of a partnership meeting of Dacheng HK held on 16 July 2013 (shortly before the foreign firm became a local law firm in Hong Kong), which were signed by (inter alia) Mr Sze, in which it was stated Dacheng HK, after its localization, would be under the control of the Hong Kong Working Committee of the Management Committee of Dacheng Beijing. 

38.Further, in the association agreement entered into between Dacheng HK and Lo & Lo dated 2 September 2013, it was stated, in recital (1) thereto, that Dacheng HK was a branch office of Dacheng Beijing in Hong Kong.  That agreement was signed by Mr Sze on behalf of Dacheng HK. 

39.In such circumstances, I consider it to be the clear understanding between Beijing Dacheng and Mr Sze that any goodwill which might exist in the business relating to the supply of legal services in Hong Kong distinguished by the name or mark of “DACHENG” or “大成” would belong to Beijing Dacheng.  It could not sensibly have been the intention or agreement of the parties that Mr Sze would be entitled to use the name or mark of “DACHENG” or “大成” in his own business, or use or exploit any goodwill attached to the name or mark of “DACHENG” or “大成” generated from carrying on the business of Dacheng HK as a branch office of Beijing Dacheng for his own benefit. 

40.The remaining two elements of a passing off claim, namely, misrepresentation/deception and damage, seem to me to be obvious on the facts of the present case.  To permit Mr Sze to continue to carry on the business of provision of legal services in Hong Kong using the name or mark of “DACHENG” or “大成” would plainly give rise to a real likelihood or risk that users of legal services in Hong Kong would be misled into believing that the services provided by Mr Sze are those of or connected with Dacheng Beijing, and Dacheng Beijing would likely suffer damage by reason of such erroneous belief. 

41.The other two complaints raised by the Plaintiffs can be disposed of shortly. 

(1)   In so far as the transfer of the Dacheng HK Trademarks to Dacheng LS in December 2014 is concerned, there is plainly a dispute of fact as to whether it was carried out in the circumstances as alleged in paragraph 19 of the Defence, which are further elaborated in paragraphs 65 to 73 of Mr Sze’s Affirmation filed on 8 August 2017.  If the basic facts relating to the transfer of the Dacheng HK Trademarks to Dacheng LS in December 2014 are as alleged by Mr Sze, the Defendants have, I consider, an arguable defence to the Plaintiffs’ complaint of unlawful transfer of the Dacheng HK Trademarks as currently formulated which ought to go to trial.  It is not appropriate to conduct a mini-trial on affidavit evidence to decide whether Mr Sze’s evidence ought to be accepted.  Mr Sze’s evidence cannot, in my view, be dismissed as “incredible” for the purpose of the present summary judgment application.  The fact that the Plaintiffs have substantially changed their complaint from “forgery” to “lack of authority” on the part of Mr Yang to sign the 2014 Transfer also makes it quite inappropriate to uphold the Plaintiffs’ complaint of unlawful transfer at this stage without hearing the oral evidence of Mr Yang and Mr Sze respectively.  I should make it clear that I have considered the Plaintiffs’ allegation of unlawful transfer of the Dacheng HK Trademarks strictly on the basis of their claim as currently formulated.  There may be other bases on which the Plaintiffs can seek to annul the transfer, or require Dacheng LS to transfer the Dacheng HK Trademarks back to Dacheng Int’l LS.  However, such bases have not been pleaded and will not be further considered here.

(2)   In so far as the Plaintiffs’ case is based on Section 18(1) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, since Dacheng Beijing (the 1^st Plaintiff) has never been the registered owner of the Dacheng HK Trademarks, it has no cause of action for trademark infringement under Section 22(1) of that Ordinance.  On the other hand, whether Dacheng Int’s LS (the 2^nd Plaintiff) has any cause of action for trademark infringement would depend on, amongst other things, the validity of the transfer of the Dacheng HK Trademarks to Dacheng LS in December 2014. 

(3)   In so far as the Plaintiffs’ case is based on Section 63 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, Mr Norman Hui expressly confirmed on behalf of the Plaintiffs at the hearing on 3 January 2018 that the Plaintiffs would not rely on that cause of action for the purpose of the present application for summary judgment.

42.Lastly, I note that there is a suggestion that the Plaintiffs’ claims are or may be barred by acquiescence or unconscionable conduct (see paragraph 82 of Mr Wong’s skeleton skeletons).  The factual matters relied upon in support of this defence, namely, those set out in paragraphs 74 to 78 of Mr Sze’s Affirmation, are not referred to in the Defence filed on 20 February 2016.  I do not consider that the Defendants should be permitted to rely on such defence which has not been pleaded or adequately pleaded.  In any event, the matters relied upon by Mr Sze have been adequately explained by Ms Kang Lili in paragraphs 15 to 19 of her Second Affirmation, and I do not consider that the defence of acquiescence or unconscionable conduct has substance.

DISPOSITION

43.For the foregoing reasons, I find in favour of the Plaintiffs on the passing off claim, and make an order in terms of paragraphs 6 to 15 and 17 of the revised draft order annexed to Au-Yeung, Cheng, Ho & Tin’s letter to the court dated 4 January 2018 (save that all references to the trade mark infringement claim shall be removed). 

44.In relation to the question of costs, I make an order nisi that the Defendants shall pay 70% of the Plaintiffs’ costs of and occasion by the Plaintiffs’ summons dated 15 March 2017, including all reserved costs, to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for one counsel.  The reduction is made on account of the fact that (i) the Plaintiffs have only been partially successful in the application, and (ii) there are breaches of paragraph 4(4) of Practice Direction 5.4 and paragraph 4(d) of Practice Direction 10.1. 

Mr Norman Hui and Ms Theo Li, instructed by Ms Au Yeung, Cheng, Ho & Tin, for the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs

Mr Philips B F Wong, instructed by Ms Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants