Step Billion Investment Ltd v. Monte Generoso Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1482/2017 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 April 2018.
1. By a sale and purchase agreement (the “Agreement”) dated 26 May 2017 entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Plaintiff agreed to purchase and the Defendant agreed to sell the Property known as ALL THAT piece or parcel of ground registered in the Land Registry as THE REMAINING PORTION OF LOT NO 1923 IN DEMARCATION DISTRICT NO 106 together with the messuages erections and buildings thereon (if any) (the “Property”). The price was in the sum of HK$7,050,000. Deposits in the total
Cites 3 cases
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HCMP 1482/2017 [2018] HKCFI 743 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1482 OF 2017 ________________________
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________________________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Joseph Kwan in Court Date of Hearing: 18 January 2018 Date of Judgment: 30 April 2018 ________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________ Background 1.By a sale and purchase agreement (the “Agreement”) dated 26 May 2017 entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Plaintiff agreed to purchase and the Defendant agreed to sell the Property known as ALL THAT piece or parcel of ground registered in the Land Registry as THE REMAINING PORTION OF LOT NO 1923 IN DEMARCATION DISTRICT NO 106 together with the messuages erections and buildings thereon (if any) (the “Property”). The price was in the sum of HK$7,050,000. Deposits in the total sum of HK$705,000 were paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant pursuant to the Agreement. 2.As in any conveyancing transaction, requisitions on title of the Property were raised by the Plaintiff and responses were made by the Defendant. However, the Plaintiff was not satisfied with the answers given by the Defendant in relation to a requisition on the scope of the power of the donee under a power of attorney dated 16 February 2009 (the “Power of Attorney”) that was used to execute an assignment dated 8 October 2009 (the “2009 Assignment”). 3.The requisition in question (the “Requisition”) was contained in paragraph 3 of the letter dated 5 June 2017 from the Plaintiff’s solicitors to the Defendant’s solicitors:
4.On 26 June 2017, the Plaintiff issued a Vendor and Purchaser Summons (the “Summons”) against the Defendant for the following reliefs:
5.The following facts are not in dispute:
6.The recital of the Power of Attorney given by the Donor is in the following terms:
7.It is also not in dispute that:
8.The Plaintiff accepts that there was proper power under the Power of Attorney to execute the 2009 Assignment. The issue is one of scope, namely, whether the terms of the Power of Attorney cover the Property (that formed part of the Lot). The Plaintiff alleges that nowhere in the Power of Attorney set out the full details of the property to which the Power of Attorney applied. The scope of the Power of Attorney is doubtful as Recital (1) only defines the property as certain land(s) and/or premises in the New Territories owned by the Donor. 9.The gist of the Defendant’s argument is that since the Property (or the Lot to which the Property is part of) was in fact owned by the Donor and situated in the New Territories as at the date of the Power of Attorney, it is clear from the language of the Power of Attorney that it applied to the Lot or the Property even though the Lot was not specifically mentioned in the Power of Attorney. Issues 10.The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has failed to answer the Requisition satisfactorily. There are two issues before the Court:
The law 11.It is accepted by the Defendant that, as the vendor, it has a duty to show and give good title to the Property (see clause 15(a) of the Agreement and section 13 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance). It means that not only does the Defendant have to give good title, it also has to answer the requisitions raised by the Plaintiff satisfactorily. These are two separate obligations. The duty to answer requisitions satisfactorily remains even if the vendor does have good title to the property (see Active Keen Industries Ltd v Fok Chi Keong [1994] 2 HKC 67 at p 76 and Kok Chong Ho v Double Value Developments Ltd [1993] 2 HKLR 423 at p 432). If the Defendant has failed to answer the Requisition satisfactorily, it would not be entitled to enforce the Agreement. 12.There is no dispute in this case that under section 13(1)(c) of the Ordinance, the Defendant has to produce the Power of Attorney in proving title. 13.As to whether a requisition has been satisfactorily answered, Fok JA (as he then was) said this in So Mariko v Tse Chun Chung John & anor [2011] 3 HKC 174, at para 39:
The Requisition and the answers 16.As stated above, the Requisition was first raised by the Plaintiff’s solicitors in their letter dated 5 June 2017. 17.On 16 June 2017, the Defendant’s solicitors replied to the Requisition in the following terms:
18.The Plaintiff’s solicitor was not satisfied with the answer. They sent a letter on 21 June 2017 saying:
19.The Defendant’s solicitors replied on the same day stating that: “ We maintain our view that the above property was one of the Donor’s properties in the New Territories and he had appointed the said Chiu But Ting Clement as his lawful attorney to sell his properties in the New Territories. No doubt as to whether the Donee was empowered to execute the said Assignment will arise. Unless you have documentary evidence to show that the Donor has no intention to include the subject Property as part of the certain lands/premises in the said Power of Attorney, your requisition will not be entertained.” 20.On 22 June 2017, the Plaintiff’s solicitors wrote back stating their disagreement with the Defendant’s solicitors. They reiterated the Requisition and their previous view that the Defendant had the duty to prove that the Power of Attorney applied to the Property. 21.The Defendant’s solicitors replied on the same day in these words:
22.By the Plaintiff’s solicitors’ letter dated 23 June 2017, the Plaintiff maintained its disagreement with the Defendant and that the Defendant had failed to answer the Requisition. The Plaintiff’s solicitorsstressed that in the absence of a schedule listing out the lands to be includedin the Power of Attorney, there were doubts as to whether the “certain land(s) and/or premises” did refer to the Property. 23.The Defendant maintained their previous views and threatened to forfeit the Plaintiff’s deposits and make claims against the Plaintiff if the latter failed to complete the sale and purchase by 26 June 2017. The Plaintiff responded on 24 June 2017 disputing that the Defendant was entitled to forfeit the deposits as a result of its failure to answer the Requisition satisfactorily. The Plaintiff also said that it had always been ready and willing to complete the purchase of the Property had the Requisition been answered satisfactorily. Following that, the Plaintiff issued the Summons. The analysis 24.The Defendant’s case is that the absence of a schedule or specific reference to the Property (or the Lot to which it forms a part) would not render the Power of Attorney void or ineffective. The scope of the Power of Attorney was referred to as certain land(s) and/or premises in the New Territories of Hong Kong to which the Donor was the registeredowner of and beneficially entitled to. Even though the Property (or the Lot to which the Property forms a part) was not specifically mentioned, it is clear from the language of the Power of Attorney that the subject matter included the Property, since the Property is located in the New Territories and that at the time of the execution of the Power of Attorney, the Donor was the owner of the Property. 25.Whilst it is desirable for the avoidance of doubt to list out the full details of the relevant property in the body or the schedule of the power of attorney, I am of the view that the absence of the full details of the property is not necessarily fatal, provided that the it is plain from the natural meaning of the language of the power of attorney that it applies to a particular property. 26.In the present case, the Power of Attorney applied to “certain land(s) and/or premises” in the New Territories that was owned by the Donor. Both Mr Wong and Ms Tang accepted that the word “certain” means “some”. In the Oxford Dictionary, “certain” means “to talk about a particular thing or person without naming it or them”. 27.It is not clear from the words “certain land(s) and/or premises in the New Territories” whether it was intended to cover all the properties in the New Territories that were owned by the Donor, or whether they referred to only some of the properties owned by the Donor. If they were referring to only some of the properties of the Donor, it would not necessarily include the Property (or specifically the Lot). Furthermore, as I have pointed out, at the time of the execution of the Power of Attorney, the Donor was only one of the three co-owners of the Lot (to which the Property forms a part). Rather than being the registered and beneficial owner of the Lot or the Property, the Donor was only one of the registered and beneficial owners. 28.Mr Wong sought to rely on the facts of the case of Lo Hung Biu v Lo Shea Chung & Another [1997] HKLRD 721 and Excelling Profit Investments Ltd v Sera Ltd [1992] 2 HKC 262 where the property was not specifically listed in the power of attorney and there was no objection raised as to the scope of the power of attorney. However, the language of the power of attorney and the circumstances in those cases were different from the present case. No assistance can be drawn to the interpretation of the Power of Attorney. At most, those cases tend to support my conclusion that absence of the full details of the property in a power of attorney is not necessarily fatal. 29.In the premises, I am of the view that the language of the Power of Attorney is ambiguous as to whether it applied to the Property. It was proper for the Plaintiff to raise the Requisition. 30.The next question is whether the Defendant has provided sufficient conveyancing evidence to show that there is no real risk of a challenge that the Power of Attorney did not empower the Donee to enter into the 2009 Assignment on behalf of the Donor. 31.At the hearing, Mr Wong sought to argue that there is no real risk of a challenge of the Donee’s reliance of the Power of Attorney in entering into the 2009 Assignment. He gave the following reasons:
32.It does appear to me that evidence could be provided to show that the risk of a challenge is so remote from the standpoint of a willing purchaser and a wiling vendor, both possessed reasonably robust common sense. However, the Defendant had never attempted in their answer to the Requisition to provide any of these answers or evidence. The gist of the answer was that the language of thePower of Attorney was clear enough to prove the scope since the Property was in the New Territories and the Donor was the owner of it. I have already dealt with this point. In view of the ambiguity, the Defendant should have offered further explanation and evidence in answering the Requisition. It was too late for the Defendant to do so through its Counsel at the hearing. 33.Even assuming that the answer from YTL would most likely be favourable to the Defendant, the Defendant should seek that confirmation in order to show beyond reasonable doubt that there is no real risk of a challenge. 34.The Defendant’s solicitors have also sought to argue that unless the Plaintiff had documentary evidence to show that the Donor had no intention to include the Property as part of the certain lands/premises in the Power of Attorney, there was no obligation to entertain the Requisition. This is clearly wrong as the Defendant has the burden of showing good title. The same argument was rejected in the case of Lo Hung Biu v Lo Shea Chung & Another [1997] HKLRD 721, at 727J to 728A. 35.Mr Wong submitted that the Property had already been sold two times since the execution of the Power of Attorney and there was apparently no objection from the purchasers. There are two problems with this submission. First, the absence of any objection does not necessarily mean there was no issue with the scope of the Power of Attorney. Also, there was no direct evidence to show that no objection was raised in previous transactions. 36.Having looked at the parties’ correspondence on the Requisitionand for the reasons aforesaid, I find that the Defendant had failed to answer the Requisition raised by the Plaintiff satisfactorily. 37.It follows that the Defendant shall return the deposit in the sum of HK$705,000 to the Plaintiff. As to the interest payable, I will set it at 5% per annum. 38.In the Summons, the Plaintiff also claims for the costs of investigating the title of the Property. However, no evidence on such costs was adduced in the affirmation filed by the Plaintiff. In both the Plaintiff’s affirmation and its Counsel’s submission, it only sought to claim for the return of the deposit. In these circumstances, I make no order on the Plaintiff’s claim for the costs of investigating the title of the Property. Order 39.By reason of the foregoing, I make the following Order:
40.In relation to the question of costs, I see no good reason why costs should not follow event. Accordingly, I make an order nisi that the Defendant should pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the Summons including the hearing of the Summons, with certificate for counsel, such costs should be taxed if not agreed. 41.I would like to thank both Counsel for their assistance.
Ms Candy Tang, instructed by Damien Shea & Co, for the plaintiff Mr Timothy Y H Wong, instructed by Chan, Evans, Chung & To, for the defendant | ||||||||||||||||||||||