Secretary for Justice v. Leung Kwok Hung

CACV 200/2017 & CACV 201/2017

[2018] HKCA 340

CACV 200/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 200 OF 2017

(ON APPEAL FROM HCMP NO 3382 OF 2016)

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AND

CACV 201/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 201 OF 2017

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 224 OF 2016)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Poon JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

A. INTRODUCTION

1.By a judgment dated 14 July 2017, Au J granted relief in HCMP 3382/2016 and HCAL 224/2016 against the appellant, having held that the Legislative Council Oath (“Legco Oath”) taken by him on 12 October 2016 was invalid and he had been disqualified as member of the Legislative Council since 12 October 2016 under article 104 of the Basic Law (“BL104”[1]) and the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance, Cap 11, (“ODO”).  The appellant has since appealed.

2.By a summons dated 13 March 2018, the appellant sought leave to call Professor Zhang Qianfan, a professor of law and government of Peking University, to give expert evidence on a number of issues relating to the Interpretation issued by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPCSC”) on 7 November 2016 on BL104 (“Interpretation”).

3.The appellant’s application is opposed by the respondents.

4.Pursuant to the Court’s directions, the appellant has provided a copy of Professor Zhang’s expert report and the parties have filed their written submissions.  After considering the materials, we take the view that the appellant’s application can be properly disposed of on paper without an oral hearing.  We now hand down our judgment.

B. BASIS FOR THE APPLICATION

5.In his reasoning, the Judge stated that the true and proper meaning of BL104 had been set out in §§1 – 3 of the Interpretation, which is binding on all the courts of Hong Kong.  In support, the Judge cited Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211; and Chief Executive of HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council [2017] 1 HKLRD 460.

6.Before the Judge, Mr Martin Lee SC, for the appellant, contended that the Interpretation is not a true and proper interpretation of BL104 as envisaged under BL158 but amounts to an amendment of BL104 and that as such, it does not and cannot operate retrospectively. The Judge rejected Mr Lee’s argument by referring to Chief Executive of HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council, supra, [53] – [59], where the Court of Appeal rejected a similar argument and concluded that the Interpretation provides the true and proper meaning of BL104 and takes effect from 1 July 1997.  The Judge regarded the Court of Appeal’s judgment as binding on him and it was not open to Mr Lee to argue the point before him.

7.In the coming appeal, the appellant will argue the same point.  He needs Professor Zhang’s expert evidence to enable him to contend that :

(1) The Interpretation is invalid because it is not a true and proper interpretation of BL104 in that, by virtue of BL5, BL8, BL18 and BL158 and article 67(3) and (4) of the Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of China (“Constitution”), the NPCSC does not have power to supplement any provision of the Basic Law when interpreting it under BL158.

(2) The Interpretation is irrelevant to the oath taking by the appellant on 12 October 2016 because insofar as it is a supplementation of BL104, it should not, according to the common law, have retrospective effect.

(3) The Interpretation is inapplicable to the appellant because it does not have immediate effect so as to supplement the relevant provisions in the ODO.

8.For present purposes, we need not dwell on Professor Zhang’s evidence.  In Part C2 below, we will highlight certain aspects of his evidence which are determinative of this application.

C. DISCUSSION

9.First and foremost, Mr Lee for the appellant must persuade us to properly exercise our discretion under the well-established principles laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 as applied to public law cases to admit Professor Zhang’s expert evidence before us.  To recap, an appellant seeking to adduce fresh evidence before the Court of Appeal must satisfy the three conditions in Ladd v Marshall :

(1) The fresh evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial;

(2) The fresh evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and

(3) The fresh evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible.

10.While these principles do apply to public law cases, some flexibility is allowed so that in exceptional circumstances where the interests of justice so require, the court may exercise its discretion to depart from them : Dr Kwong Kwok Hay v Medical Council of Hong Kong (No 2) [2007] 4 HKC 446, per Ma CJ at [10].

C1.  First condition

11.Mr Lee argued that now is the first opportunity for the appellant to apply for leave to adduce expert evidence.  This argument requires a closer scrutiny of the relevant factual matrix.

12.On 12 October 2016, individuals elected as members of Legco took their oath in order to assume office.  The manner in which some took their Legco Oath gave rise to various sets of proceedings.

13.The first group of proceedings concerned Sixtus Leung Chung Hang and Yau Wai Ching.  Au J heard submissions on 3 November 2016 and then reserved judgment.  In the meantime, the NPCSC issued the Interpretation on 7 November 2016.  Au J then directed the parties to lodge written submissions on the scope and effect of the Interpretation.  His Lordship handed down judgment on 15 November 2016, now reported as Chief Executive of the HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council [2016] 6 HKC 417.  At [124] of the judgment, Au J recorded the argument that the Interpretation was not a true and proper interpretation of BL104 but amounted to effectively an amendment and it had no retrospective effect under common law.  For the reasons that he gave at [125], Au J thought that such an argument was irrelevant for the disposal of the matters before him.  The Court of Appeal heard the appeal on 24 and 25 November 2016 and handed down its judgment on 30 November 2016, now reported as Chief Executive of the HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council [2017] 1 HKLRD 460.  The Court of Appeal heard the same argument and rejected it : see [17], [52] – [59].

14.Importantly for present purposes, Cheung CJHC said :

“ 56. Thirdly, as to the submission that the Interpretation is only an interpretation in name but an amendment of the Basic Law in substance which can only be done by the National People’s Congress in accordance with art.159 of the Basic Law, this argument does not even get off the evidential ground and must be rejected.  Here, as explained in Chong Fung Yuen in the passage cited above, one is in the interface of “one country two systems”, and, in particular, one is concerned with the other system – that is, the civil law system practised on the Mainland, when it comes to an interpretation by the NPCSC.  When the NPCSC interprets the Basic Law, it is operating under the Mainland’s civil law system.

57. In the absence of any evidence to show what, under a civil law system, particularly the civil law system practised on the Mainland, is regarded as the proper scope of an interpretation of the present type, one simply has no material to argue, let alone to conclude, that what has been done has gone outside the permissible scope of an interpretation.  The view of a common law lawyer, untrained in the civil law system, particularly the civil law system practised on the Mainland, is, with respect, simply quite irrelevant.

58. But more importantly, this present argument raises an a priori question of whether under the Basic Law, the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have ever been vested with the jurisdiction to determine whether an interpretation officially promulgated as such by the NPCSC in accordance with art.67(4) of the Constitution and art.158 of the Basic Law and the procedure therein is invalid on the ground under discussion.  Apart from citing to the Court a passage in Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, 26A-B which must be read together with Ng Ka Ling (No 2) (1999) 2 HKCFAR 141, where the Court of Final Appeal clarified in no uncertain terms that the courts in Hong Kong cannot question ‘the authority of the National People’s Congress or the Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein’ (p.142E), Mr Pun has simply made no submission on this fundamental question of jurisdiction.

59. In my view, the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the issue raised.”

15.Earlier at [53] – [55], the Chief Judge had already rejected the argument that the Interpretation did not have retrospective effect.

16.The second group of proceedings concerned four other individuals, of which the appellant is one.  Those proceedings were commenced on 6 December 2016.  So by then, the appellant must be fully aware of the need to adduce expert evidence to provide the necessary evidential basis for him to advance the same or similar arguments on the nature and effect of the Interpretation, if the court were to entertain them.

17.Because of the public interests involved, Au J directed that the proceedings be dealt with as expeditiously as possible and accordingly gave a tight procedural timetable for the parties to prepare for the hearing which the Judge on 23 January 2017 fixed to be heard on 1 to 3 March 2017.  Up until then, the appellant acted in person.

18.On 20 February 2017, the appellant was granted legal aid.  On 24 February 2017, the appellant’s solicitors wrote to the Department of Justice, asking the latter’s consent to the calling of expert evidence on PRC law pertaining to the power of the NPCSC in interpreting laws and the Interpretation at the trial.  By a letter dated 27 February 2017, the Department of Justice refused to give consent on the ground that the proposed expert evidence was irrelevant and the last-minute request for leave to call expert evidence would cause delay to the trial and cause prejudice to the applicant/plaintiff.

19.In the appellant’s written submissions filed before Au J, he made references to a number of issues concerning the Interpretation and the necessity for the respondents (not the appellant) to adduce expert evidence on PRC law in relation to those issues.

20.At the hearing on 1 March 2017, according to Mr Lee, Au J made it clear to the parties that the nature and effect of the Interpretation had already been decided by the Court of Appeal in Chief Executive of the HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council, supra, which is binding on him.  He therefore took the view it was not open to the defendants/interested parties to run those arguments before him.  Counsel then reserved their position.  At footnote 2 of the Judgment, the Judge noted :

“ Leading counsel for the other defendants have rightly recognized this position and sought only to reserve their rights to advance similar arguments concerning the effect of the Interpretation on appeal.”

By “other defendants”, the Judge meant those defendants other than the appellant : see [22] where he said that the point was not open to Mr Lee representing the appellant to argue.

21.It would therefore appear from what the Judge stated in the Judgment that the reservation was only made by those defendants other than the appellant, which is in slight variance with Mr Lee’s understanding of the position.  As Mr Yu, SC, for the respondents, did not really take any issue on this minor discrepancy, we are prepared to proceed on the basis that Mr Lee had also reserved his position to run these arguments on appeal.

22.Against the above circumstances, Mr Lee raised three points :

(1) The expert evidence was not available at the trial.  The appellant was only granted legal aid on 20 February.  His solicitors only received the Department of Justice’s letter refusing to give consent to file expert evidence on 27 February, 2 days before the hearing.  Expert evidence was clearly not available then.

(2) It would be both unrealistic and irresponsible to apply for leave to adduce expert evidence.  It is unrealistic as Au J considered himself bound by this Court’s judgment on the issues concerning the Interpretation.  That was so even if expert evidence were adduced.  Accordingly, any such application would be bound to fail.  Further, as the appellant had yet to identify an expert and could not inform the court how long it would take to find one, it would be irresponsible to apply for an adjournment for an indefinite period of time on day one of the hearing.

(3) The arguments on the Interpretation and the expert evidence on which those arguments were based were intricately linked.  By reserving the right to run the arguments on appeal, by necessary implication, the right to adduce expert evidence on appeal was also reserved.  If the appellant were not allowed to adduce Professor Zhang’s evidence now, he would suffer serious prejudice.

23.With respect, we disagree.

24.On (1), the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Chief Executive of the HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council, handed down on 30 November 2016, was widely publicized.  By the time when the proceedings below commenced on 6 December 2016, the appellant must have been aware of the need to adduce expert evidence as evidential basis if he were to run the arguments on the Interpretation.  And it was incumbent upon him and not the respondents to adduce the necessary expert evidence.  From then, he had nearly 3 months to find the expert before the hearing on 1 March 2017.  But he had not done so.  The fact that he was only granted legal aid on 20 February 2017 does not detract from his obligation to find the expert and to adduce the necessary expert evidence.  It is not an excuse to say that he could wait and do nothing to find the expert as part of his preparation of the case until legal aid was granted or legal assistance was obtained.

25.On (2), it follows from our view on (1) that the dilemma which he found himself in was self-inflicted.

26.On (3), two matters are raised.  The first concerns the so‑called reservation by necessary implication.  We are unable to accept that there could be such reservation by necessary implication as a matter of principle.  It is axiomatic that all evidence should be adduced at trial and the Court of Appeal ordinarily does not accept fresh evidence unless the conditions of Ladd v Marshall are met. Reserving the right to adduce fresh evidence on appeal presupposes that there is a right to adduce fresh evidence on appeal, when there is clearly none.  In any event, such a reservation does not bind the Court of Appeal.

27.Further, although the Judge took the view that as presently advised, it was not open to the appellant to run the arguments on the Interpretation, in anticipation of running such arguments on appeal, the appellant ought to have adduced the necessary expert evidence before him.  The respondents, if so advised, would then adduce countering expert evidence.  Any difference arising from the experts’ evidence or views should have been resolved by the Judge.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal would have the benefit of the findings made by the Judge in hearing the appellant’s arguments reserved to be run on appeal.  In our view, this ought to have been the proper way to proceed.  For as said, in our system, an appeal is ordinarily not the occasion for fresh evidence to be entertained.  There is no reason why the applicant and those acting for him did not pursue an application to call expert evidence before the Judge.  Had that been pursued, the Judge would have to make a case management decision to allow or disallow such evidence to be canvassed at trial.  The appellant cannot short-circuit the proceedings in the way he did.  In effect, he is trying to convert the appeal hearing into a first instance trial on the issues concerning the nature and effect of the Interpretation which involves potentially conflicting evidence. We cannot see any basis for allowing such a course.

28.The second matter raised in (3) is about the prejudice the appellant said he would suffer if Professor Zhang’s evidence is not allowed to be adduced.  As already pointed out, the appellant ought to have found an expert before trial but failed to do so.  Any such prejudice would have been self-inflicted.  Further, as will be seen shortly, Professor Zhang’s evidence does not really assist the appellant’s appeal.  He would not suffer any prejudice even if Professor Zhang’s evidence is not before the Court of Appeal.

29.In consequence, we hold that the appellant has failed to meet the 1^st condition of Ladd v Marshall.

C2.  Second and third conditions

30.These two conditions can be dealt with together.

31.Mr Yu took the point that Hong Kong courts have no jurisdiction to deal with a submission that the Interpretation is unlawful because it is an amendment, citing the judgment of the Court of Appeal refusing leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal in Chief Executive of the HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council, unreported, 16 January 2017 and the Reasons for Determination of the Appeal Committee dated 1 September 2017, (2017) 20 HKCFAR 390 in support.  He thus argued that it is not open to the appellant to adduce expert evidence to challenge the Interpretation as not being a proper interpretation of BL104.  Further, it is well settled that the Interpretation takes effect from 1 July 1997.

32.As noted, the appellant wishes to argue these points, which he has reserved in the coming appeal.  And Mr Lee has made some submissions in this regard.  But because of the nature of the present application, Mr Lee’s submissions are, we believe, not full.  (Of course, to what extent counsel wishes to pursue such arguments at the substantive appeal without expert evidence is entirely a matter for Mr Lee.)  We are anxious of the propositions established by the authorities cited by Mr Yu. We are equally anxious not to pre-empt Mr Lee’s fuller submissions on these points to be advanced in the coming appeal, lest a perception might arise that we had determined these points against the appellant even without hearing Mr Lee, thereby depriving the appellant the opportunity to address us on these points in full.  So we will leave Mr Yu’s submissions on these points for the time being.  But in our view, even without the objections raised by Mr Yu, the appellant has not met the 2^nd and 3^rd conditions of Ladd v Marshall.

33.Professor Zhang was asked to deal with 10 issues :

“ (1) 全國人民代表大會常務委員會（下稱「全國人大常委會」）對我國法律進行「立法解釋」法律解釋制度，是否源自蘇聯時期的社會主義法治體系？

(2) 全國人民代表大會（下稱「全國人大」）在1982年制定第四部《中華人民共和國憲法》（下稱「《1982年憲法》」）第六十七條時，其立法原意是否將全國人大常委會在第六 十七條第(三)項下對全國人大制定的法律進行部分補充和修改的職權與第六十七條第(四)項下的解釋法律的職權分割開？

(3) 當全國人大常委會根據《1982年憲法》第六十七條第(三)項對全國人大制定法律進行部分補充或進行部分修改時，是否均會更改了有關法律的原有內容？

(4) 全國人大常委會是否可根據《1982年憲法》第六 十 七條第(三)項對一些全國人大常委會自身無權修改的法律進行部分補充？

(5) 當全國人大常委會根據《1982年憲法》第六十七條第(四)項和《香港特別行政區基本法》（下稱「《基本法》」）第158條對《基本法》的條款進行解釋時，能否對《基本法》該條款進行部分補充？

(6) 當全國人大常委會有需要對《基本法》的條款進行部分補充時，是否應該根據《1982年憲法》第六十七條第 (三) 項和《基本法》第159條行事？

(7) 在內地法律中，有沒有一些與《基本法》第158條相類似的條文？

(8) 全國人大常委會於第十二屆全國人大常委會第二 十 四次會議上經表決通過的《全國人大常委會關於香港特別行政區基本法第一百零四條的解釋》（下稱「2016年人大釋法」）是否符合內地法律？

(9) 當全國人大常委會根據《1982年憲法》第六十七條第(三)項對一部全國人大制定的法律作出部分補充時，該補充是否有溯及力？

(10) 當全國人大常委會根據《1982年憲法》第六十七條第(四)項對一部全國人大制定的法律作出解釋時，該解釋是否有溯及力？”

34.For the reasons that he gave, Professor Zhang gave an affirmative answer to Issue 1 and went on to conclude :

“ 18. 基於上述理由，我就第二至第四條問題的意見如下：

(1) 第二條問題：全國人大常委會在《1982年憲法》第六十七條第(四)項下的解釋法律的職權，並不包含對全國人大制定的法律進行部分補充和修改的職權，二者是分開的。從當時制定《1982年憲法》背景來看，有關的立法原意是讓全國人大常委會得以對全國人大制定的法律進行部分補充和修改，而不是以「解釋法律」之名行「補充和修改法律」之實。

(2) 第三條問題：全國人大常委會在《1982年憲法》第六十七條第(三)項下的對全國人大制定的法律進行部分補充的職權，明顯是屬於全國人大常委會更改有關法律內容的一種方式。顧名思義，補充法律即是將一些原本沒有的內容加入原有的法律。因此，全國人大在訂立《1982年憲法》時，決定將補充法律和修改法律一同歸納在第六十七條第(三)項下，但這類補充或修改不得同該法律的基本原則相抵觸。

(3) 第四條問題：全國人大常委會在根據《1982年憲法》第六十七條第(四)項行使解釋法律的職權時，如果全國人大常委會本身享有《1982年憲法》第六 十 七條第(二)項規定的立法權，那麼全國人大常委會或可在解釋的同時對有關法律進行補充或修改。然而，就憲法第六十七條第(三)項規定的全國人大制定的法律而言，全國人大常委會只能依據該項規定對其進行補充或修改，而不能依據第六十七條第 (四) 項通過「解釋」對其進行補充或修改。

…

23. 準確了解《基本法》的特殊地位後，一個必然的結論是全國人大常委會是不能夠藉「解釋《基本法》」對《基本法》作出補充和修改，因為全國人大常委會本身並不具備補充或修改《基本法》的權力，而只能解釋《基本法》條文的含意，或對修改《基本法》提出修正案。這也是《1982年憲法》第六十七條第(三)項和《基本法》第159條的根本區別所在：前者允許全國人大常委會單方面修改「基本法律」，只要不抵觸相關法律的「基本原則」；後者則根本不允許全國人大常委會自行修改，而只能由其向全國人大提出《基本法》的修改議案，然後由全國人大作出決定。因此，《基本法》修改必須也只能嚴格按照其第159條規定的程序。”

He also cited various provisions in different PRC statutory instruments in answering the Issue 7.

35.It should be noted that the above are all general discussions and answers, which one reasonably assumes would lay down the foundation to Professor Zhang’s analysis of and answer to Issue 8, which is self-evidently the most important one.  However, Professor singularly failed to engage Issue 8 at all.  He simply wrote :

“ 33. 然而，《基本法》第158條僅規定「本法的解釋權」屬於全國人大常委會，並未授權全國人大常委會解釋一般的香港法律，因而自然的理解是全國人大常委會的解釋權限於解釋《基本法》，而無權解釋其它香港法律。因此，全國人大常委會解釋內地法律的實踐對於解釋香港法律並無直接的借鑒或啟示。《基本法》第104條中的「依法」究竟是指依照《基本法》之外的香港法律，還是包括《基本法》本身？這是一個需要根據香港法治傳統、《基本法》的立法原意和目的等背景進行解釋的《基本法》問題。”

36.In short, even assuming all his answers to Issues 1 to 7 are correct, Professor Zhang did not state that the Interpretation is invalid or arguably invalid under the PRC law.  That being his evidence, it does not provide an evidential basis for Mr Lee to launch his arguments on the true effect of the Interpretation.  Mr Lee also cannot derive from Professor Zhang’s general analysis and answers to Issues 1 to 7 a legal argument that under the PRC law the Interpretation was invalid for the reasons that he wished to deploy in his submissions because it is a matter of applying the PRC law and hence a matter of PRC law, but Professor Zhang himself has been shy from engaging Issue 8.  Mr Lee cannot fill the gap left by Professor Zhang on how to apply the general propositions arising from his analysis and answers to Issues 1 to 7 to Issue 8.

37.Issues 9 and 10 concerned whether the interpretation made by the NPCSC under articles 67(3) and (4) of the Constitution has retrospective effect.  Professor Zhang gave his views at §§34 to 36 of his report.  They are general observations and did not discuss how they would apply to the Interpretation.  Issues 9 and 10 did not ask Professor Zhang to give his view on the related question if the Interpretation which was also made by the NPCSC under BL158 has retrospective effect.  He volunteered his answer thus :

“ 37. 最後，全國人大常委會對香港《基本法》的解釋似不應具有溯及力，因為第158條規定，香港法院在判案時有義務遵循全國人大常委對《基本法》的解釋，「但在此以前作出的判決不受影響。」言下之意，如果香港法院此前對相關法條已作出判決，則全國人大常委會的《基本法》解釋沒有溯及力。但如果香港法院此前並無相關判決，這個領域的司法實踐是一片空白或只有社會默認的習俗，全國人大常委會解釋是否有溯及力？在這種情況下，全國人大常委會解釋似乎也不應具備溯及力，因為這個問題所涉及的是一般政策，和特定實踐是否存在司法判決並無必然關係。第 158 條表達的意思似為要求法院此後遵循全國人大常委會解釋，但為了保障法律和權利的安定性，並不影響此前的社會實踐與行為。”

38.In the first sentence of §37, Professor Zhang referred to BL158(3) but it is misplaced.   For the NPCSC did not issue the Interpretation upon any request by a Hong Kong court.  In the remaining part of §37, Professor Zhang referred to a non-BL158(3) scenario.  He gave an ambiguous observation without any authority in support.  In sum, Professor Zhang did not give any view on the important question if under the PRC law, the Interpretation made by NPCSC under article 67(4) of the Constitution and BL158 has retrospective effect.  Again, Mr Lee cannot fill the gap left behind by Professor Zhang’s general observations by way of submissions when whether such observations apply to the Interpretation is a matter of PRC law.

39.In the circumstances, Professor Zhang’s evidence does not really assist the appellant on his appeal. It fails to satisfy the 2^nd condition of Ladd v Marshall. And given the deficiencies as highlighted, we are not satisfied it meets the 3^rd condition of Ladd v Marshall either.

C3.  Discretion

40.Even applying Ladd v Marshall principles with some degree of flexibility as it is a public law case involving considerable importance, we still cannot admit Professor Zhang’s evidence in light of the deficiencies identified.

D. DISPOSITIONS & DIRECTIONS

41.For these reasons, we dismiss the appellant’s application.

42.Costs should follow the event.  We accordingly order the appellant to pay the respondents’ costs.  In the statement of costs, the respondents claimed for HK$182,360.00.  We find the costs claimed reasonable and allow them in full.  We further order that the appellant’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

43.Having consulted counsel’s diaries, we will fix the hearing of the appeal on 28 and 29 November 2018.  Practice Directions 4.1 applies to all the preparatory steps with the modification on the timetable for filing of hearing bundles and written submissions as follows :

(1) The appellant is to file and serve the appeal bundle(s) and his written submissions on or before 14 September 2018.

(2) The respondents are to file and serve their written submissions on or before 28 September 2018.

Mr Benjamin Yu SC, Mr Johnny Mok SC, Mr Jimmy Ma & Mr Jenkin Suen, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Plaintiff (Respondent) in CACV 200/2017 and the 1^st and 2^nd Applicants (1^st  and 2^nd  Respondents) in CACV 201/2017

Mr Martin Lee SC, Mr Carter Chim & Ms Senia Ng, instructed by JCC Cheung & Co, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the Defendant (Appellant) in CACV 200/2017 and the Interested Party (Appellant) in CACV 201/2017

[1]  The other provisions of the Basic Law referred to in this judgment will also adopt the same format of abbreviation.