Fu Hon Chin v. Director General of Civil Aviation
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 377/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 June 2018.
1. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision (“Decision”) of the Director General of Civil Aviation (“Director”) made on 26 June 2015 that the Applicant’s application for an Airport Restricted Area Permit (“ARA Permit”) to work in the Restricted Area of Hong Kong International Airport (“Restricted Area”) be refused pursuant to Section 8 of the Aviation Security Regulation, Cap 494A (“Regulation”).
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HCAL 377/2018 [2018] HKCFI 1366 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 377 OF 2018 ________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Before: Hon Chow J in Court Date of Hearing: 7 June 2018 Date of Decision: 19 June 2018 ________________________ DECISION ________________________ INTRODUCTION 1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision (“Decision”) of the Director General of Civil Aviation (“Director”) made on 26 June 2015 that the Applicant’s application for an Airport Restricted Area Permit (“ARA Permit”) to work in the Restricted Area of Hong Kong International Airport (“Restricted Area”) be refused pursuant to Section 8 of the Aviation Security Regulation, Cap 494A (“Regulation”). 2.For reasons which I shall explain below, the proposed application for judicial review is, I consider, not reasonably arguable. Accordingly, the leave application stands to be dismissed. BACKGROUND FACTS 3.The Applicant is a Hong Kong permanent resident. He has 6 previous criminal conviction records relating to dangerous drugs between 2005 and 2011, as follows:-
4.In or about June 2015, the Applicant obtained an employment with Dragon Soar Hong Kong Engineering Limited, a sub-contractor of Gammon Construction Ltd (“Gammon”), to work as an electrician on a construction site in the Restricted Area. 5.On or about 23 June 2015, Gammon, on behalf of the Applicant, applied to the Airport Authority Hong Kong (“AAHK”) for an ARA Permit (“the Application”). On the same day, AAHK notified the Director of the Application, and sent the Applicant’s personal data to, inter alia, the Commissioner of Police for the purpose of security vetting. 6.On 24 June 2015, the Commissioner of Police gave a Vetting Report to the Director in respect of the Applicant, disclosing his previous criminal conviction records mentioned above. 7.On or about 24 June 2015, the Applicant commenced working in the Restricted Area, having been issued a Visitor Pass for temporary access to the Restricted Area. 8.By a letter dated 26 June 2015, the Director informed the Airport Authority Permit Office (the “Permit Office”) that he objected to the issuance of an ARA Permit to the Applicant on security grounds. By a separate letter also dated 26 June 2015, the Director informed AAHK that the objection to the Applicant being issued an ARA Permit had an “Objection Expiry Date” of 5 May 2021. In that letter, it was also expressly mentioned that the “Objection Expiry Date” was classified as “confidential personal information” which should not be disclosed to any other party and was not to be used for operational purposes by the Permit Office. 9.On 26 June 2015, the Permit Office informed Gammon that the Application was objected to on security reasons and thus no ARA Permit would be issued to the Applicant. 10.On 27 June 2015, the Applicant was informed by his superior that AAHK would not allow him to work in the Restricted Area. His employment was terminated immediately and he was required to return the Visitor Pass. According to the Applicant, although he was not given any reason for the termination of his employment, he was convinced that the termination must have been due to his previous criminal convictions. 11.On 2 October 2015, the Applicant applied, in HCAL 193/2015, for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision on various grounds which it is not necessary to set out in this decision. On 28 December 2015, the Applicant was granted legal aid to pursue his application in HCAL 193/2015, and Messrs Tang, Wong & Wong (“TWC”) were assigned to act for him. Apparently, TWC advised the Applicant that he could lodge an administrative appeal against the Decision to the Director, and the Applicant decided to pursue the administrative appeal first. On 29 April 2016, TWC applied to the court to withdraw the application in HCAL 193/2015, which was granted by Au J on 3 May 2016. 12.In the meantime, the Applicant made Data Access Requests to the Director and AAHK, and received various documents relating to the Decision on 6 and 22 April 2016 respectively. From those documents, it was clear that the Director objected to the issue of an ARA Permit to the Applicant because of his previous criminal convictions, and that the objection had an “Objection Expiry Date” of 5 May 2021 (ie 10 years from the date of the Applicant’s last conviction). It also appears, from an internal minute M.7 of the Civil Aviation Department (“CAD”), that the objection to the grant of an ARA Permit to the Applicant was based on certain “Objection Criteria” under “Guideline (3)” which I shall further explain later in this decision. 13.On 21 November 2016, the Applicant formally lodged an administrative appeal against the Decision to the Director. 14.By a letter dated 7 July 2017 to TWC, the Director informed the Applicant that his appeal was rejected. The letter did not give any reasons for rejecting the appeal. It merely stated the following –
15.On 7 March 2018, the Applicant commenced the present application for leave to apply for judicial review, having been granted legal aid to pursue this application on 27 September 2017. 16.In the Form 86, the Applicant seeks to challenge 2 decisions of the Director, namely, (i) the Decision, and (ii) the decision on or about 7 July 2017 that the Applicant’s appeal, pursuant to section 2.5.3 of the ARA Permit Manual, against the Decision in respect of security vetting be rejected. However, as stated in the Skeleton Arguments of Mr Ma (for the Applicant) dated 25 May 2018 and as confirmed by Mr Ma at the hearing on 7 June 2018, the Applicant would withdraw his challenge to the second decision. 17.Three grounds of judicial review are advanced by the Applicant in support of his application for leave:-
LEGAL REGIME RELATING TO GRANT OF ARA PERMIT 18.Under Section 27 of the Aviation Security Ordinance, Cap 494 (the “Ordinance”):-
19.Section 6.1.24 in Part 6 of the Aviation Security Programme (“HKASP”) drawn up pursuant to Section 27 of the Ordinance provides that:-
20.The power of the Director to raise security objections to any person being granted an ARA Permit is given statutory underpinning by the Regulation. 21.By Regulation 4, subject to certain exemptions under Regulation 5 which are not relevant for the present purposes, no person shall enter or remain in a restricted area of an airport, unless he has on his person a valid permit issued to him in respect of that restricted area or is being escorted by a permit holder who is authorized to escort persons into such area. 22.Regulation 7(1)(c) provides that AAHK (being the “manager” referred to in that regulation for the present purposes) shall, in accordance with conditions approved by the Director, issue a permit to any person whose business requires his access, from time to time, to the airport restricted area. 23.Regulation 8 further provides as follows:-
24.It can be seen immediately that:-
25.In exercising his power to object to the issue of an ARA Permit in any given case, the Director is guided by the provisions contained in the Standards and Recommended Practices (“SARPs”) as well as the Aviation Security Manual Doc 8973 - Restricted (“Aviation Security Manual”) promulgated by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, a specialized agency under the United Nations established pursuant to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the “Chicago Convention”). 26.Section 4.2.4 of Annex 17 (Security) to the SARPs provides that –
27.In Chapter 1 of the Aviation Security Manual, the expression “background check” is defined to mean -
28.Paragraph 11.2.7.7 of the Aviation Security Manual further provides as follows:-
29.CAD, and the Hong Kong Police Force, Immigration Department and Customs and Excise Department (collectively the “Controlling Authorities”) have formulated and agreed amongst themselves a set of “Objection Criteria” and “Objection Periods” for determining applications for the issue of ARA Permits. 30.The Objection Criteria include whether an applicant has, within a certain period of time prior to the ARA Permit application, committed any offences relating to aviation security, dangerous drugs, violence, dishonesty or fraud, unlawful society and criminal damage, and the seriousness of the concerned offences. 31.The Objection Periods stipulate, for each relevant offence, a specified period during which an objection to the grant of an ARA Permit to a person with a criminal conviction record for that offence would be maintained. The applicable Objection Period is calculated from the date of that person’s last relevant conviction or sentence. 32.According to Siu Yuet Yung, Senior Operations Officer of CAD:-
See paragraph 28 of Mr Siu’s affirmation filed herein on 16 May 2018. 33.The Objection Criterion and Objection Period relevant to the Applicant’s case are contained in “Guideline (3)”, under which an applicant with a conviction for “possession of dangerous drugs” or “possession of pipe / equipment fit and intended for smoking / injecting / inhaling dangerous drugs” and sentenced to imprisonment or probation order would generally not be granted an ARA Permit for a period of 10 years from the date of his conviction (see paragraph 27 of the said affirmation of Mr Siu). 34.The Aviation Security Manual, HKASP and the Objection Criteria/Objection Periods are, I am told, restricted and confidential documents or information. 35.As earlier mentioned, the Director made the Decision to object to the Applicant’s Application for an ARA Permit based on Guideline (3) on 26 June 2015, and the Decision was maintained on the Applicant’s appeal on 7 July 2017. GROUND 1: INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 36.The Applicant’s complaint of discrimination has been formulated in an obscure or elliptical manner. In the Form 86, at paragraph 64, it is stated that –
37.In Mr Ma’s Skeleton Arguments for the Applicant, at paragraph 10, it is said that –
38.This complaint is further elaborated at paragraphs 13 to 14 of Mr Ma’s Skeleton Arguments, as follows –
39.At the hearing on 7 June 2018, Mr Ma confirmed that the Applicant is not complaining that the applicable Objection Criterion/Objection Period under Guideline (3) unlawfully discriminate against someone in the Applicant’s position who has a relevant criminal conviction record because such person would generally not be granted an ARA Permit. The Applicant’s complaint, rather, is that the Director’s policy of not disclosing the applicable Objection Criterion/Objection Period unlawfully discriminates against such a person because he would suffer the hardship or detriment referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Mr Ma’s Skeleton Arguments quoted above. 40.In my view, the Applicant’s complaint of discrimination is entirely misconceived. The Director’s policy of non-disclosure of the Objection Criteria/Objection Periods applies equally to all ARA Permit applicants with or without criminal conviction record(s). No question of differential treatment arises from the non-disclosure of the Objection Criteria/Objection Periods. The sort of hardship or detriment referred to by the Applicant is the result of a combination of two factors: (i) the applicant has made an application for an ARA Permit, and (ii) the applicant has a relevant criminal conviction record. Such hardship or detriment cannot be regarded as the consequence of any differential treatment being applied by the Director to such applicant (as compared to one who has no relevant criminal conviction record). 41.I should add, for the sake of completeness, that I do not consider that the applicable Objection Criterion/Objection Period under Guideline (3) unlawfully discriminate against someone in the Applicant’s position who has a relevant criminal conviction record, because:-
GROUND 2: PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS 42.Under this ground, the Applicant complains that the Director’s decision is unlawful in that he did not disclose Guideline (3) to the Applicant for comments or representations and further the Applicant was not provided with any opportunity to make representations or submissions prior to any adverse decision being made against him (see paragraph 112 of the Form 86). 43.It is true that at the time of the original application for the ARA Permit, the Applicant was not informed of the contents of Guideline (3) and thus he could not make representations or submissions to the Director as to why they should not be applied to deny his Application. However, Mr Ma fairly accepts or concedes that, by the time of the appeal in November 2016, the Applicant was fully aware of the applicable Objection Criterion/Objection Period under Guideline (3) because he had received various internal documents of CAD, including redacted versions of M.7 and two letters from CAD to AAHK/Airport Authority Permit Office both dated 26 June 2015 in April 2016. Although those documents do not set out the text of Guideline (3) and may, arguably, be read in a number of different ways, in view of Mr Ma’s explicit concession, I shall proceed on the basis that the Applicant was fully aware of the applicable Objection Criterion/Objection Period under Guideline (3) at the time of the appeal. As it was, the Applicant (through TWC) made detailed submissions to the Director as to why his appeal against the Decision should be allowed notwithstanding his previous convictions. 44.Generally speaking, when considering a challenge to an administrative decision based on the ground of procedural unfairness, the court should take a holistic view of the situation. As stated by Lord Mustill in R v Home Secretary, Ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, at 560E-F, “[t]he principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects”. In the context of the present case, one should consider the fairness of the whole process (including both the original application and the appeal), instead of at some particular stage of the process. Whatever may be said about the unfairness of the process arising from the non-disclosure of the applicable Objection Criterion/Objection Period at the time of the original application, such unfairness had, in my view, been cured by the time of the appeal. There was, at that stage, a sufficient disclosure of Guideline (3) and the materials relied upon by the Director in reaching the Decision to enable the Applicant to make “meaningful and focused representations” in support of his appeal (see Asia Television Ltd v Communications Authority (No 2) [2013] 3 HKLRD 618, at paragraphs 61, 63 and 64 per Kwan JA). GROUND 3: WEDNESBURY UNREASONABLENESS – FETTERING OF DISCRETION 45.This ground can be dealt with shortly. The Applicant complains that the Director, by a blanket application of Guideline (3) to reject the Application, has failed to assess his case individually (see paragraph 120 of the Form 86). There is, however, no evidence to indicate that the Director has failed to consider the Applicant’s case on its own merits, or has fettered his discretion by a rigid application of Guideline (3). Furthermore, having regard to the fact that the Applicant was a repeated offender in respect of dangerous drugs offences with a string of 6 convictions occurring within a period of 6 years, the last of which was only 4 years prior to the date of the Application, the decision not to grant an ARA Permit to the Applicant in the present case cannot, in my view, be said to be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. I would add that there is also no point in remitting the matter to the Director for fresh consideration because Mr Ma has made it clear that the Applicant no longer intends to apply for an ARA Permit. 46.In all, I consider that all three proposed grounds of judicial review relied upon by the Applicant are not reasonably arguable. DISPOSITION 47.For the foregoing reasons, the present application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
Mr Stanley H F Ma, instructed by Tang, Wong & Chow, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the Applicant Mr Lewis C M Law, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Putative Respondent | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment