Dbs Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd v. Guanxiang (HK) Trading Ltd and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1767/2017 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 June 2018.
1. The is a mortgage action pursuant to Order 88 of the Rules of the High Court brought by the plaintiff for payment of moneys and delivery of possession.
Cited by 1 case · Cites 5 cases
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HCMP 1767/2017 [2018] HKCFI 1392 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS 1767 OF 2017 ______________
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______________ D E C I S I O N ______________ The application and the hearing 1.The is a mortgage action pursuant to Order 88 of the Rules of the High Court brought by the plaintiff for payment of moneys and delivery of possession. 2.The plaintiff is a bank. The 1st and 2nd defendants (“D1 and D2”) were its customers. The 3rd defendant (“D3”) at some stage became a director and shareholder of D1 and D2. On the face of the document, he was the mortgagor under three mortgages all dated 11 March 2016 (“the Mortgages”). Three residential properties (“the 3 Properties”) registered in his name were mortgaged thereby to the plaintiff to secure the indebtedness of D1 and D2. Two of those properties are at Tower 12 of Mayfair By The Sea II (“Property 1”and “Property 2”), whilst the third is at Tower 11 (“Property 3”). On the face of the document, D3 has also signed a Guarantee and Indemnity dated 4 December 2015 (“the Guarantee”) in favour of the plaintiff to secure the indebtedness of D1. 3.On 16 August 2017, the plaintiff took out an Originating Summons against the defendants pursuant to Order 88 of the Rules of the High Court (“the Originating Summons”). The plaintiff seeks:
4.D1 and D2 have failed to file any Acknowledgement of Service. Monetary judgments were entered against them on 14 September 2017. 5.D3 contests the Originating Summons. His case is that the Mortgages and Guarantee are liable to be set aside for, principally, misrepresentation. In any event, he contends that this is not a case suitable for summary disposal. He seeks an order that it be ordered to continue as if commenced by Writ. The plaintiff maintains that the case is a straight-forward one, and is suitable for summary disposal. Intended intervener 6.On 13 April 2018, 6 days before the hearing, a Mr Li Shaotao (“Li”) filed a summons (“the Intervening Summons”) for an Order that he be permitted to intervene in these proceedings and be joined as the 4th defendant. He is D3’s cousin-in-law. The basis of his application is that he is in fact the beneficial owner of the three Properties, that D3 has only been holding them on trust for him, and that he (Li) and his family have been in actual occupation of Properties 1 and 2. He further seeks an Order that the proceedings by the Originating Summons be continued as if begun by Writ. 7.The Intervening Summons came before me on 19 April 2018, the same day when the substantive hearing of the Originating Summons was set down to be heard. Mr Michael Lok, counsel appearing for the plaintiff, invited me to consider the evidence currently available and dismiss the same, or in the eventuality of me not preparing to do so, adjourn the same with directions for the filing of further evidence. I was not prepared to truncate the consideration of the Intervening Summons as suggested. In the end, I gave directions for the filing of evidence and ordered the Intervening Summons to be adjourned for full argument. 8.I then proceeded to consider whether I should, in the light of the Intervening Summons and its adjournment, also adjourn the substantive hearing of the Originating Summons until after the disposal of the Intervening Summons. I noted in this regard that the battle between the mortgagee and mortgagor on the one hand, and the battle between the mortgagee and the beneficial owner on the other, are theoretically distinct. Mr Lok also urged me to proceed with the substantive hearing. His stance was that the case was appropriate for summary disposal, and whilst he accepted that no order for possession could be granted before hearing Li, he submitted that the plaintiff should not be delayed in obtaining a monetary judgment against D3. I am also keen not to lose one full day of court time. I decided to proceed with the substantive haring of the Originating Summons. The facts and the evidence 9.The material facts summarized below are gleaned from the affirmations filed: for the plaintiff—two affirmed to by Ma Ho Kin (“Ma”,Assistant Vice President of the Special Assets Management Department of the plaintiff) and one by Lam Harmony Yin (“Lam”, an assistant solicitor of Messrs Woo Kwan Lee & Lo (“WKLL”) who was involved in the preparation of the Mortgages); and for D3—two by himself. 10.D1 and D2 were customers of the plaintiff. Before me there are 8 facility letters which the plaintiff had issued in their favour (7 of which dated between 25 September 2012 and 24 March 2016 in favour of D2, and 1 dated 3 December 2015 in favour of D1). There are also a General Commercial Agreement dated 27 June 2012 entered into by D2 with the plaintiff, and another similar agreement dated 4 December 2015 by D1. 11.D3 was born in the Mainland. He received education in Hong Kong up to Form 5. He said that he was close to illiterate in English, and had no prior experience in handling corporate financial affairs. 12.D3 was (and still is) the registered owner of the 3 Properties. He however said that he only has 10% beneficial interest in them. The other beneficial owners he said are his elder cousin Gao You Huai (“Gao”) holding 40% and his cousin-in-law Li holding the balance. 13.According to D3, he did not know about the actual business operation of D1 and D2. What he said he knew was that both D1 and D2 were owned and controlled by a man with Mainland background called Yang Xiao Yong (“Yang”). 14.According also to D3, the employees from the plaintiff who served D1, D2, Yang and him at various stages were mainly Victor Yu (“Yu”)and Selina Shang (“Shang”). That was not disputed by the plaintiff. Indeed, in Ma’s 2nd affirmation, he described Shang as “a Relationship Manager of the Plaintiff” [1], and that “… it is admitted, and as stated in the Facility Letters, that the Designated Relationship Managers for [D1 and D2] were Andrew Tam, Victor Yu and Selina Shang, ex-employees of the Plaintiff.”[2] 15.I note immediately that the plaintiff has not adduced any evidence from Andrew Tam, Yu, or Shang. I note further that Ma had no contemporaneous knowledge of the events which led to the issue of the Originating Summons. His evidence was based solely on documents and records. He said at paragraph 40 of his 2nd affirmation that “It is admitted that I have never personally communicated with [D3]. I was not the responsible officer handling the facilities granted by the Plaintiff to [D1] and/or D2. I stress however that I am authorized to make my 1stAffirmation and this my 2nd Affirmation for and on behalf of the Plaintiff in these proceedings.” 16.On 27 March 2014, 24 November 2014 and 31 July 2015, Yang caused D2 to enter into three sets of agreements variably called “Non-Deliverable USD/CNY European Knock-in Ratio Ladder Forward” agreement, “Non-Deliverable Ratio Capped Forward” agreement and “Non-Deliverable USD/CNY Ratio Capped Forward” agreement. They were some sort of foreign exchange linked investment contracts. I call them “the Forex Agreements” below. How they worked is irrelevant for our present purposes. What is important is that apparently, in early January 2016, the Chinese Yuen offshore spot rate was at such a level that D2 decided to give instructions for the early termination of those Forex Agreements. Upon such early termination, and as confirmed by the plaintiffin its letter of 20 January 2016, sums in the total amount of USD 17,930,000 had by 15 January 2016 become due and payable by D2 to the plaintiff. This indebtedness of D2 under the Forex Agreements was, when incurred, unsecured. As things turned out, this amount of indebtedness was subsequently turned into an instalment loan from the plaintiff to D2 and secured by the Mortgages. I will come back to this. 17.According to D3, he was introduced to Yang by Gao in November 2015. On a number of occasions subsequent to that, it was represented to him by Yang through Gao that since he was a Hong Kong resident, if he became a shareholder/director of D1/D2 on record and if he was willing to mortgage the 3 Properties, the plaintiff could offer mortgage loans on good commercial terms, and the loans could be used by Gao for investments. 18.Subsequently, D3 indeed became a director and shareholder of both D1 and D2. He said that he did not know when the share transfers or appointment took place. According to the documents registered with the Companies Registry:
D3 said that he had never paid any consideration for those shares, and that despite his appointment as director of D1 and D2, he had never taken part in their management. He said that he had not in fact attended their offices. 19.On 3 December 2015, the plaintiff issued a facility letter in favour of D1 (“the 3/12/2015 Facility Letter”). That appears to be the only facility letter which the plaintiff had issued in favor of D1. By virtue of that facility letter, the plaintiff made available to D1 various facilities up to HK$42,000,000. Disbursement of the facilities was however subject to a number of express “Important Conditions”. Two of those conditions were that disbursement of the facilities would only be allowed after completion of the Mortgages by D3, and after “new company search showing [D3] is the director holding half shares of the Borrower”. Under the terms of that facility letter, the receipt by the plaintiff of the Guarantee to be executed by D3 was also a condition precedent. 20.The 3/12/2015 Facility Letter was signed in acceptance by Yang on behalf of D1. At that time, D3 had not been appointed its director. Whilst D3 was according to the Annual Return of D1 transferred 50% of its shares on 12 November 2015, that Annual Return was not lodged with the Companies Registry until 22 September 2016. 21.The Guarantee was dated 4 December 2015, one day after the 3/12/2015 Facility Letter. On the face of the document, D3 has signed on the same, and thereby “agrees and undertakes with the [plaintiff] to pay to the [plaintiff] on demand all sums of money and liabilities … whether certain or contingent, now or hereafter owing or incurred to the [plaintiff] by [D1]”. 22.According to D3, the circumstances leading to the execution of the Guarantee were as follows. Sometime in late 2015, Yang told him that D1 would open a bank account with the plaintiff and asked him to sign the account opening documents. Yang further informed him that relationship manager from the plaintiff would contact him directly in that regard. In about December 2015, Yu and Shang travelled to Shenzhen to meet him. D3 was presented with some documents to sign (which D3 said he subsequently discovered included the Guarantee). At paragraph 124 of his 1st affirmation, D3 said that:
23.As mentioned above, the plaintiff has not adduced any evidence from either Yu or Shang. There is no direct evidence from the plaintiff as to how the 3/12/2015 Facility Letter were negotiated and agreed upon, and how the Guarantee was executed. 24.Ma was the main witness from the plaintiff. The effect of his evidence in this regard was that D3 had been duly advised and aware of the legal effects of the Guarantee before his execution of the same, and that D3 had been offered every chance to seek independent legal advice on the same. 25.Ma was however not present during the execution of the Guarantee. His evidence was confined to comments and observations which he believed he could make from the contents of various documents. 26.One of the documents Ma referred to, which Mr Lok in his submissions relied on heavily, was the “Notice (to individual third party security provider)”. It was a bilingual document. It was addressed to D3. It sought to set out the effects of the Guarantee. It was however not signed by D3, but only by a representative of the plaintiff. 27.Another document Ma referred to was a document entitled “Confirmation and Acknowledgement” (“the Confirmation and Acknowledgement”). It was dated 4 December 2015 and apparently signed by D3. It was also a bilingual document. It contained 5 clauses. Clause 1 provided that:
The contents of Clauses 2 and 3 should however be noted. They containedinconsistent optional paragraphs or sentences each marked with an asterisk, with the direction that and those parts which were not applicable should be deleted. Those two paragraphs read as follows:
On the face of the Confirmation and Acknowledgement, none of those inconsistent optional paragraphs or parts have been deleted. Ma has in his affirmations provided no explanation as to why that was so. I will come back to this. 28.Ma did attempt to give some further factual evidence on the execution of the Guarantee. At paragraph 27(ii) and (iii) of his 2ndaffirmation, he said that:
Ma’s account was however short on factual details. In particular, whilst he said that “the purpose of the Meeting was to present certain documents … to Wong and to explain the terms and conditions thereof”, he could not say whether and if so what explanations were in fact given. He further said in generic language that “the Plaintiff did present and [D3] did sign [the Guarantee]”. He did not say who from the plaintiff presented the Guarantee to D3 for signature, and what were said in the process. 29.As have been mentioned above, the 3/12/2015 Facility Letter contemplated also the completion of the Mortgages. The Mortgages came about as follows. 30.According to D3, after Gao had asked him to mortgage the 3 Properties, he received a letter dated 3 February 2016 (“the 3/2/2016 Letter”) from Messrs Woo Kwan Lee & Lo (“WKLL”). The signed version of the letter was in English. An unsigned Chinese translation was attached. Its material parts read as follows:
31.Appendices C and D are of special relevance and I deal with them separately. 32.In respect of Appendix C, there is amongst the evidence an English version of the Warning Notice apparently signed by D3 and dated 4 February 2016. According to Lam:
When before the First Meeting, and to whom of WKLL was the signed Warning Notice handed, are however not clear. 33.Appendix D attached to the 3/2/2016 Letter (in fact marked Appendix D(a)) was an English letter (with Chinese translation, which I will come to later) entitled “Letter by Mortgagor to solicitor where charging property to secure loan to Borrower or his/her business” (“Letter by Mortgagor”). It was intended to be signed by the mortgage during the meeting due to take place to confirm the contents of the meeting. Paragraph (4) read:
34.The Schedule to the Letter by Mortgagor contained 7 parts which set out respectively the particulars of “the Mortgagor”, “the Property”, “the Lender”, “the Borrower”, “the Owner(s)”, “the Information” and “the way of the charge”. In the English version of that Letter, they were all filled out. In particular, under Part 6, it was stated that:
35.As I have said, also enclosed with the 3/2/2016 letter was a Chinese translation of the Letter by Mortgagor. The contents of the Chinese version of the Letter by Mortgagor were however different from the English version. In particular, the 7 parts in the Schedule were all left blanked. Part 6 of the Schedule contained only 4 paragraphs (as opposed to 6 in the English version), were all left blanked, and read as follows:
I note specifically that the sentence in square brackets at paragraph (c) of Part 6 of the Schedule of the Chinese version (namely “[截至會面日期為止,借款人未有欠貸款人任何款項]”) did not appear in the English version of the Letter by Mortgagor. 36.Towards the end of the Chinese version of the Letter by Mortgagor (at page 4), one finds a number of acknowledgements intended to be made by the mortgagor. The last one read as follows:
37.D3’s case is that he has been misled by the Chinese version of the Letter by Mortgagor. At paragraph 68 of his 1st affirmation, he said that:
38.He agreed that he attended WKLL on 5 February 2016 and had a meeting with Lam. He said in that regard, at paragraphs 69 to 71 of his 1st affirmation, that:
He further said at paragraphs 76 and 83 of his 1st Affirmation that:
39.Lam gave a different version. She did not dispute that the English and Chinese versions of the Letter by Mortgagor were different. In her affirmation, she said that during the meeting she had with D3 on 5 February 2016 (which she called “the First Meeting”, which term I adopt), she did explain to D3 the Information with reference to the English version. She said at paragraph 15 of her affirmation that:
40.In specific response to D3’s account of what happened during the First Meeting, she said at paragraph 16:
41.According to Lam, at the First Meeting, D3 did sign certain documents. They included the English version of the Letter by Mortgagor, one single mortgage deed over the 3 Properties, and a number of related board resolutions. I note that they were in English. 42.Lam further said that after the First Meeting, WKLL received instructions from the plaintiff to split up the signed mortgage deed into three separate ones, one covering each of the 3 Properties. Fresh documents were then prepared for that purpose, which included similar Warning Notices and Letters by Mortgagor. The Mortgages were ultimately signed by D3 on 22 February 2016 during another meeting Lam had with D3 (which she calls “the Second Meeting”). She said in this regard, at paragraph 19 of her affirmation, that:
43.On the 24 March 2016, the plaintiff issued a facility letter in favour of D2 (“the 24/3/2016 Facility Letter”). Facilities in the aggregate amount of HK$120 million were granted to D2. Those facilities included an installment loan in the sum of US$17,930,000 (“the Installment Loan”). It was in the exact amount as the total indebtedness owed by D2 to the plaintiff upon early termination of the Forex Agreements. Indeed, at page 1of the 24/3/2016 Facility Letter, it was expressly stated that the purpose of the Installment Loan was:
44.D1 and D2 have been unable to repay certain debts owed to the plaintiff. By letters to all the defendants dated 9 December 2016, the plaintiff demanded immediate payment of the outstanding amounts then jointly and severally due from them within 7 days. Repayments were not forthcoming. On 16 August 2017, the Originating Summons was issued. According to Ma’s 1st affirmation, as at 11 September 2017, D1, D2 and D3 were jointly and severally indebted to the plaintiff for the total sum of HK$22,249,742.46 and US$3,091,619.45; and that D2 and D3 were jointly and severally further indebted to the plaintiff for the total sum of HK$5.056.58 and US$18,916,941.81. Submissions on behalf of the plaintiff 45.Mr Lok on behalf of the plaintiff submits that this is a straightforward case appropriate for summary disposal. He submits that the starting point is that the documents has all been signed. D3 does not dispute the authenticity of his signatures. He is bound by his signatures. Relying on the documents alone, and in particular the bilingual documents, Mr Lok submits that D3 has all along been aware of the nature of the documents he signed, and the purported defences advanced on behalf of D3 must fail in limine. Submissions on behalf of D3 46.Mr Ho on behalf of D3 submits that on the facts, the Guaranteeand Mortgages are liable to be vitiated or set aside, and there are definitely triable issues in this case. He submits that on the unsatisfactory evidence before the Court, the plaintiff has been unable to show that the present case is suitable for summary disposal. He submits that the plaintiff has in any event been unable to “give particulars of every person who to the best of the plaintiff’s knowledge is in possession of the mortgaged property”, as is required by Order 88, rule 5(4). He submits that in the light of the substantial factual disputes, it would be abusive if the Court were to grant relief summary. Law relevant to Order 88—whether triable issues 47.The law is this regard is not in dispute. An Originating Summons is generally an inappropriate procedure where there is substantial dispute as to facts. In an action litigated by way of Order 88 procedure, judgment can summarily be given, but only if there is no trial triable issue on the evidence—see De Lasala-Debring v De Lasala [2014] 2 HKLRD 674, per Anthony Chan J at paragraph 5, Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd v China Hong Kong Textile Co Ltd [2011] 4 HKLRD 457, per Lam J (as he then was) at paragraph 5, and Lei Shing Hong Credit Ltd v Kingsfine International Ltd & Another HCMP 1169/2016 (21 April 2017), per Deputy Judge Paul Lam SC at paragraph 5. 48.As to the approach to be adopted when considering whether the evidence discloses any triable issue, I agree with the observations made by Deputy Judge A To (as he then was) in Ip Kam Wah & Another v Fair City Group Ltd [2005] 4 HKLRD 168, at paragraph 8, that:
Consideration of the evidence 49.An important issue in the present case is D3’s degree of literacy in English. D3 produced his Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination Results Notice which showed that he failed in English. Mr Lok pointed out that D3 in fact got grade “E” for “Reading Comprehension and Usage”. But D3 got “F” in respect of all other aspectsof the subject (namely “Writing”, “Integrated Listening, Reading and Writing” and “Oral English”). D3’s claim that he is close to illiterate in English cannot be dismissed off hand as being unbelievable. 50.Given the possibility that D3 may in fact be “close to illiterate in English” as he now claims, what he has been told about the Guarantee and Mortgages will have to be considered with particular care:
51.The documents at this stage are also problematic:
52.The background which led to the execution of the Guarantee and Mortgages also supports D3’s case that he might have been misled:
53.I emphasize that I am not suggesting that the background facts highlighted above are necessarily suggestive of fraud or otherwise any vitiating factors. My view is that D3’s case has to be considered against such background. My further view is that D3’s case, when considered and set against such background, is not unbelievable, and ought not to be dismissed offhand. 54.To complete the picture, I record that parties have made a lot of submissions before me (both law and facts) on the possibility of D3 having been misled or unduly influenced by third parties, and whether the plaintiff had been put on enquiry as a result. On the evidence, I have found for the reasons set out above that D3’s case that he has been misled by parties employed or engaged by the plaintiff is not unbelievable. In the circumstances, I do not see the need to consider the possibility of third party impropriety. Disposal 55.For the reasons set out above, I refuse to deal with the matter summarily. I am of the view that the facts of the case warrant further consideration with the benefit of pleadings, discovery and cross-examination. I order that the case should proceed as if started by Writ. For this purpose, I give the following directions:
56.I also make an order nisi that D3 should have the costs of and occasioned by the hearing.
Mr Michael Lok, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the plaintiff Mr Ambrose Ho SC, leading Mr Alan Kwong and Mr David Fong, instructed by Lau, Kwong & Hung, for the 3rd defendant Mr Martin Kok, instructed by Lee & Yik Lawyers, for the intended intervener / intended 4th defendant | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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