Tahir Ambar Ali v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 814/2017 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 July 2018.
1. The applicant is a national of Pakistan who first came to Hong Kong in 2009 when he raised a claim with the Immigration Department under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but by a letter dated 15 May 2012 in which he stated that he wanted to return to Pakistan because his problem was solved and that his life was safe in there, and hence he withdrew his claim and was repatriated to Pakistan on 24 July 2012 without any dec
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HCAL 814/2017 [2018] HKCFI 1544 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 814 of 2017 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan: Leave to apply for judicial review dismissed. Observations for the Applicant: 1.The applicant is a national of Pakistan who first came to Hong Kong in 2009 when he raised a claim with the Immigration Department under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but by a letter dated 15 May 2012 in which he stated that he wanted to return to Pakistan because his problem was solved and that his life was safe in there, and hence he withdrew his claim and was repatriated to Pakistan on 24 July 2012 without any decision being made in respect of his claim. 2.The applicant subsequently entered Hong Kong illegally and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 23 May 2016, and on 11 August 2016 he lodged a non-refoulement claim in which he stated as follows:
3.Not surprisingly the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) found the applicant’s claim seriously lacking information and supporting materials, and hence by a letter dated 29 August 2016 requested him to provide further information on or before 12 September 2016, and when that letter was returned unclaimed and marked “address unknown”, a telephone call was made to the applicant and after his confirmation of his address as the same as before, a further letter was sent out on 3 October 2016 with the same request for him to provide further information on or before 17 October 2016. 4.In that letter the applicant was specifically referred to Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance when he was requested to provide his evidence in support of his claim as follows:
5.In the absence of any response or further information from the applicant the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 24 October 2016 rejected his claim and subsequently served a removal order on him. In his decision the Director gave the following reasons for rejecting the applicant’s claim:
6.On 24 January 2017 the applicant filed his notice of appeal against the removal order in which he stated as follows:
7.After again checking with the applicant about his address, the Director by a letter dated 26 January 2017 informed him of the earlier decision of 24 October 2016 of the refusal of his claim. 8.On 27 October 2017 the applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision of 24 October 2016, and in it he put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge:
9.In his supporting affirmation of the same date the applicant gave the following reasons and explanations in support of these complaints of his:
10.By then the applicant was of course way out of time as Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. As the Director’s decision was dated 24 October 2016, any leave application would have to be made not later than 24 January 2017, and hence there is a delay of more than nine months in the applicant’s leave application. 11.It is clear to me that the applicant’s explanation must be the same as that for his failure to provide the Director with further information as to his claim, which is that he never received those letters from the Director notwithstanding his telephone confirmation of his address, which was stated at Room 1, 3/F, 218 Tai Nam Street, Sham Shui Po, Kowloon in the letters from the Director, while in both the applicant’s supporting affirmation and the exhibited copies of letters from him to the Director all show a different address which may go to support his claim of not receiving the Director’s request for further information. 12.However, a close examination of the dates of all those letters from the applicant show that none of them were made during the period of the Director’s letters of requests between August and October 2016, but were instead all dated in 2017 with the earliest one on 13 March 2017. 13.Whilst it is of course possible that the applicant might have in August 2016 already moved to the new address as stated in those letters of his and therefore the Director’s requests sent after August 2016 never reached him, but as noted above after the Director’s first request was returned unclaimed, the second request dated 3 October 2016 was sent out to the same address after confirmation with the applicant on the phone, which goes to show that at least in October 2016 the applicant had still not yet moved to his new address. In any event it is clearly his duty to so inform the Director of any change to his address. 14.Furthermore, and equally significant is the applicant’s admission in paragraph 4 of his affirmation quoted in paragraph 9 above, that he was aware that he should provide further information to the Director, and if it is his complaint that he was not given any extension of time or opportunity to do so, I note that this is not his first application or his first time in Hong Kong, as he was here from 2009 to 2012 for his first torture claim application and should therefore know his way around and more importantly his dealings with the Immigration Department in similar circumstances, and that there was nothing to stop him from submitting further information in support of his claim even afterwards if he so wished. 15.In fact, notwithstanding what he has asserted in his affirmation, even now in his leave application he did not provide any further information in support of his claim as to what political problem and land dispute that he had with his cousin in Pakistan, nor did he do so at the oral hearing of his application when he failed to attend without any explanation. In the circumstances I do not accept his claim to have never received the Director’s requests for further information in support of his case, and hence that cannot be his explanation for his delay with his leave application either. 16.As for my consideration of the merits of his intended application to see if there is other good reason to extend time, I am unable to find any merits or basis in any of his proposed grounds as being just his broad and vague assertions without any particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they applied to his claim, of which I totally agree with the Director that as it stands it is wholly devoid of any substance or justification for non-refoulement protection. 17.In the premises and for the reasons given, I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason to extend time for him to do so, his leave application is hereby dismissed. Dated the 20th day of July 2018.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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