HKSAR v. Ng Wai Ling
Read the full judgment text of CACC 149/2002 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 12 August 2003.
1. On 1 March 2002, the Applicant, who was the fourth defendant in the court below, was convicted of conspiracy to defraud after a trial in the District Court before Judge Wesley Wong. She now seeks leave to appeal against conviction.
Cites 1 case
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CACC000149/2002 CACC 149/2002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 149 OF 2002 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC 693 OF 2001) ____________________
____________________ Coram: Hon Stuart-Moore VP, Yeung JA and Tong J in Court Date of Hearing: 12 August 2003 Date of Judgment: 12 August 2003 ____________________ J U D G M E N T ____________________ Stuart-Moore VP (giving the judgment of the Court): 1.On 1 March 2002, the Applicant, who was the fourth defendant in the court below, was convicted of conspiracy to defraud after a trial in the District Court before Judge Wesley Wong. She now seeks leave to appeal against conviction. 2.The facts of the case provide a woefully familiar pattern of deception in what has become known as "Loco London Gold/Silver" fraud. The general allegation is effectively summarised in the particulars of the charge which alleged against the Applicant (charged with D1-3 and D5-9) that between 20 December 1999 and 2 March 2000 she conspired, together with her co-defendants, and with Yuen Lik-hang and others unknown, to defraud such persons as might be induced to give them money to invest, by dishonestly:
3.All except D8 and D9 were convicted on this charge. 4.Best Sky was found by the judge to have been an entirely bogus outfit. It possessed none of the essential features of a genuine bullion trading company. It was simply used as a vehicle for fraud from its well-appointed offices at Fung House in Connaught Road Central. Its methods were, it has to be said, almost exactly the same as this court has encountered in numerous other cases of the same kind. 5.The judge, in his Reasons for Verdict, summarised how Best Sky trapped its victims into coming forward by placing regular advertisements in newspapers offering employment for people to work as clerks or cleaners. Those who responded were then "employed", not in the capacity described in the advertisements but, instead, to make "calculations". Almost immediately they found themselves being turned into "clients" once they had "invested" money in personal accounts. Despite making relatively small deposits, these so-called clients were allowed to "trade" in what purported to be massive sums. In no time, they found that the profits they were said to have made had been wiped out. They quickly discovered that they had become the victims of a scam when they were told that they had lost their entire capital outlay. 6.The prosecution's evidence about the Applicant's role focused entirely on the way in which PW2 was induced, through the efforts not only of the Applicant but D3 and D6 also, to part with $21,000. In his Reasons for Verdict, the judge summarised in some detail the nature of the evidence against the Applicant before giving his brief assessment in these terms:
7.The case which was advanced on the Applicant's behalf at trial was that she was in virtually the same position as PW2. She had supposedly come to Best Sky on the same day as PW2 and may, therefore, far from assisting in the fraud, merely have been an innocent dupe in the events which unfolded thereafter. This contrasted with the prosecution's allegation that the Applicant was merely acting the role of a new recruit at Best Sky when she told PW2 that she had started work on the same day as PW2. The prosecution claimed that this was obviously an untrue assertion bearing in mind that PW2 had testified that it was the Applicant who had "taught" her how to do "calculations" on her first day at work. 8.The Applicant chose not to give evidence in support of the wholly innocent role which it had been suggested on her behalf she had played. It was, therefore, pre-eminently a case in which it was for the judge to decide, on the evidence adduced by the prosecution, whether there was sufficient material on which an inference of guilt could safely and irresistibly be drawn against the Applicant. 9.Against this background, it was firstly submitted by Mr Surman, on the Applicant's behalf, that there was "no evidence against (the Applicant)". 10.This submission was plainly misconceived in the light of the evidence we have set out already. Best Sky was a bogus company. It only existed to defraud the public. There was not a shred of evidence, as Mr Madigan pointed out in his written argument on the Respondent's behalf, that any genuine trading ever took place. The talk of high returns and investment potential which was done in front of PW2 by those, including the Applicant, who had pretended to be genuinely interested, was obviously capable of amounting to evidence of a rehearsed charade which was intended to, and did, induce PW2 to part with her money. The judge was entitled, Mr Madigan contended, to have drawn an inference adverse to the Applicant. We agree and, accordingly, we reject the first ground. 11.In the closely related second and third grounds, which were advanced by way of alternatives to the first ground, it was argued that the prosecution's evidence was "so tenuous" that the conviction was unsafe or unsatisfactory and that the judge had drawn erroneous inferences against the Applicant. 12.These grounds also fail. As we have said already, the Applicant did not give evidence. She was, of course, under no duty to do so. Indeed, the same applies to her co-defendants none of whom gave evidence and no witnesses were called on their behalf. We consider that, bearing in mind the whole nature of Best Sky's operation, there was a sufficiency of evidence from which the judge could safely conclude that the Applicant had played along with the scheme which led PW2 into being persuaded to "invest" her money with this bogus enterprise. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that the guilty participants in this fraudulent scheme would have left a genuinely new recruit, as the Applicant had told PW2 she was, to teach PW2 how to do the accounts. 13.In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, in our view the judge drew the only sensible inference which was realistically open to him, based on the Applicant's words and conduct, set against the whole of the surrounding circumstances. In arriving at his conclusion, the judge had assessed the evidence given by the all-important witness to testify against the Applicant and we have not been provided with any reason which would justify our interference with the judge's conclusion. This was a case where the failure of the Applicant to give any explanation for her conduct can only have strengthened the inference that she had acted as a participant in the conspiracy. 14.The application is dismissed.
Representation: Mr P.K. Madigan, SGC, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent. Mr Giles Surman, instructed by Director of Legal Aid, for the Applicant. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACC 149/2002