Rana Sohel v. Ian Candy, Esq., and Another

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1029/2017 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 September 2018.

1. The applicant is a 30-year-old national of Bangladesh who entered Hong Kong illegally on 20 February 2014 and was arrested by police on 26 February 2014.  After being referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Bangladesh he would be harmed or killed by his uncle over a land dispute and over their political differences.  He was then released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.

Cited by 2 cases · Cites 1 case

Case No.HCAL 1029/2017[2018] HKCFI 2098
Court
High Court CFI
Date21 Sep 2018
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 1029/2017

[2018] HKCFI 2098

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LISTNo. 1029 of 2017

BETWEEN

Rana Sohel Applicant
and
Gerard Paul Muttrie, ESQ.,
Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent
and
Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

    consideration of the documents only; or
    consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

Leave to apply for judicial review dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.The applicant is a 30-year-old national of Bangladesh who entered Hong Kong illegally on 20 February 2014 and was arrested by police on 26 February 2014.  After being referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Bangladesh he would be harmed or killed by his uncle over a land dispute and over their political differences.  He was then released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.

2.By a Notice of Decision dated 22 May 2015 the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejected the applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“torture risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“HKBOR”), Cap 383 (“BOR 3 risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”).

3.By a Notice of Further Decision dated 18 July 2017 the Director again rejected the applicant’s claim in the absence of any response from him to an earlier invitation to submit additional facts which may be relevant to his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection including any other absolute or non-derogable rights under HKBOR including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 risk”).

4.By then the applicant had filed his appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) against the Director’s decision, for which he attended an oral hearing before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions put to him by the adjudicator for the Board. On 23 March 2017 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

5.On 10 April 2017 the applicant filed his Form 86 under HCAL 126/2017 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and in his supporting affirmation of the same date he put forward the following eight grounds for his intended challenge:

(1) procedural impropriety/unfairness in the adjudicator’s failure to carry out sufficient research and inquiry into COI and for failing to have regard to relevant and up-to-date COI in the consideration of his claim;

(2) irrationality in the adjudicator’s failure to take into account or putting proper weight on relevant COI and for cherry-picking and putting weight on irrelevant COI in the consideration of his claim;

(3) irrationality in the adjudicator’s failure to evaluate and make finding of fact as to whether a consistent pattern of gross and mass violation of human rights in Bangladesh;

(4) irrationality in the adjudicator’s failure to analyze and assess whether state protection exists in Bangladesh and misdirected himself as to the extended meaning of state protection;

(5) irrationality in the Board’s decision in taking into account and putting weight in irrelevant consideration or based on incorrect or inaccurate facts;

(6) procedural impropriety for failure to call for psychological and psychiatric evaluations and reports on the applicant;

(7) procedural impropriety/unfairness in the adjudicator applying the incorrect standard of proof in his decision; and

(8) procedural impropriety/unfairness due to lack of or insufficient representation from the assigned duty lawyer for the applicant resulting in unfair procedure.  

6.His application then came before Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock and after failing to attend the oral hearing without explanation, the learned judge proceeded to deal with the application in his absence and on 25 August 2017 dismissed it after finding no substance in any of his proposed grounds for his intended challenge, nor did she find any error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s decision or any failure on the part of the adjudicator to apply high standard of fairness in the assessment and consideration of the applicant’s claim.  

7.That decision was never appealed by the applicant who instead filed another Form 86 in these proceedings now before me again for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and in his supporting affirmation he put forward exactly the same eight grounds as before when all of which had already been found to be without substance and were rejected by the learned Judge in that proceedings.

8.In the premises plainly the principle of res judicata applies and this second application of the applicant is clearly an abuse of the court’s process.  Accordingly his application is hereby dismissed.

Dated the 21st day of September 2018.

(NG Ka-wing) 
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must: 
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)). 
 
Sent to the Applicant on 21 September 2018 

Rana Sohel

Applicant’s ref. no.:Nil. 
Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 21 September 2018

Gerard Paul Muttrie, ESQ.,
Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:USM 1618/15/6/4/B222

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
RBCZ 9001377/17
(RBCZ 114/14)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Office
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) 



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