Re Bansiles Jamaicha Baguindo
Read the full judgment text of CACV 98/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 27 September 2018.
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 29 March 2018 refusing her leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 18 May 2016 and 6 January 2017 rejecting her non-refoulement claim and the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office/ Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 3 November 2017 dismissing her ap
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CACV 98/2018 [2018] HKCA 641 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 98 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 871 of 2017) ___________________________________
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________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ Hon Chu JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 29 March 2018 refusing her leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 18 May 2016 and 6 January 2017 rejecting her non-refoulement claim and the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office/ Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 3 November 2017 dismissing her appeal against the Director’s decisions. The applicant agrees to the appeal being heard before a two-judge court. 2.The applicant is a national of the Philippines. She came to Hong Kong in November 2006 to work as a domestic helper. Her employment contract was terminated prematurely, and she has overstayed since April 2007. She was arrested by the police on 15 March 2009. She lodged a torture claim in 2009 which was rejected by the Director in October 2012, and her appeal to the Board was dismissed in February 2013. On 17 October 2014, the Court granted her application for judicial review, and her torture claim was remitted to the Director for reconsideration. Upon the commencement of the unified screening mechanism, the applicant’s claim was assessed as a non-refoulement claim under all applicable grounds. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on her fear that, if she returned to the Philippines, she would be harmed or killed by two creditors, Boy Sison (“BS”) and Gilbert Gacutan (“GG”), because she had failed to repay her loans. According to the applicant, she took a loan from BS to pay for a training course in London, which did not materialise as the employment agency ran away with her money. She then took another loan from GG to enable her to come to Hong Kong to work. BS was said to be an influential man, the leader of a gang, and well connected with politicians and the New People’s Army (“NPA”), which is a guerrilla group in the Philippines while GG was a moneylender and related to local politicians. The applicant said that as a result of her failure to make repayments, her family members were harassed, threatened and assaulted, and her family home was vandalized. The applicant provided to the Director a document from the Barangay Captain’s office (“Barangay Captain Document”) as proof of her account that her parents had made a complaint about the harassment, threat and assault to the family and the property damage to the family home. 4.By the Notice of Decision dated 18 May 2016, the Director rejected the applicant’s claim having regard to the BOR 3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2], and the torture risk[3]. The Director assessed the risk of harm from her creditors to be low, which was further reduced or negated by the availability of state protection and internal relocation options. By letter dated 9 December 2016, the Director invited the applicant to provide additional information relevant to an assessment of the BOR 2 risk[4]. The applicant replied on 23 December 2016, in which she mentioned the creditors went to her home several times between May and July 2016 to demand repayments and threatened her parents, attacked her brother and molested her sister. By a Notice of Further Decision dated 6 January 2017, the Director decided against the applicant under the BOR 2 risk ground. 5.The Board heard the applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decisions on 2 February 2017. The applicant provided a number of documents to the Board relating primarily to the levels of crime, terrorist attacks and killings in the war on drugs in the Philippines. With the assistance of an interpreter, the applicant gave an account of her case to the Board, which was set out in [26] to [38] of the Board’s decision. For reasons given in [39] to [53] of the decision, the Board, while accepting that the applicant had borrowed two loans, failed to repay them and that legal action to recover the debts might have been commenced, did not accept that the applicant’s creditors had harmed her family members and issued threats to harm her. It also did not accept that the Barangay Captain Document (see [3] above) was a genuine document and refused to place weight on it. The Board concluded that the risk of harm to the applicant should she return to the Philippines to be extremely low. It also found that none of the applicable grounds were made out and dismissed the appeal. 6.The applicant filed her Form 86 on 13 November 2017 seeking leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant’s supporting affirmation filed on the same day advanced the following grounds in support of the relief sought:
7.The Judge held an oral hearing on 9 March 2018 to hear the leave application. He dismissed the application and gave the following reasons in [15] to [21] of the Form CALL-1 dated 29 March 2018, [2018] HKCFI 701:
8.The applicant’s Notice of Appeal dated 11 April 2018 raised the following grounds of appeal:
9.The applicant’s written submission essentially repeated the grounds in the Notice of Appeal. In her oral submission, she stated that the Barangay Captain Document was a certified copy obtained from the authority in the Barangay district. She also asked to be allowed to stay in Hong Kong as she would be in danger upon return to the Philippines. 10.Ground (1) is directed at [17] of Form CALL-1. This Court had repeatedly emphasised that evaluation of evidence, including COI condition, and assessment of risk are matters for the Director and the Board, who are the primary decision makers. Merely disputing the Director’s or the Board’s findings on the evidence or asserting the existence of harm and risk, without pinpointing any error in law or procedure or procedural impropriety, will not amount to a ground for judicial review. There is no merit in this ground of appeal. 11.Ground (2) is also unarguable. The concept of extended acquiescence is irrelevant in light of the Board’s rejection of the applicant’s claim that her creditors were politically influential, and had harmed her family members and issued threats to harm her. 12.Ground (3) is directed at [16] of Form CALL-1, and is in substance a repetition of Ground (b) of the grounds for judicial review (see [6] above). For the reasons stated in [9] above, we agree with the Judge that the applicant’s challenge to the Director’s assessment of the COI has no merit. Further, since the Board did not accept that the applicant’s creditors had harmed her family members or issued threat to harm her, it did not have to, and had not proceeded to, consider the COI. In the absence of any proper basis to challenge the Board’s finding that the risk of harm to the applicant at the hands of her creditors to be extremely low upon her return to the Philippines, the Director’s assessment of the COI is of no relevance. We see no merit in this ground of appeal. 13.Ground (4) is related to [20] of Form CALL-1 and is a repetition of Ground (e) of the grounds for judicial review (see [6] above). The Board had referred to features in the Barangay Captain Document that gave cause for concern as to its authenticity. These include the document was written in English, not made out on official letterhead, and did not bear any distinguishing marks or seal. These are matters that the Board was entitled to take into account when assessing the authenticity of the document. It was also open to the Board to conclude on these considerations that there were doubts as to the genuineness of the document, and to refuse to place weight on it. The applicant has not put forward any substantive point that can point to error in the Board’s assessment of this piece of evidence. Although the applicant asserted in her oral submission that the document she adduced was a certified copy, there was no evidence in support. There is, in the circumstances, no proper basis on which the court can interfere with the finding of fact made by the Board. Ground (4) is not arguable. 14.For the reasons given above, there are no grounds for disturbing the Judge’s rejection of the grounds put forward for the intended judicial review. We agree with the Judge that the intended judicial review is not reasonably arguable and has no prospect of success, and leave to apply for judicial review should be refused. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unpresented, appeared in person. [1] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383. [2] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. [3] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. |
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