Pjm v. Gpn
Read the full judgment text of FCMC 4999/2014 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 3 October 2018 before Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy.
Costs – Children's matter – Self-representation – Variation of costs order – No order as to costs – Petitioner father represented himself – Respondent mother incurred significant legal costs – Court varied costs order – Petitioner to pay 50% of Respondent's costs – Certificate for counsel
Legal issues: Variation of costs order in children's matter
Outcome: Costs order varied; Petitioner to pay 50% of Respondent's costs; Petitioner to pay costs of summons
Cites 2 cases
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FCMC 4999 / 2014 [2018] HKFC 167 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NUMBER 4999 OF 2014 ----------------------------
---------------------------- Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public) Date of written submissions: 20 August 2018 (Paper disposal) Date of Ruling: 3 October 2018 --------------------------------- RULING --------------------------------- Introduction 1.This application arises out of my judgment on the arrangements for the children of the family dated the 2 May 2018. In my Conclusions and order I said as follows:
The Respondent mother now seeks to challenge that costs order. 2.By the time of the trial the parties had been locked in ongoing litigation and related disputes with respect to their two children for a considerable period of time. Communication between them was very difficult and there was very little if any mutual respect or trust. Thus although some of the outstanding issues at trial were relatively minor the parties were nevertheless unable to reach consensus. 3.In general terms it could be said that I came down mainly in favour of the mother in that I agreed with her that the current shared care arrangement should continue. However, I accept that I did make further directions with respect to some of the other ongoing issues between the parties, as requested by the father. Some of those issues were compromised. On others I came down in favour of the father. For example, I specifically directed that both parties only refer to T having a condition that he has actually been diagnosed with – see the highlighted paragraph 1 (44) (iv) above. 4.Given that this was a children’s matter I decided at the end of the day to initially make the standard order in relation to costs. The mother seeks to vary that costs order and asks either that the father be ordered to pay her costs or that alternatively he contribute towards them and that the costs be taxed or summarily assessed with certificate for counsel. According to the documents produced the mother’s final discounted legal bill came to just over HK$300,000. The law 5.The law on costs is not in dispute. It is accepted than in the normal course of events the court will make no order as to costs when the matter in issue relates to children. A costs order against one parent in a child related matter is considered unusual unless that parent has for example, been unreasonable in the conduct of the litigation. See Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 2 FLR 569. 6.In S v S HCMP 5547/1999, Deputy High Court Judge Gill when summarizing the various cases then available on the subject elaborated on this point when he said as follows:
The issue 7.Unlike in other cases the issue here is not simply a matter of degree. Rather it is the mother’s case that given that she had no alternative but to seek legal assistance on this matter and that she was all along a reluctant participant in the process, that it is only fair and reasonable for the father to either pay for or to contribute towards her legal costs. It is of note that the father chose to represent himself throughout and thus he has no legal costs to speak of. Generally, as set out above, it is accepted that there should be no order as to costs in a dispute over children. As pointed out by the father in his submission, this is so that parents will not be discouraged from raising legitimate concerns which need to be properly ventilated and determined by the courts when considering the best interests of a child. However, there are exceptions to this general rule and the court’s discretion is in no way limited in this respect. Discussion 8.In summary the mother said as follows in her written submission:
I largely accept what she says. In particular, I accept that funding the litigation costs would have been extremely difficult for her, given her limited income. Although the father is responsible for more of the children’s direct costs, nevertheless he has a much higher disposable income than that of the mother. 9.As I understand it the judgments that provide us with precedent when considering costs orders in relation to children matters, were made on the premise that both parties were legally represented throughout. I am not aware of any reported decision where that is not the case. The ethos behind the no order as to costs principle is that both parties should be responsible for their own legal costs regardless of the outcome of the litigation. Thus neither party should be afraid of having a costs order made against them when raising a legitimate concern about their children. Generally speaking, if an adverse costs order is made against one party then they would be responsible for both their own legal costs and a portion of the other side’s costs. Such an order could be very significant from a financial perspective and could have very serious ramifications. The hope is that the no order principle would mean that this significant side effect of most litigation would be more limited where the dispute is about children. This does not apply however where one party is legally represented and the other is not. In such a case there is clear inequality from the start. In this instance the mother has been left with a crippling debt, whereas the father has not. Conclusion 10.In general I accept that the mother was perfectly within her rights to instruct solicitors and counsel to represent her. The allegations made by the father against her were serious and she was rightly concerned that she should not be disadvantaged in any way by the process, which she clearly found difficult. I also accept that she tried to settle matters with the father and that she has been the more successful party overall. I also note that she tried to mitigate her loss, so to speak, and that on occasions she did represent herself in court, but that she felt unable to do so at trial. 11.Given that the mother has significant legal costs and seemingly the father has none, it seems to me that it would only be fair and reasonable for each party to be responsible for 50% of the mother’s party and party costs. There shall be certificate for counsel. 12.Thus I shall make an order as follows: The costs order nisi made by myself on the 2 May 2018 shall be varied so that the Petitioner do pay 50% of the Respondent’s costs, such costs to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed. There shall be certificate for counsel. 13.In so far as the costs of this summons are concerned I can see no reason why the costs shall not follow the event in the normal way. Consequently, the father shall pay the mother the costs of and arising out of her summons dated the 16 May 2018, such costs to also be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed.
The Petitioner father represented himself The Respondent mother represented herself | ||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under FCMC 4999/2014