Re Khalilur Rahman
Read the full judgment text of CACV 307/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 29 October 2018.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J on 6 July 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review.
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 5 cases
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CACV 307/2018 [2018] HKCA 765 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 307 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 702/2017) ___________________________
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J on 6 July 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He first came to Hong Kong on 15 April 2006 and was permitted to remain as a visitor until 29 April 2006. He did not leave Hong Kong despite the expiry of his permission to remain and overstayed illegally. He was arrested by the police on 26 January 2007 and subsequently lodged his torture claim on 31 January 2007. On 8 March 2011, the Director of Immigration rejected his torture claim. His appeal against the director’s rejection was dismissed on 7 April 2011. He was deported back to Bangladesh on 20 May 2011. 3.He came to Hong Kong illegally on 12 December 2015 and was arrested by the police on 20 December 2015. He raised his claim for non-refoulement protection on all applicable grounds except the torture risk[1] on 26 December 2015. His claim was based on the fear that, if he returned to Bangladesh, he would be harmed by some members of Awami League (“AL”) because he witnessed an aftermath of a murder committed by three people who were closely connected to AL in August 2001. After he was deported back to Bangladesh, the applicant claimed that such AL members set fire upon his house in 2011. Further, he was assaulted by them in 2014 sustaining injuries resulted in his hospitalization. In 2015, an arrest warrant was issued against him in relation to the bombing of a vehicle. He said he had been framed up by the AL members in causing such warrant to be issued. 4.By two notices of decision dated 29 June 2016 and 14 September 2017, the director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. The former covered the BOR 3 risk[2] and the persecution risk[3], and the latter the BOR 2 risk[4]. 5.The applicant petitioned to an adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office against the director’s decisions. An oral hearing was held on 29 May 2017 and the applicant confirmed under oath the matters stated in the supplemental claim form and the interview records. After considering the case, the adjudicator accepted that the applicant might have witnessed the murder in 2001. He however rejected the suggestion that those AL members were still pursuing the applicant after 16 years. Furthermore, after studying the applicant’s evidence (including medical records of the hospital), the adjudicator did not accept that the applicant had been subject to ill-treatments reaching the minimum level of severity. In terms of the alleged false charge, the adjudicator did not find credible evidence on the charge being based on a framing up. The adjudicator found the applicant to be a fugitive from justice. He also rejected the applicant’s assertion that those AL members had the ability to locate him anywhere in Bangladesh. The adjudicator was satisfied that internal relocation was a viable alternative for the applicant if he returned to Bangladesh. The petition was dismissed on 28 September 2017. The judge’s decision 6.On 3 October 2017, the applicant applied to the court for leave to apply for judicial review. In the Form 86, the proposed respondent was named as “The Petition Team (Security Bureau)” (sic), and the intended applicant for judicial review was against “The Petition Team (Security Bureau) taken decision on my case at 28 September 2017” (sic). No ground for seeking relief was contained in the Form 86. The applicant deposed in his supporting affirmation dated 3 October 2017 that:
7.The following documents were exhibited to the supporting affirmation:
8.As the applicant did not request for an oral hearing, the judge proceeded with the application on the papers. After setting out the factual background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the director and the adjudicator, the judge refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The reasons for refusing leave were set out in [12] – [14] of the CALL-1 Form of 6 July 2018, [2018] HKCFI 1216, as follows:
The appeal 9.On 6 July 2018, the applicant filed a notice of appeal against the judge’s decision. The applicant stated the followings in the notice of appeal:
10.The applicant also lodged his written submissions on 21 August 2018. In the written submissions, the applicant reiterated his dissatisfaction with the decision of the director in rejecting his non-refoulement claim and asked the court to reconsider his case. The applicant also attached the following documents to his written submissions:
11.We heard the appeal on 25 October 2018. General propositions 12.Before we consider the merits of this appeal, we would reiterate the following general propositions regarding an appeal on non-refoulement cases (see, Re Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Morol Rana [2018] HKCA 617 at [13]; and Re Shrestha Mahesh [2018] HKCA 619 at [14]):
Discussion 13.Items (a) and (g) described at [10] above are new evidence. We do not accept that they are admissible on appeal. First, the applicant gave no explanation as to why he could not obtain the evidence for use at the hearing before the judge. 14.Second, whilst the letter from the wife partly referred to event taking place after the hearing before the Adjudicator, we are not satisfied that the evidence meets the threshold in Section 37ZO(2) of the Immigration Ordinance[5]. 15.Further, in light of the adjudicator’s finding that internal relocation was a viable option for the applicant, the incident described in the letter of the wife, even assuming that it had actually happened, could not have an important influence on the outcome of the case. Accordingly, the applicant fails to satisfy the requirements in Ladd v Marshall. 16.There is no basis to challenge the judge’s (and the adjudicator’s) decision on the ground that the applicant was not given an opportunity to obtain further documents in support. The applicant had indicated at the hearing before the adjudicator that he had no additional evidence that he wished to give: see [35] of the adjudicator’s decision. He had the full opportunity to, and did in fact place evidence for the consideration of the judge. This ground cannot take the applicant any further. 17.The adjudicator had already given due consideration to the murder in 2001, the hospital records and the arrest warrant: see [45] to [50] of his decision. The assessment of risk of harm in light of the evidence is primarily a matter for the adjudicator. We cannot find anything amiss in that assessment. 18.In substance, the applicant tried to invite the court to undertake the assessment as if it were a primary decision maker. As we have explained, this is not a permissible course for the applicant to take in the intended application for judicial review. The judge is correct in refusing leave for him to apply for judicial review. 19.For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant appearing in person [1] This refers to the risk defined under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. [5] Section 37ZO(2) allows a subsequent torture claim to be made if the applicant provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that—
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