Re Ali Zulfiqar
Read the full judgment text of CACV 343/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 27 November 2018.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 20 July 2018 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 1 December 2016 and 27 October 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeals against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 9 February 2015 and 9 March 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoule
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CACV 343/2018 [2018] HKCA 873 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 343 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 842 /2017) -----------------------------------
----------------------------------- Before: Hon Barma JA and L Chan J in Court Date of Hearing: 21 November 2018 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 27 November 2018 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 20 July 2018 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 1 December 2016 and 27 October 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeals against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 9 February 2015 and 9 March 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claims. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He entered Hong Kong on 27 April 2009 illegally and was arrested by the police on same day. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 1 May 2009. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on the allegation that he was the target of honour killing. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [2] to [3] of the CALL-1 Form. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 9 February 2015 (“the Director’s First Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s First Decision covered the BOR 3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2], and the torture risk[3]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After a hearing on 7 December 2015, the Board dismissed the appeal on 1 December 2016 (“Board’s Decision”). 6.By a Notice of Further Decision dated 9 March 2017, the Director also assessed the applicant’s claim based on the BOR 2 risk[4], and decided against him. 7.On 27 October 2017, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Further Decision without an oral hearing. 8.The Board was satisfied at [8] that the threat of harm was not instigated by any state agent and at [14] that internal relocation would be viable. At [33] of the Board’s Decision dated 1 December 2016, the Board also found that the applicant’s case was not credible although it did so only for completeness and it clear at [30] that the appeal failed independently of this ground. The deputy judge’s decision 9.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 3 November 2017. The Form 86 contained no ground for seeking relief. 10.In the affirmation in support of the leave application dated 3 November 2017, the applicant advanced various grounds for judicial review which are summarised below:
11.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [11] to [18] of the CALL-1 Form:
Grounds for appeal 12.In the Notice of Appeal dated 26 July 2018 the applicant advanced the following grounds of appeal:
13.In his skeleton submissions dated 22 October 2018, the applicant submitted that:
14.The applicant agreed by a letter of 26 July 2018 that the appeal could be heard by two judges. We heard the appeal on 21 November 2018. Discussion 15.We observe first that none of the arguments relied upon in the Notice of Appeal, or the skeleton submissions, were raised as grounds for judicial review before the court below. It is not open to the applicant to raise such grounds on appeal for the first time, well outside the time limit for bringing judicial review proceedings. 16.In any event there is no merit in these grounds. 17.As to the first ground, the judge did not refer to the applicant’s credibility and as is clear from the Board’s Decision, this was not the basis of the decision. 18.As for the second ground, given the Board’s finding in relation to internal relocation it would also have been bound to fail. 19.Further, an application for leave for judicial review is not a rehearing and the court’s role is not to act as an avenue of further appeal. It is incumbent on the applicant to point out the procedural or other public law errors allegedly committed by the Board. The judge would not be required himself to come to a view on the credibility of the applicant or the state protection afforded to the applicant from honour killing even if they had been raised before him, as the primary decision maker is the Board. The court should not usurp the role of the Board and will only intervene if public law grounds for doing so are established. See: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160, Hounkpedji Messanh v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 152, Re Rizwan alias Rizwan Gulistan [2018] HKCA 162, and Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163. 20.There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [3] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. |
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