Re Ahammed Mamun
Read the full judgment text of CACV 428/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 10 December 2018.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 24 August 2018 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 24 November 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 6 May 2016 and 13 July 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
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CACV 428/2018 [2018] HKCA 929 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 428 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 986/2017) -----------------------------------
----------------------------------- Before: Hon Cheung JA and Barma JA in Court Date of Hearing: 4 December 2018 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 10 December 2018 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 24 August 2018 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 24 November 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 6 May 2016 and 13 July 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered Hong Kong on 26 August 2015 illegally and was arrested by the police on on the same day. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 23 September 2015. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on threats from members of an opposing political party. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [2] to [5] of the CALL-1 Form. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 6 May 2016 (“the Director’s First Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s First Decision covered the BOR 3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2], and the torture risk[3]. 5.By a Notice of Further Decision dated 13 July 2017, the Director also assessed the applicant’s claim based on the BOR 2 risk[4], and decided against him. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After a hearing on 11 September 2017, at which it considered both Decisions of the Director, the Board dismissed the appeal on 24 November 2017 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection. 7.At [43] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found that the applicant’s case was not credible. The Board was also satisfied at [61] that state protection would be available for the applicant and at [62] that internal relocation would be viable. The deputy judge’s decision 8.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 30 November 2017 which contained the following grounds for judicial review:
9.In the affirmation in support of the leave application dated 30 November 2017, the applicant expanded on the grounds for judicial review. 10.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [12] to [17] of the CALL-1 Form:
Grounds for appeal 11.In the Notice of Appeal dated 31 August 2018 the applicant stated that:
The applicant also set out an extract from paragraph 36 of the decision of the House of Lords in Horvath (reported at [2001] 1 AC 489). 12.In his skeleton submissions dated 29 October 2018, the applicant submitted that the judge accepted at [7] of CALL-1 Form that there was a risk of harm upon his return but the risk was low. He relied on a newspaper article in January 2015 to show that he will be seriously injured by the opposing political party if he returns. He also submitted that the Board and the judge failed to take into account the dangerous political, social and economic situation in Bangladesh. 13.In his further submission dated 5 November 2018, the applicant also explained why it is not safe for him to return. 14.The applicant agreed by a letter of 31 August 2018 that the appeal could be heard by two judges. We heard the appeal on 4 December 2018. At the hearing, the applicant reiterated that it was still not safe for him to return to Bangladesh, but said that he would be willing to return after the situation there improves. Discussion 15.The only ground of appeal put forward by the applicant is based on a complaint in relation to [7] of the judgment below. However, that paragraph does not constitute a finding by the judge, but is a summary by the judge of the findings of the Director (which were upheld by the Board, as appears from [10] of the judgment below.) 16.In the court below, the applicant did not specifically challenge these findings by the Director and the Board. The grounds for judicial review advanced by him were general and broad ones, which the judge was right to reject for the reasons given in his judgment. It is not now open to the applicant to rely on this different ground on appeal, when it was not advanced in the court below. 17.In any event, as this court has repeatedly held, the primary decision makers on factual matters are the Director and the Board, and an application for judicial review is not a further appeal against their decisions, but is concerned with the legality of their decisions and the fairness of the process of which they were reached. Like the judge, we can see no basis for interfering with those decisions. 18.The matters mentioned by the applicant at the hearing do not constitute a basis for interference with judge’s decision. 19.There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [3] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. |
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