Re Qadir Sher

CACV 242/2017

[2018] HKCA 972

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 242 OF 2017

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 341/2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.By a judgment dated 16 March 2018, this court (Cheung CJHC (as he then was) and Lam VP) dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock dated 20 October 2017 refusing leave to apply for judicial review.

2.By a notice of motion of 21 September 2018, the applicant seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

3.In his affirmation dated 21 September 2018, the applicant put forth two questions said to be of great, general, or public importance, namely:

(a)   “whether lack of legal representation is a reasonable basis to challenge the fairness of the process”; and

(b)   “whether there ought to be an additional basis for advancing a case on the BOR 2 risk separate from the BOR 3 risk, torture risk, and persecution [risk].”

4.As the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal within time, good and sufficient ground must be shown by the applicant before the court will exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time for him to do so: section 24(5) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484): see: Full Wisdom Holdings Ltd v Traffic Stream Infrastructure Co Ltd CACV 266/2003, 27 July 2004; Bowlstar (HK) Ltd v Ho Kwai Po CACV 156/2006, 10 July 2007; Elijah Saatori v Raffles Medical Group CACV 109/2008, 11 March 2009; and Tsit Wing (Hong Kong) Company Limited & Others v TWG Tea Company Pte Ltd & Another (unreported) CACV 191/2013, 29 January 2015.

5.The applicant was late by more than 5 months in seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The delay is significant. Ignorance of law cannot be a reasonable excuse for the delay.

6.In our view, the grounds set out in the applicant’s affirmation are clearly misconceived.  None of them has been argued before this Court in the appeal before us.  In any event, in the context of the present case, none of them has any merit.

7.It is plain to us that the questions stated in the applicant’s affirmation are not proper questions for submission to the Court of Final Appeal for determination.  There is no basis to grant leave on the “otherwise” limb.  The statutory criteria set out in section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) are not met. 

8.For these reasons, we refuse to extend time for the applicant to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, and dismiss the application for leave accordingly.

The applicant acting in person