Universal Music Ltd v. Neway Music Ltd and Others

HCA 1738/2017

[2018] HKCFI 2403

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1738 OF 2017

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Before: Hon L Chan J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 22 October 2018

Date of Judgment: 30 October 2018

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J U D G M E N T

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1.This is an action by the plaintiff, Universal Music Limited (“Universal”) against the defendants (“Neway Group”) for copyright infringement of Universal’s karaoke music videos (“KMVs”).

2.Universal has taken out an application on 16 March 2018 for summary judgment on liability under RHC Order 14, or alternatively, judgment following the determination of various questions under RHC Order 14A.  Neway Group has taken out a summons on 1 August 2018 under RHC Order 1B r 1(2)(a) for stay of this action including Universal’s application pending the determination of Copyright Tribunal Proceedings CT 2/2010 (“the CT2 proceedings”).

Background

3.Neway Group have applied in the CT2 proceedings before the Copyright Tribunal (“the tribunal”) for a licence from Hong Kong Karaoke Licensing Alliance Ltd (“HKKLA”) covering the use of back-catalogue KMVs of a number of record companies including Universal.  HKKLA was a copyright licensing body for K-server licences and represented some record companies including Universal, Warner Brothers and Sony.  Neway Group regarded the terms of the licensing scheme operated by HKKLA unreasonable.  It applied under section 156(1) of the Copyright Ordinance; Cap. 528 (“the Ordinance”) as the originator to the tribunal against HKKLA under the CT2 proceedings to seek reliefs under s 156(3) and (4).

4.The duration of the licence sought by Neway Group under s 156(4) in CT2 proceedings is to commence retrospectively form 1 July 2010 to a date at 6 months from the date of tribunal’s decision in the proceedings.  The proposed licence covers all the KMVs of Universal the subject matter of complaint in this action.

5.Whilst CT2/2010 was pending, HKKLA applied to this court by originating summons for interim payment or, alternatively, other relief.  I gave judgment on 7 November 2013 and ordered payment into court by Neway Group as security for payment under the licence that may be granted by the tribunal in the CT2 proceedings. 

6.Part of my judgment as varied on 8 May 2014 required Neway Group to pay a yearly sum of HK$5 million into court no later than 14 July of each year commencing from 2014, unless CT2/2010 should be decided on or before 1 July of that year.  That was the security for the yearly licence for back catalogue KMVs that may be granted by the tribunal commencing from 1 July of the year.  Furthermore, if Neway Group would opt for a licence for new KMVs for any particular scheme year, it should pay into court a further security of HK$15 million for that year.  Only this part of the judgment (“the amended order”) was effective from 8 May 2014.  The rest of the judgment had become spent before that date.

7.HKKLA took out a summons on 4 June 2015 for discharge of the amended order (“the discharge summons”).  The ground of the application is that some of the record companies which own the copyright works licensed by HKKLA in its scheme had withdrawn their authorization from HKKLA and the authorization by these record companies ceased on 30 June 2015.  The record companies wanted to license their copyright works themselves.  HKKLA had notified Neway Group of the cessation of its authorization by letter on 31 March 2015.

8.Neway Group opposes the discharge summons.  It argued that once a scheme has been referred to the Tribunal under s 156(1), it shall remain in operation pursuant to s 156(2) of the ordinance until the proceedings on the reference are concluded. 

9.After hearing arguments on both sides, I gave a decision on the discharge summons on 6 January 2017 against Neway Group (“the discharge decision”).  I in particular held in §90 of the decision as follows:

“90. In the light of the above analyses, I am of the following view on the interpretation of s. 156(2). S. 156(1) governs the reference to the Tribunal of a scheme that is “in operation”. The scheme referred is one that is “in operation”. It is not a scheme “proposed to be operated” which is governed by s. 155. Nor is it a scheme that has already been lapsed. Since it is a scheme “in operation”, there is no need to provide for its continuation after the reference is made. However, if for any reason, the scheme cannot continue to operate, then it can come to an end. The reference of it to the Tribunal will only be up to its cessation and not beyond. S. 156(2) does not require the operator to continue its operation if the operator does not desire or is not in a position to do so. If however the scheme, which is in operation when referred to the Tribunal, should continue to operate after the making of the reference, then s. 156(2) requires that it shall remain (or it remains) in operation in the same terms and conditions as and when the reference was made until the conclusion of the reference. The function of s. 156(2) is to preserve the totality of the scheme as referred pending its resolution by the Tribunal.”

10.I also decided in §93 of the decision that HKKLA’s scheme could not have continued beyond 30 June 2015.  I therefore discharged the amended order from 30 June 2015 onwards.

11.After the expiration of the scheme on 30 June 2015, Neway Group entered into licences with Warner Brothers and Sony for use of their KMVs.  They are two of the major record companies which had authorized HKKLA to use their KMVs in the expired scheme.  But no licence has been entered between Universal and Neway Group for the latter’s use of the former’s KMVs.

12.Universal claims in this action that Neway Group has since 1 July 2015 been infringing its copyright in its KMVs or “the Plaintiff’s Copyright Works” as defined in §§25 and 26 of the statement of claim.  Neway Group has admitted in this action that it had been using Universal’s KMVs from 1 July 2015 to 2 October 2018 and stopped the usage on 3 October 2018.

13.Since sections 156(1) to (4) and 160(1) and (2) have been and will be referred to and are important for this decision, I set them out in full as follows:

“156. (1) If while a licensing scheme is in operation a dispute arises between the operator of the scheme and-

(a) a person claiming that he requires a licence in a case of a description to which the scheme applies; or

(b) an organization claiming to be representative of such persons,

that person or organization may refer the scheme to the Copyright Tribunal in so far as it relates to cases of that description.

(2) A scheme which has been referred to the Tribunal under this section remains in operation until proceedings on the reference are concluded.

(3) The Tribunal shall consider the matter in dispute and make such order, either confirming or varying the scheme so far as it relates to cases of the description to which the reference relates, as the Tribunal may determine to be reasonable in the circumstances.

(4) The order may be made so as to be in force indefinitely or for such period as the Tribunal may determine.

…

160. (1) A licensing scheme which has been confirmed or varied by the Copyright Tribunal—

…; or

(b) under section 156 or 157 (reference of existing scheme to Tribunal),

is in force or, as the case may be, remains in operation, so far as it relates to the description of case in respect of which the order was made, so long as the order remains in force.

(2) While the order is in force a person who in a case of a class to which the order applies—

(a) pays to the operator of the scheme any charges payable under the scheme in respect of a licence covering the case in question or, if the amount cannot be ascertained, gives an undertaking to the operator to pay them when ascertained; and

(b) complies with the other terms applicable to such a licence under the scheme,

is in the same position as regards infringement of copyright as if he had at all material times been the holder of a licence granted by the owner of the copyright in question in accordance with the scheme.”

Neway Group’s submissions for the application for stay

14.Mr Yan, SC, leading counsel for Neway Group referred to s 156(3) and submitted that the tribunal has jurisdiction under it to make an order, either confirming or varying the referred scheme so far as it relates to cases of the description to which the reference relates, as the tribunal may determine to be reasonable in the circumstances.  He further submitted that such order may be in force indefinitely or for such period as the tribunal may determine under s 156(4). 

15.Mr Yan further submitted that if the tribunal should grant the order in terms as sought by Neway Group in the CT2 proceedings pursuant to s 156(3) for the duration of 6 months after the decision as requested by Neway Group under s 156(4), and Neway Group complies with such order, Neway Group will be regarded as at all material times the holder of a licence granted by the owner of the copyright in question under s 160(2).  The reason being that under s 160(2), if a person applying for the licence pays the licence fee which is ordered and complies with the terms of the provisions, he is put in the same position as regards infringement of the copyright as if he had, at all material times, been the holder of a licence granted by the owner of the copyright in question on the terms specified in the order.  There would have been no infringement as claimed by Universal in this action.

16.In seeking the stay, Mr Yan submitted that in an infringement action where the defendant is applying for a licence before the tribunal and such licence, once granted, would absolve him from liability, the infringement action should be stayed or adjourned pending the determination by the tribunal.  He relies on California Red Limited v Gold Typhoon Entertainment Limited & Ors HCA 2684/2008 & HCA 2735/2008, 23 July 2009, at §§3-4 (per Hon Rogers VP) and Phonographic Performance Ltd v Raine [2014] EWHC 1398 at §§15-18.  

17.In Phonographic Performance Ltd v Raine [2014] EWHC 1398, the plaintiff, a collecting society, claimed the defendant for copyright infringement.  The defendant operated a number of nightclubs in the UK.  He had previously obtained licences to use the relevant copyright works from the plaintiff, and had further applied to the Copyright tribunal for further licences to use the same.  When dealing with the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment and the defendant’s cross application for a stay of proceedings, the learned Judge, in exercising his discretion to grant the stay, stated at §§15 and 18 as follows: -

“15. Nonetheless, it is clear that the intention is to ask the tribunal not only to declare that the company is entitled to a licence but also to declare that it was entitled to a licence as from 3 August 2013, and if that were right and the tribunal acceded to the application and made a declaration or, even better for the company, granted a licence from that date or directed that one be granted, then it would follow that none of the companies could be found to have acted in breach of copyright after that date. And if that were right, then there would be no foundation for an injunction against Mr Raine based on the fact that he had authorised or procured a breach of copyright by either or both of those companies after that date.

...

18. … a judge in a position such as the one I am placed in would have jurisdiction to and could properly stay an action on terms in the event of a relevant issue being referred to the tribunal and counsel for PPL had so conceded (and properly conceded) that it would be proper for a judge to take that course if he saw fit.”

18.It is Neway Group’s case that despite the expiration of the scheme on 30 June 2015, the tribunal can still order under s 156(4) that Neway Group can make lawful use of Universal’s KMVs beyond 30 June 2015 and Universal cannot sue Neway Group for infringement of its copyrights by reason of such use.

19.Mr Yan further submitted that a stay of proceedings will not prejudice Universal to any significant degree.  The CT2 proceedings are close to being determined.  The parties have already filed and exchanged their closing submissions on 2 October 2018 and will file their supplemental closing submissions on 12 November 2018.  A hearing has been fixed on 14 to 15 March 2019 for the tribunal to raise questions arising out of the parties’ written submissions.  Accordingly, it is likely that the tribunal will give its decision sometime in mid-2019. 

20.Furthermore, Neway Group has stopped using any of Universal’s KMVs from 3 October 2018 and no copy of such KMVs remains in the Neway Group’s karaoke servers and systems.  Neway Group has also on 12 October 2018 returned and delivered up to HKKLA the hard disks containing the watermarked copies of the said KMVs which were furnished and delivered to Neway Group as pleaded in §25 of the statement of claim.  Neway Group is also prepared to file and serve affidavit(s) to confirm these matters and undertake not to restore or reinstate any of the Universal’s KMVs.

Universal’s submissions to oppose the application for stay

21.Mr Wong, SC, leading counsel for Universal, submitted that I have already decided in the discharge decision that the tribunal in the CT2 proceedings cannot determine the duration of the scheme operated by HKKLA to run beyond 30 June 2015 as HKKLA ceased to be authorized by the record companies (including Universal) to use their KMVs after this date.  Hence, the order in the CT2 proceedings cannot affect Universal’s rights after this date and cannot be an answer to Universal’s claim in the present action which only count from 1 July 2015.

22.The discharge decision also decided that Universal is not a party to the CT2 proceedings and HKKLA was not the agent of Universal or the other record companies in operating its scheme (see §103 of the discharge decision).  Hence, the order to be made by the tribunal in the CT2 proceedings cannot bind Universal and cannot be an answer to Neway Group’s infringement of Universal’s rights. 

23.For either of the above two reasons, the CT2 proceedings and this action are wholly different and do not overlap.  A decision in this action will not pre-empt the tribunal’s decision in the CT2 proceedings.  Hence, there is no basis to stay this action pending the outcome of the CT2 proceedings.

24.Mr Wong further submitted that the stay application must be rejected in the light of the legal principles set out by Ma J (as he then was) in Linfield Ltd v Taoho Design Architects Ltd [2002] 2 HKC 204 at §§13 to 14:

(1)  The stay must not cause injustice to the plaintiff in the action.

(2)  The applicant for a stay must satisfy the court that the continuance of the proceedings would be oppressive or vexatious to him or an abuse of the process of the court.

(3)  Where a plaintiff institutes proceedings as of right, he is not to be deprived of carrying on those proceedings unless very good reasons exist to the contrary (and only in “rare and compelling circumstances”: see Poon Ka Man Jason v Cheng Wai Tao [2018] HKCFI 771 (unrep., HCA 304/2011, 13 April 2018) per Au Yeung J at §37).

25.Mr Wong also submitted that there is no question of wastage of time and resources for the court or the parties for the court to proceed to hear and decide the Order 14/14A application as this action is different from the CT2 proceedings.  There is also no certainty as to when the ruling in the CT2 proceedings will be available.

26.The main argument in the stay application is whether the tribunal’s determination under s 156(4) in the CT2 proceedings can allow Neway Group to enjoy the benefits under the scheme licensed by HKKLA or make use of Universal’s KMVs beyond 30 June 2015 and hence be a complete answer to Universal’s claim in this action.  This is also the main argument in Neway Group’s opposition to Universal’s application under Order 14/14A. I therefore deal with both matters together.

Universal’s summons and the issues raised therein

27.Universal took out a summons on 16^th day of March 2018 for summary judgment under Order 14 or alternatively judgment following the summary determination of several questions under Order 14A.  The questions raised for determination under Order 14A are:

(1)  Whether by the discharge decision, the court has finally and conclusively adjudged as between Universal and the 1^st defendant (acting as agent for all other defendants) all relevant factual and legal issues considered therein, so that Neway Group in these proceedings are debarred and/or estopped from denying the correctness of the discharge decision on those factual and legal issues or from raising any argument on those issues which have been specifically rejected in the discharge decision.  The relevant factual and legal issues include:

(a)  That upon its proper interpretation, s 156(2) of the ordinance does not mandate a licence scheme which has been referred to the tribunal to continue to operate until the conclusion of the reference.

(b)  That upon proper interpretation of s 156(2) of the ordinance, HKKLA’s licensing scheme, which has been referred to the tribunal in CT2/2010, can come to end despite its having been referred to the tribunal under s. 156(1) and before the determination of the CT2 proceedings by the tribunal.

(c)  That, upon the undisputed withdrawal bythe relevant record companies including Universal of HKKLA’s authority to license their copyrighted works, HKKLA could not continue to operate its licensing scheme which accordingly could not have continued beyond 30June 2015, even though the tribunal is yet to make a determination of the CT2 proceedings.

(d)  That s 156(2) does not have the effect (as contended by the 1^st Defendant) that will compel the record companies including Universal to allow HKKLA to continue licensing the use of their copyright works to licensees indefinitely once a reference of the scheme is made to the tribunal.

(e)  That s 156(2) does not require the operator of the scheme to continue its operation if the operator does not desire or is not in a position to do so.  The reference of the scheme to the tribunal will only be up to its cessation and not beyond.

(f)  That s 156(4) of the ordinance which deals with the duration of the order made under s 156(3) does not (as contended by the 1^st Defendant) empower the tribunal to determine the longevity of the licence scheme, and that s 156(4) of the ordinance does not give the tribunal the power to dictate that the operator of the scheme should continue a scheme indefinitely if the operator cannot or does not want to do so.

(g)  That HKKLA is and was not an agent of Universal.

(h)  That the 1^st Defendant is not entitled, pursuant to the Interim Measures (as defined in paragraph 23 of the statement of claim), to a licence of “back catalogue KMVs” up to 30 June 2016.

(2)  Alternatively, the questions of law identified in (1)(a) to (h) above be determined summarily as between Universal and Neway Group.

(3)  Further, whether ss 156(4) and 160 of the ordinance empower the tribunal to make any order which could have an effect of putting Neway Group in the same position as regarding copyright infringement as if they have since 1 July 2015 been the holder of a licence granted by universal in respect of the Plaintiff’s Copyright Works.

28.The questions in (1)(a) to (h) in a nut-shell raised three issues; namely:

(1)  whether the reference of HKKLA’s licensing scheme to the tribunal would have invoked s 156(2) which mandated the continuation of scheme until the conclusion of the reference or HKKLA’s scheme had already come to an end on 30 June 2015 and s 156(2) does not mandate HKKLA or the record companies to grant licence under the scheme or otherwise for use of their copyright works from 1 July 2015 because of the withdrawal by the record companies of HKKLA’s authority to licence their copyright works from 1 July 2015 regardless of the fact that the scheme had been referred to the tribunal under s 156(1);

(2)  whether the tribunal can under s 156(4) determine the longevity of a licensing scheme and dictate that a scheme shall continue indefinitely even if the scheme operator cannot or does not want to do so; and

(3)  Whether there is an agency relationship between Universal and HKKLA.

29.I think Mr Yan accepts that I have decided the 1^st issue in the discharge decision against him as I held that the licensing scheme could be terminated before the conclusion of the CT2 proceedings (§§10 - 11 of Neway Group’s skeleton submissions on summary judgment).  Mr Yan has not submitted any argument against this part of the discharge decision in his skeleton submissions on summary judgment.  He only argued the 2^nd issue with vigour.  Regarding the 3^rd issue of agency, Mr Yan did not touch on it in his skeleton submissions.  But he did submit in §17 that the order of the tribunal in the CT2 proceedings (Universal not being a party) could prevent Neway Group from being liable (to Universal or HKKLA?) for infringement without stating the basis.  I would therefore deal with the interpretation of s 156(3) and (4) and whether the tribunal’s order in the CT2 proceedings can protect Neway Group from infringement claim brought by Universal. 

Universal’s submissions under Order 14 or 14A

30.Regarding Neway Group’s contention that the tribunal can determine under s 156(4) that the duration in which a licensee can enjoy the rights in a licence can go beyond the expiration of the license scheme, Mr Wong submitted that the discharge decision has already rejected this contention conclusively. 

31.I referred to §§28 to 29 of the discharge decision as follows:

“28. Mr Yan emphasised that the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction under s. 156(3) to confirm or vary the terms of a licensing scheme and to determine under s. 156(4) that the order should last indefinitely or only for a definite period. Whether the Tribunal should make an order in CT2/2010 that the scheme as referred should remain in force beyond 30 June 2015 when the authorization by the record companies to the plaintiff was terminated is a matter that should be left to the Tribunal and not to be decided by this court in the discharge summons.

29. I think Mr Yan, in making this submission, has misunderstood the meaning of s. 156(4) as he equated the order of the Tribunal to be made under s. 156(4) with the scheme that has been referred to the Tribunal. S. 156(4) merely gives the Tribunal power to provide that the order made under s. 156(3) may be in force indefinitely or for such period as the Tribunal may determine. S. 156(4) empowers the Tribunal to determine the duration of the order and not the longevity of the scheme. Even when the scheme should have lapsed, been superseded, or otherwise terminated, it may still be necessary to have the order in force so as to deal with the aftermath. I do not think the legislature should have given the Tribunal the power under s. 156(4) to dictate that the operator should continue a scheme indefinitely if the operator cannot or does not want to do so.” (emphasis supplied)

32.Mr Yan does not dispute this conclusion, but he submitted that on a proper reading of the discharge decision, I have not rejected Neway Group’s argument on the interpretation of s 156(3) and (4).  He further submitted in §17 that the order to be made by the tribunal under s 156(4) will not compel HKKLA to perform the terms of the scheme, as the scheme has been terminated (based on the discharge decision).  The effect of the order under s 156(4) will only prevent Neway from being liable for infringement provided that it complies with the terms of the order as per s 160(2). 

Interpretation of s 156(3) and (4) and decision on Universal’s summons

33.I do not think the tribunal can make an order under s 156(3) and (4) to allow Neway Group to use Universal’s KMVs in return for its payment to Universal thereof otherwise then in the context of a licence.   I am unable to understand how the tribunal can order that Neway Group can continue using Universal’s copyright works when HKKLA’s scheme had already been put to an end.  I also cannot understand how Neway Group can be immune from Universal’s suit of infringement if its use of Universal’s KMVs is not pursuant to a licence granted either by HKKLA pursuant to its licensing scheme or by Universal.  Neway Group can only lawfully use Universal’s KMVs if it is licensed to do so.  For there to be a licence, there must be a licensor and a licensee.    

34.I also agree with Mr Wong that any order to be made under s 156(3) is predicated upon the existence of a scheme under which a licence can be granted.  If there is no scheme, there is nothing for the tribunal to confirm or vary under s 156(3).  Since HKKLA’s scheme had already ended on 30 June 2015, the tribunal cannot make any order under s 156(3) to confirm or vary its terms.

35.I also hold that the tribunal cannot make any order under s 156(4) in the CT2 proceedings that can protect Neway Group from an infringement claim brought by Universal in respect Neway Group’s use of Universal’s KMVs from 1 July 2015 in the absence of any licence from Universal.

36.Mr Yan has also referred to me the legal principles governing application for summary judgment which are well-established: -

(a)  Factually, it has to be determined what the defendant says is believable, rather than whether its version of events is to be believed. 

(b)  As a matter of law, even if what the defendant says is believable, it has to be determined whether it amounts to an arguable defence in law.

(Schindler Lifts (Hong Kong) Ltd v Ocean Joy Investments Ltd [2003] 1 HKC 438, at 442 (§10) (per Ma J, as he then was.))

37.In the light of my interpretation of s 156(3) and (4) above, I have answered the 2^nd issue raised under Order 14A in favour of Universal.  I also hold that Neway Group has no arguable defence in law to this action.

38.If Neway Group has no defence to this action, then it is futile to stay the action pending the tribunal’s decision in the CT2 proceedings.  Furthermore, this action deals with Universal’s claim from 1 July 2015 whilst the CT2 proceedings only deal with the grant of a licence under the HKKLA scheme that that ended on 30 June 2015.  They do not overlap.  The order to be made in the CT2 proceedings will also not affect Universal as it is not a party to those proceedings and HKKLA was not its agent in operating the expired scheme.  To allow the action to proceed will also not result in wastage in time and costs as there is no overlap between this action and the CT2 proceedings.  It will also cause injustice to Universal if this action is stayed.  I therefore dismiss Neway Group’s summons to stay proceedings.

Judgment

39.Since I have held that Neway Group has no defence to this action, Universal should be given judgment of this action.  Mr Yan has objected to an order for Universal to inspect Neway Group’s karaoke servers.  I think that objection is valid and I omit that from the orders I make.  I order: -

(1)  against the 1^st Defendant for: -

(a)  an order for removal, and procuring the removal of all original and infringing copies of the Plaintiff’s Copyright Works as defined in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the statement of claim dated 1 September 2017 (“the SOC”) from the Defendants’ karaoke server and system without retaining any copy thereof within 7 days after service upon of them of this order;

(b)  an order for delivery up upon oath and procuring the delivery up upon oath of all original or infringing copies of the Plaintiff’s Copyright Works previously provided by HKKLA to the 1^st Defendant without retaining any copy thereof within 7 days after service upon of them of this order;

(2)  against all the Defendants for: -

(a)  a declaration that the Defendants have infringed the Plaintiff’s copyright in the Plaintiff’s Copyright Works;

(b)  an order that each of the Defendants, whether acting by itself or its related directors, officers, servants, contractors, employees, agents or any of them or otherwise howsoever, be restrained from: -

(i) infringing the Plaintiff’s copyright in the Plaintiff’s Copyright Works or any of them by making, using, copying, possessing, dealing in or with, transmitting and/or distributing infringing copies of the same without the consent or licence of the Plaintiff; and

(ii) directing, procuring, causing, enabling or assisting others to do so.

(c)  an order for delivery up or destruction upon oath of all infringing copies, goods, articles and materials in the custody, power or control of the Defendants or any of them which would offend against the foregoing orders and injunctions; or, at the option of the Plaintiff, permanent deletion of all digital or electronic copies in the possession, power, custody or control of the Defendants or any of them (if they are remaining) within 14 days after service upon them of this order;

(d)  an order that there be an inquiry as to damages (including statutory additional damages), or at the Plaintiff’s option, an account of profits in respect of the Defendants’ infringement of the Plaintiff’s Copyright Works;

(e)  an order that the Defendants do pay all sums found due to the Plaintiff by the Defendants upon taking such inquiry or account together with interest thereon at 2½% above the prime rate of the Hong Kong Bank from the issuance of the writ herein; and

(f)  an order that the Defendants do pay the Plaintiff the costs of this action including this application forthwith, to be taxed if not agreed.

40.I also make a costs order nisi that Neway Group do pay the costs of this action including the costs of the two summonses to Universal to be taxed on the indemnity basis with certificate for two counsel.  I order indemnity costs because I regard this opposition by Neway Group as an abuse of process.  The issues raised by Neway Group in its defence in this action have all been decided in the discharge decision.  Neway Group should know where it stands.  Furthermore, it is also unreasonable in challenging Universal’s copyright ownership.  There is also the dispute of delay made by each side against the other.  I do not think there is enough material for me to decide this dispute against either or both of them. 

Mr Wong Yan Lung SC and Ms Jacqueline Law, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the plaintiff

Mr John M Y Yan SC and Mr Philips B F Wong, instructed by Tony Au & Partners, for the 1^st to 24^th defendants