Re Sardar Md Manir
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CAMP 92/2018 [2019] HKCA 67 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 92 OF 2018 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 492/2017) -----------------------------------
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.On 28 September 2018, this court (Chu and Barma JJA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the judge”) on 7 June 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim. 2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1] We will not repeat them here. 3.The applicant subsequently applied, by a notice of motion dated 29 October 2018, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant stated in his notice of motion that:
4.Because the applicant failed to comply with the unless order made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 31 October 2018, the applicant was debarred from lodging any written submissions and the application was dealt with on paper on the basis of the materials already filed before the court. 5.Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of his notice of motion. 6.The matters stated by the applicant in his notice of motion do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in his notice of motion. The first paragraph of the notice of motion is vague and lacks particulars. The matter raised in the second paragraph was not relied by the applicant in his notice of appeal. As we have explained before, it is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the hearing before it;[2] nor generally is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new fact-sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal.[3] The applicant never provided any subsequent document to supplement his notice of motion. 7.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). 8.For these reasons, the notice of motion dated 29 October 2018 is dismissed.
The applicant acting in person [1] See [2018] HKCA 648 [2] See Ageas Insurance Co (Asia) Ltd v Lam Hau Wah Inneo, CACV 65/2014, unreported, 19 May 2015, at [7] to [9]; and The Law Society of Hong Kong v A Solicitor, CACV 78/2014, unreported, 10 July 2015, at [4] to [7]. [3] See Flywin Co Ltd v Strong & Associates Ltd (2002) 5 HKCFAR 356 at [39]. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Re Shaikh Shamim
Re Daramola Loukman Mouniru
Re Ghous Niaz
Re Gurung Soyta
Re Pramanik Billal
Re Alam Mahir
Re Shamroz Khan
Re Binyameen Muhammad
Re Miah Mohammad Shamim
Re Aashiq Khan
Re Ahmad Hassan
Tin Lik v. Deutche Bank Ag and Others
Re Tieu Van Thuyet
Re Orense Marian Masangkay
Re Mihindukulasuriya Irene Fernando
Re Ghale Tej Bahadur
Re Rai Gita
Re Haider Ali
Re Ahmed Samir and Others
Re Chellam Govindan
Further hearings and rulings under CAMP 92/2018