Bepari Hiru v. Li Wai-chi, Esq.
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 681/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. The Applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He is now aged 28 (DOB: 10 April 1990).
Cites 4 cases
|
HCAL681/2018 [2019] HKCFI 205 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 681 of 2018 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam:
It is further directed that:
Observations for the Applicant Background 1.The Applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He is now aged 28 (DOB: 10 April 1990). 2.The Applicant claimed he would be harmed or killed by some people of the Awami League (“AL”) because he refused to leave Jamaat Shibir (“JS”), which was the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islam (“JEI”). 3.The Applicant said his whole family supported JEI. He joined JS in 2010. 4.In 2012, the Applicant attended a meeting with some JS members. Forty odd armed AL people came. They attacked the JS members. They threatened to kill the Applicant and other JS members if they continued to work for JS. The Applicant was injured but managed to escape. 5.The Applicant’s uncle made a report to the police. However, the police did not register his complaint and did nothing to help. No reports were made to other police stations due to jurisdiction concern. The local JS leader was not able to help either. 6.The Applicant stayed in the house of his sister-in-law. He still got threatening calls from his enemies. 7.In April 2012, the Applicant moved to a place called Madaripur. Two months later, he found the police and some members of the Chhatra League (“CL”) were looking for him there. [CL was the student wing of AL.] The Applicant believed his enemies had made false accusation to the police. Feeling insecure, he moved to Dhaka where he stayed in his cousin’s place for six months. 8.In January 2013, ten odd CL members with arms approached the Applicant. They accused him of continuing to work for JS. They beat up the Applicant until he lost consciousness. The Applicant was injured. He did not report the matter to the police because he had lost faith in the police. 9.The Applicant moved to another place called Sylhet. In February 2013, he was again assaulted by ten odd CL members. He was hurt but managed to escape. Again, he did not make any report to the police. 10.The Applicant moved further to Gazipur. He stayed in his uncle’s place for one and half years. Nothing special happened but the Applicant learnt the police and the CL people were still looking for him in his home village. The CL people threatened the Applicant’s family that they would kill the Applicant. 11.The Applicant believed his enemies targeted him because he was affiliated with JS. They wanted him to join AL. 12.On 16 July 2014, the Applicant left Bangladesh for China. Three days later, he sneaked into Hong Kong and was arrested on the same day, i.e. 19 July 2014. He then lodged a non-refoulement claim. 13.The Applicant learnt from his family that the Bangladesh police and the CL people were still looking for him. The CL people threatened to kill him. 14.The Applicant did not think the Bangladesh authorities would protect him. He said JS had been banned in Bangladesh and the authorities were against JS members. 15.The Applicant thought internal relocation was not viable because AL was the ruling party and had extensive control in the country. 16.In the ensuing two-tier screening process here, the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on 16 August 2016 refused the Applicant’s claim with respect to these three applicable grounds: (i) risk of torture,[1] (ii) risk of persecution[2] and (iii) risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (BOR3 risk)[3]. The Applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“TCAB/NCPO” or simply “the Board”). The Board received the Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) on 2 September 2016. The Applicant did not give any reason for his late filing of appeal. On 25 January 2017, the Board refused to accept the Applicant's late appeal against the Director's decision. 17.On 10 April 2017, the Director refused the claim with respect to the fourth applicable ground: risk of violation of the right to life (BOR2 risk)[4]. There was no appeal filed by the Applicant against the Director's further decision. 18.One odd years later, on 19 April 2018 the Applicant applied for leave for judicial review against the Board's decision dated 25 January 2017. Timeline 19.Things happened in this order: –
Respondent/Interested party 20.The Unified Screening Mechanism is a two-tier process. The Director screens an applicant’s non-refoulement claim first; the applicant may appeal to the Board which deals with his/her case on a rehearing basis. 21.In Re Moshsin Ali, the Court of Appeal states that “the decision of the immigration officer is not a decision that, within this administrative structure, is susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the board is pursued by a claimant.”[5] 22.In Form 86 (the notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review), the Applicant named the Adjudicator as respondent and the Director as interested party. Thus, the Adjudicator is the putative respondent; the Director is the putative interested party. The Director's decision 23.In his decision dated 16 August 2016, the Director did not accept the Applicant faced any torture risk, persecution risk or BOR3 risk. He also considered reasonable state protection and internal relocation were available to the Applicant in any event. The Director refused the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim with respect to those three applicable grounds. 24.On 10 April 2017, the Director further refused the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim with respect to the fourth applicable ground: BOR2 risk. The Board's decision 25.On 2 September 2016, the Applicant appealed against the Director's decision dated 16 August 2016. He did not appeal against the Director's further decision dated 10 April 2017. 26.The Director's decision was sent to the Applicant by mail c/o the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) on 16 August 2016 [Tuesday]. According to s. 37ZV(3) of the Immigration Ordinance Cap. 115, a notice so sent is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary to have been served or given and received on the second working day after it is sent. Therefore, in the present case the 14-day period was to run after 18 August 2016 (Thursday). It would end on 1 September 2016 (Thursday). However, the NOA from the Applicant was only received by the Board on 2 September 2016. It was late. 27.The Applicant did not give any reason in his NOA to explain why he was late in filing his appeal. 28.On 2 September 2016, the Board issued a letter to the Applicant to ask him why his appeal was late. The Applicant acknowledged receipt of the letter but did not reply to the Board. 29.The Adjudicator noted the Applicant failed to give any reason in his NOA for his lateness and failed to reply to the Board after the Board had issued a letter to ask him why his filing of appeal was late. The Adjudicator considered the regime governing late filing of appeal was strict. He was of the view that the delay though short by itself was still a serious and significant failure to comply with the rules in s. 37ZS and s. 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance. The Applicant did not give any reason for his delay. The Adjudicator found there were no special circumstances that would make it unjust to reject the Applicant’s late filing of appeal. He thus dismissed the Applicant's late appeal. Grounds for judicial review 30.In Form 86 and his affirmation, the Applicant complained he was not legally represented in his filing of appeal. His appeal to the Board was late because he was in jail and it was not easy to get things done or on time. The Applicant also said he was uneducated and did not know English. He further complained he received the Board’s decision (dated 25 January 2017) only on 17 April 2017 31.In Form 86, the Applicant mentioned he had applied to the Legal Aid Department (“LAD”) and time was required. That caused delay. He said he also had to obtain all relevant documents from DLS and the Security Bureau. 32.Further in Form 86, the Applicant complained the Adjudicator unlawfully fettered his discretion; acted in a procedurally unfair manner; rendered unreasonable or irrational decisions; failed to meet the greater care and duty owed to a self-represented claimant. The Applicant complained there were failures by the assigned duty lawyer resulting in a lack of and/or insufficient legal representation. He accused the Adjudicator misdirected himself in law; failed to make sufficient inquiry; failed to consider updated or relevant country-of-origin information ("COI"); took into account outdated cases and irrelevant information; considered information not officially recognised or simply hearsay; cherry-picked information; failed to evaluate and make a finding of fact as to whether there existed in Bangladesh a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights; failed to call for psychological or psychiatric reports; failed to properly consider the issues of state protection and state acquiescence; applied the wrong standard of proof. Court hearing 33.The hearing was scheduled for 23 July 2018. The Applicant was absent. A Bengali interpreter called him on the phone. The Applicant told the interpreter that he got the notice of hearing but did not understand its content. He said he was sleeping then and could not come immediately to the court. The Applicant then switched off his phone. 34.The court has not heard further from the Applicant. Discussion 35.Judicial review is concerned with the reasonableness, lawfulness and fairness of the decisions and the process of reaching such decisions by the authorities. 36.A non-refoulement claim involves ‘life and limb’; any decision will bear significant consequences on an applicant. Therefore, high standards of fairness must be achieved. The court should look at an applicant’s case under ‘rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny’.[6] Nevertheless, it is said in Re Islam Rafiqul: –
37.The Applicant not only filed his appeal late to the Board. He also filed the current application for leave for judicial review late. The Board's decision dated 25 January 2017 was sent to the Applicant in prison then. [The Applicant was arrested by the police for unlawful employment in late October 2015. He was convicted on 11 January 2016 and sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.] The Applicant, however, only filed his application for leave for judicial review almost 15 months later on 19 April 2018. Late application for leave for judicial review 38.Order 53 Rule 3(1) of the Rules of the High Court states: –
39.Order 53 Rules 4(1) and (2) of the Rules of the High Court read: –
40.It is clear from these provisions that no application can be made after the three-month period unless the Court considers there is a good reason for extending time. The Applicant must provide good reasons for the Court to approve an extension of time. It is a pre-requisite in late application for leave for judicial review.[8] If the court is not satisfied that there is a good reason for extending time, then no application for judicial review can be made in accordance with Rule 4(1). In that event, the Court should not proceed to consider if leave should be granted or refused on other grounds.[9] 41.In the present case, the Board’s decision was issued on 25 January 2017. The Applicant only applied for leave for judicial review almost 15 months later on 19 April 2018. Excluding the 3-month grace period for filing, he was almost late by 12 months. 42.The Applicant said he received the Board’s decision (dated 25 January 2017) only on 17 April 2017. The Board's decision was sent to Pik Uk Prison on 25 January 2017. The Applicant's name was clearly stated on the covering letter of even date together with his prisoner number (P 392562). It was implausible that the Applicant did not get the Board's decision in January 2017 but only in April 2017. 43.The Applicant mentioned he had made application to LAD (Legal Aid Department). Time was required and that caused delay. In the court file, there was only a record of the Applicant's applying for legal aid on 21 May 2018. The Director of Legal Aid refused his application on 11 June 2018. I cannot see how legal aid matters had contributed to the Applicant's late application for leave for judicial review. 44.The Applicant also attributed his delay to having to obtain all relevant documents from DLS and the Security Bureau. There was simply no evidence to support his vague assertion. 45.The Applicant failed to show any good reason for the almost 12-month delay in his application for leave for judicial review. The delay was undue and substantial. The prejudice that would be caused to the putative respondent was not insignificant. Discipline should be maintained in the area of public law. The current application involved no issue of general importance. It also had no merits. 46.The Adjudicator dismissed the Applicant's appeal because it was late. He was of the view that the delay though short by itself was still a serious and significant failure to comply with the strict rules in s. 37ZS and s. 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance. The Applicant failed to give any reason for the delay. The Adjudicator found there were no special circumstances that would make it unjust to reject the Applicant’s late filing of appeal. Conclusion 47.The current application for leave for judicial review is unreasonably late. There are no justified circumstances that oblige the court to consider such late application. I refuse to grant the Applicant extension of time. His late application for leave for judicial review is therefore dismissed. Dated 30th day of January 2019
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] As defined in Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, which definition is the same as that found in Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. [2] By reference to the non-refoulement principle under Articles 33 and 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. [3] Under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] Under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [5] CACV 54/2018, para 45. [6] Secretary for Security v Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187, paras 44-45. [7] CACV 219/2018 [2018] HKCA 570, para 14(1). [8] CACV 110/2016 Kwok Cheuk Kin, para. 17. [9] Ibid., para 19. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 681/2018