Randeep Singh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non Refoulement Claims Petition Office

CACV 209/2018

[2019] HKCA 300

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 209 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 520 OF 2017)

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BETWEEN

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Before: Hon Yeung Acting CJHC, Poon and Pang JJA

Date of Judgment: 14 March 2019

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Poon JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

1.By a judgment dated 9 January 2019 ([2019] HKCA 23), this Court (Hon Yeung Acting CJHC and Hon Poon JA) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the Judge”) dated 24 May 2018 refusing to grant leave to him to apply for judicial review.  The intended judicial review was against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 11 December 2014 and 11 May 2017 and the decision of Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 26 July 2017.  The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the judgment.  We will not repeat them here.

3.By a notice of motion filed on 31 January 2019, the applicant applied for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.

4.In the notice of motion, the applicant set out the following grounds :

“ 1.  The Judges (of this court) have erred in saying that the Judge has rightly referred to the principle of a rehearing and had correctly applied it in the case. This is because this was not the case in the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration and did not say that the decision was ‘overtaken’ at any stage. The fact that the decision was ‘confirmed’ would in a way mean that the Adjudicator merely agreed with the Director and therefore by appealing against the decision of the Adjudicator I would also be entitled to appeal against the decision of the Director.

2.  The Judges have also failed to consider my case fully before coming with a judgment.  The Judges were merely trying to dispose of my case as quickly as possible and have therefore been unfair.  The Judges have failed to consider why the Duty Lawyer Service was not called upon to represent me for my BOR 2 risk.  The Judge of the Court of First Instance mentioned that ‘the duty lawyer scheme will continue to represent applicants in their appeals if they are of the view there is merit in their cases.  The applicant said during the hearing that the duty lawyer scheme told him they would not continue to represent him because in their opinion his appeal had no merit’.  This was merely based on the three other applicable grounds and had nothing to do with the BOR 2 risk.  They should not be taken out of context. The Judge’s ignorance of the facts is an error in law.”

5.In compliance with the direction given by Master Au-Yeung on 4 February 2019, the applicant lodged his written submission on 14 February 2019.  We have duly considered the applicant’s notice of motion and his written submission.  Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1, this application is processed on papers without any oral hearing.

6.Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.  In his written submission, the applicant reiterated his complaints as set out in the notice of motion which were previously ventilated before this court.  They do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  Nor do they involve an arguable point or a question of great general or public importance.  The statutory criteria for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal under section 22(1)(b) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484) are not met.

7.Accordingly, we refuse to give the applicant leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and dismiss his notice of motion.

The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person