Re Rahman Talukder Md Atikur
Read the full judgment text of CACV 564/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 26 March 2019.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“ the Judge ”) given on 21 November 2018 refusing the applicant leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Adjudicator of the Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 28 February 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 4 November 2016 rejecting the applicant’s non‑refoulement
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CACV 564/2018 [2019] HKCA 356 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 564 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 338 OF 2018) ____________________
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_________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ Hon G Lam J (giving the judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“the Judge”) given on 21 November 2018 refusing the applicant leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Adjudicator of the Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 28 February 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 4 November 2016 rejecting the applicant’s non‑refoulement claim. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered Hong Kong on 9 March 2016 and was arrested by the police on the same day. He lodged a non‑refoulement claim on 13 March 2016. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on threats from a man identified as Shikdar who was the General Secretary of a political party, the Awami League, in the applicant’s area. The basis of the applicant’s claim has been summarised by the judge at [2] to [16] of the CALL‑1 Form. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 4 November 2016 (“the Director’s Decision”), the director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the BOR 2 risk,[1] the BOR 3 risk,[2] the persecution risk,[3] and the torture risk.[4] 5.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After a hearing on 4 January 2018, at which it considered the Director’s Decision, the Board dismissed the appeal on 28 February 2018 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non‑refoulement protection. 6.At [71] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found that the potential threats against the applicant did not attain a minimum level of severity and are highly unlikely to occur. The Board was also satisfied at [74] that state protection would be available for the applicant and at [72]‑[73] that internal relocation would be viable. The deputy judge’s decision 7.The applicant filed an application for leave to apply for judicial review in Form 86 on 5 March 2018 which contained 9 grounds of judicial review:
8.In the affirmation in support of the application for leave dated 5 March 2018, the applicant deposed to the facts relied on for his claim for judicial review. 9.A hearing of the applicant’s application took place in open court before the Judge on 4 July 2018. By a decision recorded on the CALL‑1 Form dated 21 November 2018, the Judge refused to give leave for judicial review. In the CALL‑1 Form, after summarizing the facts and background of the case and the decisions of the Director and the Board, the Judge gave the following reasons for refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [41] to [55]:
Grounds of appeal 10.In his Notice of Appeal dated 3 December 2018 the applicant referred to his affirmation filed on the same day for his grounds of appeal, which are that:
Discussion 11.In relation to his first ground of appeal, in his skeleton submissions dated 11 February 2019, the applicant submitted that high standards of fairness are applicable to his case. He also submitted that the Board erred in not conducting a rehearing and in simply assessing if the Director’s decision was faulty, and that the Board failed to consider the conditions of the applicant’s country of origin. These criticisms of the Board’s decision are misplaced. First, this is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance not to grant leave for judicial review, not an appeal from the Board. In any event, there is nothing to substantiate these criticisms. Having read the Board’s decision it seems to us clear that the Board did not mistake its functions. It conducted a detailed inquiry and gave careful consideration to the matters raised by the applicant, including the conditions of the applicant’s country of origin, namely, Bangladesh. 12.The applicant has asserted in his first ground of appeal that the Judge erred in law in holding there was no state acquiescence or involvement, but he has failed to give any particulars for the alleged legal error committed by the Judge. Nor are we able to detect any legal error. No viable ground of appeal has been made out. In any event the Board made the critical findings that the circumstances did not attain a minimum level of severity and the threats were highly unlikely to occur: [70]-[71] of the Board’s decision. 13.As for the second ground of appeal, the applicant simply submitted in his skeleton submissions that the decision maker is under a constitutional duty to act fairly. The judge did give detailed reasons in the CALL‑1 Form as set out above. This ground is without merit. 14.There is no merit in the appeal which will therefore be dismissed.
The Applicant was not represented and appeared in person [1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 83. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. |