Re Mohammad Rayhan Uddin
Read the full judgment text of CACV 384/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 28 March 2019.
1. By our judgment dated 10 December 2018 (published as [2018] HKCA 944 ), we dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock dated 12 July 2018 (published as [2018] HKCFI 1727 ) refusing leave to apply for judicial review.
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CACV 384/2018 [2019] HKCA 374 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 384 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 755 OF 2017)
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_______________ JUDGMENT _______________ Hon Fung J (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.By our judgment dated 10 December 2018 (published as [2018] HKCA 944), we dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock dated 12 July 2018 (published as [2018] HKCFI 1727) refusing leave to apply for judicial review. 2.In his notice of motion dated 31 December 2018, the applicant sought leave of appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against our judgment on the following ground:
3.In compliance with the directions of the court, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 14 January 2019. In it, the applicant submitted that the adjudicator acted in a procedurally unfair manner in dealing with his application and that a decision of an administrative body could be set aside on the basis of irrationality. The applicant also referred to section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which concerns the late filing of notice of appeal for the Torture Claims Appeal Board. 4.At [16] of our judgment, we explained that we dismissed the applicant’s appeal because of his failure to advance any effective argument that justified a reversal of the judge’s decision. Plainly, the applicant did not engage our reasons for dismissal in this application. 5.We cannot discern any relevance of section 37ZT in this application. 6.The applicant did not raise any question of great general or public importance that merits the consideration of the Court of Final Appeal. Nor do we see any reason to grant leave on the “or otherwise” limb. The statutory criterion for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is therefore not met: section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484). 7.Accordingly, we dismiss the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.
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