Re Mapili Emilyn Sampaga

CACV 375/2018

[2019] HKCA 320

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 375 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 712 of 2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Chu JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 24 December 2018, this Court handed down our judgment[1] dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the Judge”) given on 24 July 2018 refusing her leave to apply for judicial review.     

2.By a Notice of Motion dated 7 January 2019, the applicant applied for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant had also lodged a written submission to support her application. 

3.Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the notice of motion.

4.Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

5.The Notice of Motion as well as the written submission advanced two main grounds of appeal:

(1)  It was wrongly concluded that the applicant did not have any basis to engage the principle of state acquiescence.

(2)  There was procedural unfairness in that: (a) the Judge erred in not taking notice that the applicant was a lay man and was not legally represented; and (b) it was wrong not to adjourn the hearing when the applicant had made a legal aid application.

6.The proposed grounds of appeal advanced by the applicant do not afford proper basis for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  Firstly, the grounds relate only to the personal circumstances of the applicant or the facts of this case.  They do not involve any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b).  Secondly, for the reasons we gave in [11] to [13] and [15] to [16], there are no merits in the two proposed grounds of appeal.      

7.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

8.As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, we dismiss the Notice of Motion.

The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person.