Re Mohammed Moinuddin

CACV 413/2018

[2019] HKCA 314

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 413 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 989 OF 2017)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Yeung Ag CJHC (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.By a judgment dated 18 January 2019 ([2019] HKCA 15), this Court (Yeung Acting CJHC and Poon JA) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan dated 10 August 2018 refusing to grant leave to him to apply for judicial review.  The intended judicial review was against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 9 September 2016 and 7 August 2017 and the decision of Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 12 October 2017.  The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the judgment.  We will not repeat them here.

3.By a notice of motion dated 1 February 2019, the applicant applied for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.

4.In the Notice of Motion, the applicant set out the following grounds:

“I would like to inform the Honourable Court that there is some error in law in my decision. Decision maker just relied on COI (Country of Origin Information) information and my previous facts which were in favour while rejecting my claim. Actual life occurs different situation then what is mentioned in COI information. The Officer and Courts prefer to ignore the overwhelming of the evidence of this violence toward minorities searching for unrealistic silver lining. The Decision is betray (sic) bias and formula approach unlikely fairly access the danger of my life and clearly not reasonable.”

5.In compliance with the direction given by Master Au-Yeung on 4 February 2019, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 15 February 2019.  In his written submissions, the applicant merely cited some general legal principles, case law and statute in relation to claims for non-refoulement protection without making any reference and/or linkage to his case. 

6.We have duly considered the applicant’s notice of motion and his written submissions.  Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1, this application is processed on papers without any oral hearing.

7.Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.  In our view, the grounds of appeal are regurgitation of arguments which were advanced at the lower court and duly rejected by the Judge.  They do not constitute viable grounds for granting leave to the Court of Final Appeal.  For the reasons that we gave in our judgment of 18 January 2019, we did not see any prospect of success in the applicant’s intended appeal against the Judge’s order. 

8.None of the questions raised by the applicant in the notice of motion or in his written submission involve any question of great general or public importance is such that it ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.  Nor do we see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb.  The statutory criteria for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484) are not met.

9.Accordingly, we refuse to give the applicant leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and dismiss his notice of motion.

The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person