Galiza Gomer Dadis v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 100/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 24 April 2019.

1. The applicant entered Hong Kong lawfully on 30 December 2014 but thereafter overstayed.  He was arrested by the police on 11 February 2015.  The applicant submitted a non-refoulement (“NRF”) claim by way of written representation on 13 February 2015.  His NRF claim form was submitted on 25 April 2017.

Cites 2 cases

Case No.HCAL 100/2018[2019] HKCFI 487
Court
High Court CFI
Date24 Apr 2019
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 100/2018

[2019] HKCFI 487

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 100 of 2018

BETWEEN

Galiza Gomer Dadis Applicant
and
Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent
and
Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

    consideration of the documents only;     or
    consideration of the documents and the Applicant being present/absent in open court

Order by The Honourable Mrs. Justice Campbell-Moffat:

Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

Procedural history

1.The applicant entered Hong Kong lawfully on 30 December 2014 but thereafter overstayed.  He was arrested by the police on 11 February 2015.  The applicant submitted a non-refoulement (“NRF”) claim by way of written representation on 13 February 2015.  His NRF claim form was submitted on 25 April 2017.

2.The applicant attended a screening interview on 17 May 2017.  The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dismissed his claim on all grounds by Notice of Decision (“the Decision”) on 23 May 2017.  He appealed the Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”). The adjudicator of the TCAB, Mrs Sydelle Muling (“the Adjudicator”), heard his appeal on 16 October 2017.  The Adjudicator considered his appeal on all applicable grounds including BOR 2 and refused his appeal on 16 January 2018.

3.The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 22 January 2018 and did not request an oral hearing.  The matter was therefore considered on the papers.

Background

4.The applicant is a Filipino national.  He was born on 23 December 1985 in Bagu.  He is single and worked as a construction worker until 2010.  In 2010, he joined the New People’s Army (“NPA”) and maintains that he was employed as a messenger.  He carried out this function between 2010 and 2014.  In 2014, however, he was tasked with killing someone.  As he did not want to do so, he stole money from the NPA and fled to Manila until he came to Hong Kong.  The applicant believes that he will be killed by the NPA if he is returned to the Philippines.  He has had no contact with anyone in the Philippines since his arrival in Hong Kong.

The non-refoulement claim

5.Under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”), the applicant’s claim is to be assessed on all applicable grounds which are:

i.  Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“torture risk”).  Under torture risk, the applicant must establish he has substantial grounds for believing he will be subjected to torture if returned to his home state.  Those grounds cannot be speculative or theoretical and the risk of torture must be real and personal.  The standard of proof is a low one.

ii.  Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“HKBORO”), Cap 383 and Article 7 of the ICCPR (“BOR 3 risk”).  Under BOR 3, the applicant must establish that he has a genuine and substantial risk of being subject to mental or physical torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading ill treatment; or punishment, if returned to his home state.  The level of such mental or physical torture etc. must reach a minimum level of severity.

iii.  Risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”).  Under “persecution risk”, the applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear that there is a real chance that he will face persecution based upon race, religion, nationality or membership of a social group or political opinion if she is expelled and returned to his home state.

iv.  Risk of a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the HKBORO, Cap 383 and Article 6 of the ICCPR (“BOR 2 risk”).  Under BOR 2, the applicant must establish a real risk that he will be arbitrarily deprived of his life, have a death penalty imposed upon him; or be the victim of genocide or otherwise be deprived of his rights under BOR 2.

6.It is the duty of both the Director and the Adjudicator to weigh all of the available credible, reliable evidence and ascertain whether the applicant had established the factual basis of his claim.  The Director and the Adjudicator must then assess the level of harm the applicant says he fears.  Each ground of claim above has a relevant level of risk.  It is for the applicant to establish that he is the subject of such risk.  Under the HKBORO, he must show substantial grounds for believing that the harm which he fears is “foreseeable, real, personal and present”.  The question is whether there is a real risk or real chance of the occurrence or recurrence of the harm which he fears.

Decision of the Director

7.The applicant seeks to review the decisions of both the Director and the Adjudicator.  As the applicant has already utilised the channel of appealing the Director’s Decision to the TCAB and the TCAB treated the appeal as a rehearing, the Decision of the Director is not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the Board has been pursued by the claimant and dealt with.

Decision of the Adjudicator

8.The Adjudicator analysed the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds. She arranged for an oral hearing and treated the appeal as a rehearing.  She correctly set out the law and key legal principles including the burden and standard of proof.  The Adjudicator obtained a considerable amount of further information during the hearing which highlighted the implausibility of the applicant’s scant account.  She found the applicant to be unconvincing.  She did not accept that he had been separated from his family at a young age, or that he had scavenged for a number of years before joining the NPA in order to survive.  His story about his function and role in the NPA was also disbelieved.  Accordingly, he had not met the burden placed upon him to establish his claim under any head.

Leave to apply for judicial review

9.Judicial review is not a rehearing of the merits of the applicant’s original application for refugee status.  This is an application to apply for leave to judicially review the Decision of the Adjudicator.  The applicant must show an arguable case that there was either unlawfulness, unreasonableness or unfairness by those bodies or persons when dealing with his application in order to obtain leave to judicially review them.

Grounds of review

10.There were no grounds of review.  The applicant seeks a re-hearing of his appeal.  He has not complained of any procedural irregularity, unfairness or unreasonableness.  The applicant has a duty to state the grounds of his intended judicial review and show that they are reasonably arguable and enjoy a realistic prospect of success: Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.  I have nevertheless considered whether the papers indicate any such ground for the purposes of considering whether to grant leave.

Conclusion

11.Despite the fact that the applicant did not submit any grounds of review, I have considered the papers carefully.  I have not found any error of law or procedure.  I see no evidence of procedural unfairness nor a failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness throughout. Despite the onus being upon the applicant, the Adjudicator engaged in a joint endeavour with the applicant and considered all relevant criteria; gave the applicant a reasonable opportunity to state his case and enquired into that case appropriately.  She gathered a considerable amount of further information which highlighted a significant number of improbabilities within the case of the applicant.  There is no criticism of her determination, which was open to her on the facts and eminently reasonable.  

12.In my judgement, there is no reasonably arguable basis upon which the applicant could found a claim for judicial review and, as such, there would be no realistic prospect of success if he were to be granted leave.  I therefore refuse leave for judicial review.

Dated the 24th  day of April 2019.

  (Marcus Wong)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must:

       

a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).

 

Sent to the Applicant on 24 April 2019

Galiza Gomer Dadis

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.

 

Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 24 April 2019

Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 7340/17/6/36/F378

Department of Justice for Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
RBCL/2620/16 (RBGI/599/16, RBCZ-12817-16)




Form CALL-1

 

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 100/2018