Re Munna Mohammad
Read the full judgment text of CACV 566/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 2 May 2019.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam given on 21 November 2018 refusing the applicant leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 15 February 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 27 September 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
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CACV 566/2018 [2019] HKCA 468 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 566 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 327/2018) -----------------------------------
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam given on 21 November 2018 refusing the applicant leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 15 February 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 27 September 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered Hong Kong on 15 July 2014 illegally and was arrested by the police on the same day. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 19 July 2014. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on alleged threats from members of an opposing political party. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [2] to [9] of the CALL-1 Form. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 27 September 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the BOR 2 risk[1], BOR 3 risk[2], the persecution risk[3], and the torture risk[4]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After a hearing on 7 December 2017, the Board dismissed the appeal on 15 February 2018 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection. 6.At [43] and [49] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence was vague and very limited, and in the light of this the Board did not accept that the applicant was in fact a member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party or that he was persecuted for being a member of that party. The deputy judge’s decision 7.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 2 March 2018 which contained no ground for seeking relief. 8.In the affirmation in support of the leave application dated 2 March 2018, the applicant advanced the following grounds for judicial review:
9.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [28] to [36] of the CALL-1 Form:
Grounds for appeal 10.In the Notice of Appeal dated 4 December 2018 the applicant said that:
11.In his skeleton submissions dated 22 February 2019, the applicant stated that he could not obtain any documents from Bangladesh, but that the Board should not have dismissed his claim for lack of documents. He asserted that it was unsafe for him to return, but said that he would be willing to return to Bangladesh if the Hong Kong Government requested the Bangladeshi government to afford him protection. Lastly, he claimed that the Director and the Board had decided to dismiss his claim without properly reviewing it. 12.The applicant agreed by a letter of 4 December 2018 that the appeal could be heard by two judges. We heard the appeal on 17 April 2019. At the appeal, the applicant indicated that he had nothing to add to the matters stated in his Notice of Appeal and skeleton submissions. Discussion 13.The only ground of appeal in the Notice of Appeal simply repeats the assertion, rejected by the Board, that the applicant would be at risk of harm if refouled to Bangladesh. As this court has repeatedly stated, the evaluation of the evidence and making of factual findings is within the remit of the Board, and an application for judicial review does not operate as a further appeal. It is necessary for the applicant to show some public law ground on which the court should set aside the Board’s decision. The bare assertion that it is unsafe for him to return is not a proper ground for seeking leave for judicial review, or for this appeal. In any event, it is apparent from the Board’s Decision that it gave careful consideration to the applicant’s evidence, and explained clearly why such evidence was rejected. In our view, the judge was entitled to hold, as he did at [35] of the CALL-1 Form, that there was no public law error in the Board’s Decision. 14.Further, the applicant does not identify any alleged error on the part of the judge, so that the matters he advances are not viable grounds of appeal. As we have often stated, in an appeal to this court, it is necessary to identify errors made by the judge, as an appeal is not simply to be treated as a further opportunity to make an application for judicial review. 15.There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. |
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