Re Bilal

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 318/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 May 2019.

1. On 3 January 2019 I refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review of the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) respectively dismissing his non-refoulement claim and his subsequent appeal upon finding none of the grounds put forward by him as reasonably arguable or with any prospect of success in his intended application.

Cited by 1 case

Case No.HCAL 318/2018[2019] HKCFI 823
Court
High Court CFI
Date07 May 2019
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 318/2018

[2019] HKCFI 823

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 318 OF 2018

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RE: BILAL Applicant

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 8 March 2019

Date of Decision: 7 May 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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1.On 3 January 2019 I refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review of the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) respectively dismissing his non-refoulement claim and his subsequent appeal upon finding none of the grounds put forward by him as reasonably arguable or with any prospect of success in his intended application.

2.The applicant now by a summons issued on 14 February 2019 seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period for him to lodge his appeal under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A ended on 17 January 2019, and hence he was late by about one month.

3.In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court will have regard to (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.

4.In the applicant’s case a delay of one month may not be regarded as inordinate, but neither is it insignificant.  In his supporting affirmation of the same date he admitted of receiving the decision on 3 January 2019 but as he was not aware of the rule requiring the filing of appeal within 14 days, he was therefore late with his application, but at the hearing of his summons when it was pointed out to him that ignorance of the law does not make it excusable for his delay, he then changed his explanation that he had in fact moved to a new address without informing the Court, and hence by the time he received the decision from his former tenant he was already out of time to appeal, for which if true he has only himself to blame as it was his duty to inform the Court immediately of any change to his address.  Either way I am not satisfied that he has provided any good reason for his delay.

5.Nor did he provide any draft or proposed ground for his appeal,or any particulars as to any error in the decision or why it was unreasonable or unfair, and at the hearing he conceded that there is no error in the Court’s decision, but as his life would still be in danger in Pakistan, he cannot go home and therefore he wanted to appeal.  In the absence of any reasonably arguable ground for appeal, I am unable to see any prospect of success in his intended appeal.

6.In the premises it would be futile to extend time for what appears to me a hopeless appeal.  Accordingly I refuse his application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss his summons.

  (Bruno Chan)
  Deputy High Court Judge

The applicant appeared in person

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