HKSAR v. Chan Chun Man
Read the full judgment text of CACC 216/2017 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 16 May 2019.
1. Before Andrew Chan J and a jury, the applicant was convicted after trial of one count of ‘aggravated burglary’ (Count 1) and one count of ‘rape’ (Count 5). [1] He was sentenced to the respective terms of 6 and 8 years’ imprisonment, and the total sentence of 11 years. He seeks leave to appeal against that sentence. [2]
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 2 cases
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CACC 216/2017 [2019] HKCA 516 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 216 OF 2017 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 87 OF 2016) _______________
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____________________ J U D G M E N T ____________________ Hon Pang JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) : 1.Before Andrew Chan J and a jury, the applicant was convicted after trial of one count of ‘aggravated burglary’ (Count 1) and one count of ‘rape’ (Count 5).[1] He was sentenced to the respective terms of 6 and 8 years’ imprisonment, and the total sentence of 11 years. He seeks leave to appeal against that sentence.[2] The Charges 2.The indictment in the case contained five charges. 3.Both Count 1 and Count 2 alleged aggravated burglary. They were laid as alternative charges in that the ulterior intent named in Count 1 was to inflict X, the female victim, with grievous bodily harm whereas the ulterior intent in Count 2 was rape. These charges pertained to the applicant’s unauthorised entry into X’s flat on 15 October 2015, at a time when X was not at home. 4.Later on the same evening, X returned to her flat where, from the early hours of 16 October 2015 to the next morning, she was allegedly raped (Count 3), indecently assaulted (Count 4) and raped again (Count 5) by the applicant, in that sequence. 5.As said, the applicant was convicted only of Count 1 and Count 5. In relation to Count 4, of which the applicant was acquitted, X was allegedly forced to perform fellatio on him. The Facts 6.In his reasons for sentence, Andrew Chan J (‘the Judge’) explained the background as well as the events which immediately preceded the case as follows. It covered how Count 1, the aggravated burglary, was committed :[3]
7.As regards the circumstances in which Count 5, the rape, came about, one goes back to the Judge’s summing up for a more detailed description of what happened, based on X’s evidence :[4]
8.That, we are satisfied, is the full version of events which the jury accepted. It is different in every important aspect to what the applicant said to exculpate himself in evidence: what made X tear at his clothes, why he hit and squeezed X on the neck and for what purpose did he take out his cutter.[5] It is difficult to see how the jury would have convicted the applicant on Count 5 had they disbelieved X on any of those matters. 9.Although there was disagreement on the total number of times of sexual intercourse that had taken place (X said two, the applicant said three), the above-mentioned details were commonly accepted as those which surrounded the last sexual act between the two, so there is no dispute as to which particular instance of sexual intercourse Count 5 was based upon. 10.It was common ground that the applicant did wear a condom during the preceding one, or two, instance or instances of sexual intercourse, at the specific request of X, at least insofar as the first occasion was concerned.[6] It was common ground that the applicant did not consult X before proceeding in an unprotected manner during Count 5. 11.It should also be mentioned that, despite the parties’ disagreement on the details and circumstances regarding their subsequent ingestion during the rest of the evening, the applicant’s own case was that he had taken some aphrodisiac pills before sneaking into X’s home and hiding in her brother’s wardrobe.[7] The Sentence (Count 1) 12.With respect to Count 1, these are the first things that the Judge said. He found the offence to be premeditated for the following reasons :[8]
13.Next, the Judge dealt with the presence and intended use of the applicant’s cutter, and why he thought it was not out of the latter’s kindness that X escaped actual or physical injury :[9]
14.Turning to such guidance as was available on sentence, the Judge observed :[10]
15.Referring once again to the background and circumstances of the case, and highlighting the need to protect one party of a failed relationship from the obsessive other, the Judge explained why he considered a 6-year term would be appropriate for Count 1 :[11]
(Count 5) 16.Recounting some of the features of the assault, the Judge concluded straightaway that this was a “particularly bad case of rape” :[12]
17.He pointed out the lasting psychological impact it may have on X :[13]
18.Adding to those factors the applicant’s lack of remorse, and the absence of any mitigating factor in the case, the Judge sentenced the applicant to 8 years’ imprisonment on Count 5 :[14]
(Overall Sentence) 19.Finally, taking into account the totality principle, the Judge sentenced the applicant to a composite term of 11 years’ imprisonment by way of the following orders :[15]
Grounds of Appeal 20.Mr John Reading SC, who acted on behalf of the applicant here but not at trial, has put forward four grounds of appeal. 21.It is his complaint in the first three grounds of appeal that the sentences in question were either manifestly excessive (Ground 1 and Ground 2 re the respective sentences on Count 1 and Count 5) or wrong in principle (Ground 3 re the ordering of the sentences on Count 1 and Count 5 to be partly consecutive). 22.Under Ground 4, Mr Reading complains that the Judge ought to but did not take into account X’s view that, because of their past relationship, the applicant should be afforded some leniency in sentence. Discussion 23.We do not think the Judge was wrong in passing a sentence of 6 years in relation to Count 1. 24.He was entitled to take a dim view on what the applicant admitted under caution.[16] There were repeated references to “dying” or “perishing” together (攬住一齊死、同歸於盡).[17] Specifically, there were admissions that the applicant would kill X and then himself if he failed to win X back,[18] that the cutter was the weapon with which the applicant would carry out the killing[19] and that killing X and himself was the reason why the applicant had brought the cutter to the flat.[20] 25.There is nothing to indicate that the jury had not based their verdict on the full extent of those admissions which, of course, included the lesser objective of maiming as opposed to murdering X. Indeed, with the exception of these admissions, we fail to see any evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could prove the ulterior intent of causing grievous bodily harm as opposed to rape. 26.The Judge was also correct to reject, as we do Mr Reading’s like contention, that Count 1 was not as serious as it might have been had the applicant failed to put down his cutter. As the Judge pointed out, the applicant was not to be credited with this turn of events. Rather, it was the pacifying tactic of X, which included the promises of marriage, that placated the applicant and saved her from a more tragic ending. That was the stated position of the Judge, a position to which counsel in mitigation could provide no good answer.[21] 27.We are not persuaded that the Judge’s reference to HKSAR v Chan Li Fat was misguided.[22] It is both debatable, and irrelevant, whether that constituted a more serious case of aggravated burglary. The mere fact that in considering the offence in isolation, ie disregarding the other atrocities Chan committed during his house-breaking (see paragraph 31 of that judgment), the Court of Appeal had identified 10 years as the appropriate starting point of sentence for the charge of aggravated burglary clearly indicates the gravity with which this offence must be regarded. The fact that Chan had a fairly staggering past criminal record may be a contributing factor (the judgment was unspecific on this point) but it is not a factor that could go all the way to explain the loftiness of that starting point. 28.We are fully aware that, unlike Chan, the applicant was a first offender. But given all the circumstances of the case, and bearing in mind the maximum penalty for aggravated burglary, which is life imprisonment, we are not persuaded that the 6-year sentence on Count 1 is manifestly excessive. 29.Neither do we think the 8-year term on Count 5 is open to criticism. 30.We do not agree with Mr Reading that, because there were similar past incidents, the applicant’s pre-taking of aphrodisiac pills and non-wearing of a condom would become less of an aggravating factor or factors. 31.If anything, the pill-taking only goes to show how intent the applicant was to procure sexual relations with X when, not an evening before, X had resorted to the help of her cousin to talk sense to the applicant, as well as refusing to spend the night alone with him. This unregarding doggedness is alarmingly consistent with the latter’s admission that should X refuse to leave her new boyfriend, he would “first take possession of her body” (首先佔據佢嘅身體) and, if that still did not work, turn the cutter on her and then himself.[23] We fail to see how that was not a particularly disturbing feature in this case. 32.The applicant’s act of going unprotected was equally atrocious. It was not what X wanted, plus her wishes must be clear to the applicant who, in connection with the acquitted Count 3, was specifically asked by X to wear a condom. The applicant’s action is not made less grave by the fact that there were previous incident or incidents of unprotected sex (there was a dispute on the number). On the last of these occasions at least, the applicant’s intention was admittedly to impregnate X so that X would return to him and not go to her new boyfriend. It resulted in setting X off to purchase her ‘morning after pills’.[24] These points we have canvassed during the hearing to no rejoinder from leading counsel. 33.Mr Reading has prayed in aid a number of authorities, not least the case of R v Millberry & Others.[25] He relies on the passage of the judgment which deals with the types or scenarios of rape which merit an 8-year starting point.[26] This, however, is of little or no assistance to the applicant. It was stated in Millberry that, in England at least, the general approach and sentencing structure as previously expounded in R v Billam[27] should remain substantially unchanged and, if Billam is anything to go by, breaking into or otherwise gaining access to the victim’s home where the offence was committed is an aggravating factor which would bring the starting point to beyond 5 years.[28] In our experience, it is certainly so in Hong Kong. 34.Given all the above, and the violence that was incidental to the rape (whether a link can immediately be established between the two, it seems to us clear that X would not have given in had she not been hit, strangled and threatened with a cutter), we would say that the 8-year term on Count 5 was, to borrow the words of the respondent, not a day too long. This is notwithstanding the fact that the applicant was a first offender with no previous conviction. 35.The rationale behind taking on board a victim’s plea for leniency on behalf of a defendant is now firmly established. It shows the offence to have an attenuated impact on the victim. Less frequently, it may be that, if a defendant is more heavily punished, the result would add to the distress and concern suffered by the victim. See HKSAR v Wong Siu Kwan,[29] citing R v Hayes,[30] at paragraph 25 of its judgment. In most, if not all, the reported cases, there would be a letter authored by the victim as part of formal mitigation. 36.As we pointed out during the hearing, the situation with X was entirely different. What she did (and we only have a two-page cross-examination on the topic to go by) was to refuse to sign her witness statement at the police station, spoke to the applicant’s brother on the phone overnight, brought along a solicitor to the station on the following day and either sought to change her evidence or asked if the applicant could have a discount in sentence (it is not at all clear).[31] It could even be that the solicitor was instructed by the applicant’s brother, albeit at X’s suggestion.[32] 37.In any event, X had fully explained her action to have been borne out by the ambivalence between wanting justice for herself, on the one hand, and the guilt of personally putting behind bars a person whom she had known for a long-time, on the other.[33] This is not the same as “partial forgiveness” as leading counsel puts it. Aptly, the psychologist who prepared X’s impact report described her situation as follows (with emphasis added) :[34]
38.The complaint that the Judge had failed to take into account X, the victim’s view on sentence is not made out. 39.This leaves Mr Reading’s only remaining ground on totality. 40.Although we are not with him that the sentences on Count 1 and Count 5 should run wholly concurrently, we do think there is a substantial overlap between the two offences at least in terms of what the applicant wanted to achieve in letting himself into the flat: win X back, or take her physically and then kill her and himself. Viewed this way, the total sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment is manifestly excessive. Rather, a composite term of 9½ years’ imprisonment would be just desserts for the applicant’s overall criminality. Disposal 41.We grant the applicant leave to appeal against his sentence and, treating the hearing of the application as the appeal proper, allow his appeal. 42.The respective terms of 6 and 8 years’ imprisonment on Count 1 and Count 5 should stand, plus 1 year and 6 months of the sentence on Count 1 is to run consecutively to the sentence on Count 5, thus giving rise to a new composite sentence of 9 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The applicant’s appeal is allowed to that extent.
Mr John Reading, SC, instructed by M/s Huen & Cheung, for the Applicant Mr Franco Kuan, SADPP(Ag) of Department of Justice, for the Respondent [1] The trial was conducted in Chinese. [2] The appeal against conviction was dismissed upon receipt of the applicant’s Notice of Abandonment dated 12 February 2018. [3] AB204 – 205: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB267Q – 268I: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [4] AB128 – 130: Judge’s summing up (English translation); AB40U – 41R: Judge’s summing up (Chinese original). [5] AB158 – 160: Judge’s summing up (English translation); AB55T – 56R: Judge’s summing up (Chinese original). [6] Counter 445, the applicant’ 1st video recorded interview under caution. [7] AB158: Judge’s summing up (English translation); AB55L: Judge’s summing up (Chinese original). [8] AB205: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB268J – L: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [9] AB205 – 206: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB268L – P: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [10] AB206 – 207: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB268Q – 269C: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [11] AB207 – 208: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB269D – P: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [12] AB208 – 209: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB269Q – 270E: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [13] AB209: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB270F – H: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [14] AB209: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB270I – K: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [15] AB209 – 210: Judge’s reasons for sentence (English translation); AB270L – N: Judge’s reasons for sentence (Chinese original). [16] Both the applicant’s 1st and 2nd video recorded interviews were admitted into the evidence after a voir dire. They have not been translated into English for this appeal. The admissions quoted here encapsulate the Court’s own rendition of what the applicant had said. They are not a word-for-word translation. [17] Examples include Counters 216, 253, 265, 1025, 1087, 1167, 1174, the applicant’s 1st VR1. [18] Counter 253, the applicant’s 1st VRI. [19] Counter 265, the applicant’s 1st VRI. [20] Counter 264, the applicant’s 1st VRI. [21] AB 197, counsel’s mitigation (English translation); AB276, counsel’s mitigation (Chinese original). [22] [2010] 4 HKLRD 109. [23] Counter 291, the applicant’s 1st VRI. [24] Counters 1211 – the 1221, the applicant’s 1st VRI. [25] [2003] 2 All ER 939. [26] Para 20 of the Millberry judgment. [27] [1986] 1 All ER 985. [28] Paras 5 and 6 of the Millberry judgment. [29] CACC 166/2001 (17 October 2001). [30] Times Law Report 5 April 1999. [31] AB436A – 437N (X’s cross-examination). [32] AB437N (X’s cross-examination). [33] AB436S (X’s cross-examination). See also AB442M – P (X’s re-examination). [34] AB648. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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