Re Sidhu Davinder Singh
Read the full judgment text of CACV 45/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 4 June 2019.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Sidhu Davinder SINGH, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 25 January 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 10 November 2017 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice o
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CACV 45/2019 [2019] HKCA 638 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 45 OF 2019 (On appeal from HCAL 76 of 2018) ___________________
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Sidhu Davinder SINGH, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 25 January 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 10 November 2017 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 30 December 2016 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of India in his late twenties, is a fear of being harmed or even killed by a man named Gaggi Singh (“Gaggi”), a police officer in Bathinda City with connection to the ruling Alkali Dal Party. Such alleged fear is said to arise out of the following circumstances:
Entry into Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 3.When the applicant informed his family of Gaggi’s threats, they became concerned for his safety due to Gaggi’s status as a police officer and his connection with the ruling party. When the applicant was advised by a friend who was in Hong Kong that he could seek protection in Hong Kong, he left India for Hong Kong via mainland China on 1 August 2015. When he was refused entry into Hong Kong on 3 and 5 August 2015 on his own Indian passport, he returned to China and later sneaked into Hong Kong by boat on 6 August 2015. He surrendered to the Immigration Department on 11 August 2015. He raised the NRF Claim by written representation dated 23 April 2016 and submitted a completed Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 14 October 2016. Director’s Decision 4.In processing the NRF Claim, the Director’s representatives conducted a screening interview on 22 November 2016 with the applicant who was represented by the Duty Lawyer Service. 5.The Director’s Decision covered all applicable grounds: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 3” risk[3] and “BOR 2” risk[4]. The NRF Claim was found to be not substantiated.
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 6.The applicant appealed to the Board. 7.The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 6 October 2017, at which the applicant was assisted by a Punjabi interpreter 8.The Board found the applicant consistent in his account of his brother and friends attacking Gaggi who was a policeman and then absconding. This part of the applicant’s claim, though thin, was simple and unembellished and probably true. 9.The Board, however, attached no credence to the applicant’s assertion that he did not complain to the relevant authorities about being subsequently attacked by Gaggi because of the policeman’s political affiliation. The applicant’s claim that the police would fail to protect him is premised on a supposition and did not cross the threshold of a real risk. Nor did the Board accept the claim that the 2 attacks on him by Gaggi gave rise to a fear in the applicant that he would be harmed or even killed by Gaggi. It defies rational belief that someone would take the life-changing and radical decision to flee his country, his family and livelihood on the basis of 2 relatively minor incidents of threats and harassment. 10.As to whether the applicant would face a real risk of any form of harm in India, the Board found it unlikely for the applicant to remain a person of interest to Gaggi years after he left India. 11.In any event, based on reliable country of origin information (COI) relating to India, the applicant would enjoy sufficient protection from the authorities. The applicant can further safely and reasonably relocate to a different part of India, especially when there was absolutely no evidence that Gaggi had any influence outside his local area. 12.For the aforesaid reasons, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Director’s Decision on all applicable grounds. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 13.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (“Form 86”) issued under HCAL 76/2018 on 16 January 2018, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Form 86 itself did not set out any ground on which the intended judicial review was sought but, as summarised by the Judge at [9] ofthe Form CALL-1 dated 25 January 2019 ([2019] HKCFI 227) (“Form CALL-1”), by the supporting affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant relied upon the grounds of:
14.The Judge set out his reasons for refusing leave, after an oral hearing, in [10]-[16] of the Form CALL-1 as follows:
Appeal to Court of Appeal and grounds of appeal 15.By a notice of appeal filed on 31 January 2019, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on the following ground:
16.The applicant filed written submission on 23 April 2019, which, after introducing himself, asserted as follows:
17.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 28 May 2019. He had nothing to add to his grounds of appeal or written submission. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 18.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim afresh. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 19.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)]. Discussion 20.The applicant has not identified any error of law, any relevant matter not taken into account or any other mistake (plain or otherwise) by the Judge. Nor can we discern any. 21.Neither the notice of appeal nor the written submission, as set out above, contained any valid ground of appeal, properly so called. Disposition 22.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the HKBORO. [4] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. |
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