Re Apple Razaul Karim
Read the full judgment text of CACV 546/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 13 June 2019.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr APPLE Razaul Karim, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 26 October 2018 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 30 November 2017 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of
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CACV 546/2018 [2019] HKCA 670 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 546 OF 2018 (On appeal from HCAL 1043 of 2017) -----------------------------------
----------------------------------- Before: Hon Yuen JA and Lisa Wong J in Court Date of Hearing: 3 June 2019 Date of Judgment: 13 June 2019 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr APPLE Razaul Karim, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 26 October 2018 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 30 November 2017 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 30 September 2015 and a notice of further decision dated 13 February 2017 (“1st Director’s Decision” and “2nd Director’s Decision” respectively). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of Bangladesh now aged about 38, is a fear of being harmed or even killed by members of the Awami League (“AL”) if he should return to Bangladesh. Such alleged fear is said to arise out of the following circumstances:
Entry into Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 3.The applicant left Bangladesh on 2 October 2012. While at the Dhaka Airport, he had to pay a bribe of 50,000 Takas to secure the return of his passport and boarding card from some unknown airport staff. 4.He arrived in Hong Kong by boat illegally through Shenzhen on 5 October 2012 and was arrested by the police on the same day. He raised a torture claim under article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by written submission dated 10 October 2012. Upon the commencement of the unified screening mechanism (USM) on 3 March 2014, his claim was taken to be a non-refoulement claim under the USM. The applicant lodged his non-refoulement claim form on 1 December 2014. 5.While in Hong Kong, the applicant has kept contact with his family and friends. He was informed that both the AL people and the police have continued to search for him. Director’s Decision 6.In processing the NRF Claim, the Director’s representatives conducted screening interviews on 22 April 2015, 17 June 2015 and 25 August 2015 with the applicant who was represented by the Duty Lawyer Service. 7.The 1st Director’s Decision covered torture risk[1], persecution risk[2] and “BOR 3” risk[3]. The NRF Claim was found to be not substantiated.
8.Following the 1st Director’s Decision, by a letter dated 27 January 2017 (“12.6.2017 Letter”), the applicant was invited to submit additional relevant facts on or before 10 February 2017 so that the Director could take them into account in considering the NRF Claim on any other applicable grounds. The applicant did not respond to such invitation. In the absence of additional information, by the 2nd Director’s Decision, the Director also rejected the NRF Claim for failing to establish a “BOR 2” risk[4]. Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 9.The applicant had in the meantime appealed to the Board on 12 October 2016 after the 1st Director’s Decision. 10.The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 13 March 2017, at which the applicant adopted all the information contained in the hearing bundle as his evidence, answered questions by the Board with the assistance of an interpreter and was given the opportunity to make submissions. The applicant submitted another document at the hearing. 11.The Board’s Decision covered torture risk, persecution risk, “BOR 2” risk[5] and “BOR 3” risk and dismissed the applicant’s appeal on all these applicable grounds. Essentially, the Board found the credibility of the applicant questionable as he could not provide the dates of many events that were significant to his case. As for the documents provided by the applicant, including those in relation to the false criminal charges against him and including the additional letter provided at the hearing, the Board identified various problems which cast doubt on their authenticity so that no weight could be attached to them. The Board did not believe that the applicant had given a true account of the past events experienced by him.The Board found that the applicant was no more than a low-level supporter of the BNP. It was not convinced that he had been targeted by the AL and falsely charged with the various alleged offences as he was free to depart Bangladesh on his own passport without problem. For the same reasons, the Board assessed the alleged future risk of harm to be low. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (“Form 86”) issued under HCAL 1043/2017 on 8 December 2017, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Form 86 contended that the Board was in breach of procedural fairness in that it had:
13.Further, by the supporting affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant complained that:
14.The Judge’s reasons for refusing leave after an oral hearing can be found in [15]-[21] of the Form CALL-1 dated 26 October 2018, [2018] HKCFI 2267 as follows:
Appeal to Court of Appeal and grounds of appeal 15. By a notice of appeal filed on 8 November 201, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on the following ground:
12. The applicant filed written submission on 26 April 2019. However, he mainly repeated the facts of his case, which had been disbelieved by the Board and advanced before the Judge. 13. The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 3 June 2019. He had nothing to add to his grounds of appeal or written submission save that the duty lawyer did not put down what he had explained to him and the interpreter cut him short before the Board. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 14. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim afresh. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 15.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)]. Nor would the Court of Appeal generally entertain new arguments based on facts, when those arguments should have been canvassed below. Discussion 16.As stated above, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal because it disbelieved the applicant’s version of the events alleged to have given rise to the risk for which he seeks non-refoulement protection. It came to such a view on the applicant’s credibility and the reliability of his account and the documents produced in support thereof. 17.Neither the notice of appeal nor the applicant’s submission (written or oral) has addressed the adverse findings as to fact made by the Board against him or stated how the judge might have erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or been otherwise plainly wrong. 18.The applicant’s fresh complaints against the duty lawyer and the interpreter at the Board hearing were never raised before the Judge and therefore not open to him to argue before this court. Disposition 19.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the HKBORO. [4] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] Although the applicant did not lodge any further appeal after the 2nd Director’s Decision. |
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