Re Ghous Niaz
Read the full judgment text of CACV 72/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 17 June 2019.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam given on 1 February 2019 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 30 April 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 September 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
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CACV 72/2019 [2019] HKCA 679 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 72 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 810 OF 2018) ___________________________
___________________________ Before: Hon Barma JA and Hon Bharwaney J in Court Date of Hearing: 10 June 2019 Date of Judgment: 17 June 2019 ____________________ J U D G M E N T ____________________ Hon Bharwaney J (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam given on 1 February 2019 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 30 April 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 September 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He entered Hong Kong on 13 September 2012 illegally and was arrested by the police on 15 September 2012. He lodged a torture claim on 17 September 2012 which was refused on 24 January 2013. His appeal against the refusal for his torture claim was dismissed on 11 April 2013. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 21 November 2013 and 16 December 2013. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on threats from 3 cricket players who were jealous of the applicant’s achievement in the cricket team. They kidnapped the applicant and asked him to leave his cricket team. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [2] to [5] of the CALL-1 Form. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 7 September 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the BOR 2 risk[1], BOR 3 risk[2] and the persecution risk[3]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After a hearing on 8 March 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal on 30 April 2018 (“Board’s Decision”). 6.At [28] of the Board’s Decision, the Board accepted that the applicant’s case was credible. However, the Board held at [32] that because the applicant has stopped playing cricket, there is no ground for the three cricket players to be jealous of him anymore. The Board was also satisfied at [37] that state protection would be available for the applicant and at [39] that internal relocation would be viable. The deputy judge’s decision 7.The applicant filed a form 86 on 9 May 2018 which contained no ground for seeking relief. 8.In the affirmation in support of the leave application dated 9 May 2018, the applicant advanced the following grounds for judicial review which are summarised below:
9.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [28] to [38] of the CALL-1 Form:
Grounds for appeal 10.In the Notice of Appeal dated 15 February 2019 the applicant advanced the following grounds of appeal:
11.In his skeleton submissions dated 10 May 2019, the applicant repeated the matters raised in his Notice of Appeal. He asked that his case be remitted to the lower court. 12.The applicant agreed by a letter of 15 February 2019 that the appeal could be heard by two judges. We heard the appeal on 10 June 2019. Discussion 13.All of the grounds of appeal are concerned with language assistance. Even if he is not reasonably proficient in English, it is clear that the applicant had access to language assistance. As the judge rightly noted in [32] of CALL-1 Form, a friend helped him to prepare Form 86 and the affirmation. The applicant had also been assisted by qualified interpreters while he was still represented by the Duty Lawyer Service and during the screening process before the Director and the Board. He was also able to file his Notice of Appeal and his Skeleton Submissions in the English language in which he identified the alleged errors committed by the judge and made submissions on those alleged errors. 14.In our view, the applicant cannot credibly make any complaint, even in relation to the rejection of the claim in respect of “BOR 2” risk, without actually identifying what, if any, relevant additional information he could have provided to the Director and the Board had he been assisted by an interpreter at the times when he alleged he did not have such assistance. We are not satisfied that the applicant suffered any real prejudice from the alleged lack of language assistance. 15.Further, the applicant alleged that the judge did not give weight to his language limitation. This ground is unfounded. The judge has dealt with this issue at [32] of CALL-1 Form. 16.In conclusion, the applicant did not in the notice of appeal or his skeleton submissions identify any error of law by the judge, any relevant matter that he failed to consider, or any other reason why the refusal of leave for judicial review was plainly wrong. Nor can we discern any. 17.There is no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap.383. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap.383 [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. |
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