Kwong Wing Lan v. The Personal Representative of the Estate of Edward Chan Otherwise Known As Chan Tak Tai, Deceased
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 3379/2015 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 3 July 2019.
1. Madam Kwong brought this action to claim a possessory title to a residential unit known as Flat M, 6 th Floor, State Theatre Building, Nos. 277-291 King’s Road, Nos. 4, 4A-D, 6, 6A-D, Java Road, Nos. 2-16 Tin Chong Street, North Point, Hong Kong (“ the Property ”) based on the plea of adverse possession.
Cited by 2 cases
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DCCJ 3379/ 2015 [2019] HKDC 908 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION No. 3379 OF 2015 ____________
____________ Coram: His Honour Judge Kent Yee in Court Date of Hearing: 3 July 2019 Date of Judgment: 3 July 2019 __________________ J U D G M E N T __________________ Introduction 1.Madam Kwong brought this action to claim a possessory title to a residential unit known as Flat M, 6th Floor, State Theatre Building, Nos. 277-291 King’s Road, Nos. 4, 4A-D, 6, 6A-D, Java Road, Nos. 2-16 Tin Chong Street, North Point, Hong Kong (“the Property”) based on the plea of adverse possession. 2.On 19 September 2018, Madam Kwong made an application for default judgment against the defendant and HH Judge Winnie Tsui dismissed her application by the decision of the even date (“the Decision”) for want of service of her Amended Statement of Claim on the defendant. Therefore, Madam Kwong has to prove her case at trial. 3.The procedural history of this action was outlined in the Decision and I shall not repeat the same here. It suffices for me to highlight that Madam Kwong obtained leave from a master to proceed with this action in the absence of a person representing the estate of Mr Edward Chan under Order 15, Rule 15(1), Rules of the District Court on 25 September 2017. This explains the absence of the defendant at the trial hearing. Further, it should be clarified that the official solicitor did give Madam Kwong an acknowledgement of service by their letter dated 16 June 2017 after being served with the amended writ. 4.Madam Kwong is the only live witness at trial and it goes without saying that her evidence concerning her alleged exclusive possession of the Property for more than 12 years prior to the date of the amended writ is not challenged. I should first refer to her pleading. The pleaded case of Madam Kwong 5.In the Amended Statement of claim, Madam Kwong has made the following factual allegations (copied from the actual document):
Evidence of Madam Kwong 6.At trial, Madam Kwong testified in support of her claim. She adopted the contents of her witness statement as part of her evidence. She added that she moved out of the Property in 2018 out of convenience. 7.Her witness statement largely supports the allegations in the Amended Statement of Claim. I am aware that in respect of the alleged occupation of the Property by Madam Chu and Mr Chiu prior to 1987, her evidence is merely hearsay in nature. I have no reason to disbelieve her, nevertheless. 8.Her witness statement aside, I have perused all the documentary evidence. The authenticity of such documents is not in dispute. I find that the following facts are proved by documentary evidence.
9.There is no reason why I should not accept Madam Kwong’s evidence that she started residing at the Property in 1987 with Mr Chiu and continue to reside at the Property despite the death of Mr Chiu until 2018. During the said period, she was in physical possession of the Property to the exclusion of all other persons including Mr Edward Chan or anyone claiming an interest in the Property. In the absence of contrary evidence, I also accept her evidence that she had never obtained the consent or authorization of Mr Edward Chan or his agent and personnel or representative of his estate for her occupation of the Property. Her occupation had never been interrupted by any objection raised by Mr Edward Chan or any one claiming an interest in the Property. 10.I should also make it clear that I accept all the evidence of Madam Kwong in her witness statement. It is, as pointed out above, largely supported by documentary evidence. 11.Based on the foregoing factual findings, I also accept the pleaded case of Madam Kwong that Mr Edward Chan was never in physical possession of the Property but was dispossessed by firstly Madam Chu and Mr Tsang in 1962 and subsequently by Mr Chiu and Madam Kwong. Their physical possession of the Property was never consented to or authorized by Mr Edward Chan. 12.The legal principles relating to adverse possession are well established. Applying those principles to the foregoing factual findings, I can conclude that the two major elements of adverse possession, i.e., physical possession of the Property and intention to possess the Property to the exclusion of all others including the actual paper owner, i.e. animus possidendi, are borne out by the evidence. 13.In the circumstances, I hold that Madam Kwong has been in exclusive possession of the Property for more than 12 years prior to the date of the amended writ herein and Mr Edward Chan’s title to the Property has been extinguished by virtue of sections 7 and 17 of the Limitation Ordinance, Cap. 347 and Madam Kwong has acquired a possessory title to the Property. 14.For completeness, I am satisfied by a rate demand note that the rateable value of the Property falls below the jurisdictional limit of the District Court. Conclusion and Orders 15.For the reasons given, I conclude that Madam Kwong has proved her pleaded case of adverse possession on the balance of probabilities and her claim should be allowed. I enter judgment against the defendant. Madam Kwong is entitled to the two declarations sought in respect of the extinguishment of the rights and interest of Mr Edward Chan over the Property and her possessory title to the Property. I grant the relief accordingly. 16.There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. I make an order that the defendant should pay Madam Kwong costs of this action including all costs previously reserved including certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed. Madam Wong’s own costs should be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations. 17.Lastly, I thank Ms Wong for her assistance in this matter.
Ms Linda Wong, instructed by Tang and So assigned by the Legal Aid Department, for the plaintiff The defendant was not represented and absent |
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