Re Salwant Singh
Read the full judgment text of CACV 164/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 19 July 2019.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam on 19 March 2019 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review.
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CACV 164/2019 [2019] HKCA 805 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 164 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 773/2017) __________________________
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________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________ Hon Lam Acting CJHC (giving the Judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam on 19 March 2019 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. Background 2.The applicant is a national of India. He arrived in Hong Kong on 25 June 2016 and was permitted to remain as a visitor for 14 days. He overstayed here since 10 July 2016 upon the expiry of that permission. He surrendered to the Immigration Department on 13 July 2016. He lodged a claim for non-refoulement protection on 20 July 2016. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on the fear that, if refouled, he would be harmed, or even be killed, by his parents, who were believers in Sikhism, because he intended to marry a Christian. The background facts of this case were summarized by the judge in [1] – [12] of the Form CALL‑1 ([2019] HKCFI 684). 4.By a notice of decision dated 28 December 2016[1], the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) assessed the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds, including the risk of violation of absolute and non-derogable rights guaranteed under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (particularly, the BOR 2 risk[2] and the BOR 3 risk[3]), the persecution risk[4], and the torture risk[5]. 5.The applicant lodged an appeal/petition to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/an adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) against the Director’s decision. An oral hearing was held on 6 September 2017, and the Board dismissed the appeal/petition on 22 September 20171. In its decision, the Board noted that the applicant’s claim was based on bare assertions without evidence in support. He was evasive when he was asked about the political aspects of his claim. The Board considered that his fear of harm by his parents because of religious reasons was not well-founded. There was no credible evidence that his parents wanted to kill or harm him. The Board did not accept that the applicant’s father was as politically influential as the applicant claimed. There was no reliable evidence that the applicant had suffered physical or mental injuries of requisite severity. Nor was there any reliable evidence indicating either the unavailability of state protection or the involvement of the state. The judge’s decision 6.The applicant filed his Form 86 on 17 October 2017, seeking leave to apply for judicial review against the Director’s and the Board’s decisions. He set out the grounds for seeking relief in his affirmation filed on the same day in support of the application. The grounds were summarized by the judge at [24] of the Form CALL-1. 7.An oral hearing was held on 10 August 2018. 8.At [18] of the Form CALL-1, applying the decision of this Court in Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549, the judge held that the applicant could not seek leave for judicial review against the Director’s decision. 9.As mentioned earlier, the judge refused to grant leave to apply for judicial review. His reasons in refusing leave were set out in [29] – [35] of the Form CALL-1 as follows:
The appeal 10.On 2 April 2019, the applicant filed a notice of appeal. In it, the applicant advanced the following grounds of appeal:
11.The applicant lodged his written submission on 14 June 2019. The applicant submitted that,
12.By a letter dated 2 April 2019, the applicant gave consent to this appeal being heard by a 2-member court. 13.Notwithstanding notice of hearing duly given, the applicant failed to turn up for the hearing on 15 July 2019. We proceed to process the appeal on the basis of written materials lodged by the applicant. General principles 14.Before we address the merits of this appeal, we would highlight some general propositions that this Court has adopted in determining an appeal for non-refoulement cases.
Discussion 15.In the present case, the Board rejected the applicant’s claim on the ground that it was not satisfied that the applicant would face a real risk of harm if refouled. As correctly pointed out by the judge at [30] of the Form CALL-1, assessment of risk of harm is within the province of the Board. The court will not interfere with the findings of the Board unless they are reversible on public law grounds. After rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny of the Board’s decision, the judge found no realistic prospect of success to challenge the findings of the Board in the intended judicial review. 16.In this appeal, the applicant asked this Court to reassess his case afresh. As explained above, this is not a permissible course. 17.In our view, nothing stated by the applicant in the notice of appeal or in his written submission constitutes a valid ground of appeal. 18.Having reviewed the materials before us, we cannot see any error on the part of the judge. We agree with the judge that leave to apply for judicial review should be refused. 19.For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant acting in person, absent [1] The applicant did not include the decisions of the Director and of the Board in the Appeal Bundle. We have retrieved these documents from the lower court file. [2] This refers to the violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. [3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. [5] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115). [6] Secretary for Security v Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187, paras 44-45. [7] CACV 219/2018 [2018] HKCA 570, para 14(1). |
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